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Abstract 
 
There is no legal or regulatory definition of what constitutes a “Hedge Fund”, though 
the generally accepted definition is that they are unregulated pools that invest in any 
asset class as well as derivative securities and use long and short positions, as well as 
leverage where the manager is compensated with a proportion of the returns. Hedge 
funds are not new, Alfred Winslow Jones in generally credited with the formation of the 
first hedge fund in 1949, however the industry remained small and relatively unnoticed 
for many years. In 1990 there were just 610 hedge funds managing approximately 
$39bn of capital, however by the end of 2007 the industry had grown to over 10,000 
funds managing almost $2trn of capital. The credit crisis of 2008 which has caused 
hedge funds to suffer both investment losses and investor redemptions means that as of 
the end of 2008 the industry has contracted slightly with over 1,000 funds closing and 
the capital being reduced to $1.5trn. 
 
This thesis contributes to a growing academic literature on hedge funds using both 
theoretical and empirical studies in several ways. In Chapter 2 I outline how the 
particular nature of hedge fund fee contracts affects the distribution of hedge fund 
returns and how using net of fee returns will lead to biased results when applying factor 
models. These facts have been completely ignored thus far in the literature as academics 
have generally applied the same techniques that have been previously used for mutual 
funds. I quantify the effect of ignoring the fee structure by replicating several empirical 
studies using both net and gross returns. In Chapter 3 I present an extensive empirical 
study of how the hedge fund managers adjust the risk of their funds in response to both 
their past returns relative to their high-water mark and their past returns relative to their 
peer group. I then attempt to reconcile these results with the various theoretical models 
that have been proposed. In Chapter 4 I examine the disparity between academic theory 
and practitioner behaviour with regard to the number of hedge funds required in a 
portfolio to adequately diversify risk. I identify a number of shortcomings in the 
original literature and demonstrate that due to the nature of the previous studies their 
conclusions were inevitable. I go on to present my own empirical study which suggests 
that practitioner behaviour of holding much more diverse portfolio is actually rational. 
In Chapter 5 I address the issues documented in the literature with factor models of 
hedge fund returns. As hedge funds follow dynamic trading strategies they tend to 
exhibit non-linear relationships to the standard asset classes. I attempt to overcome this 
problem by introducing time variation and non-linearity in two ways, firstly by using an 
asymmetric factor model where the factor exposures vary according to the state of 
economy and secondly by applying a two state Markov regime switching regression 
model. Adopting these approaches not only leads to an improvement the fit of the factor 
models, it also allows me to investigate if hedge funds alpha varies over time and to 
ascertain whether they deliver this alpha when investors need it most, namely in times 
of recession when the marginal utility of wealth is higher.   
 
 
.
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Academic research on the hedge fund industry is in its infancy when compared to the 
literature on mutual funds. Most of the key papers have been written during the last 
seven years, with the level of interest increasing rapidly in line with the growth of assets 
and the availability of reliable data. Research has followed the framework established 
for mutual funds as many of the same questions need to be answered. The key areas of 
research can be summarised under the following headings:  
 − What biases are present in the available hedge fund data? − What drives hedge fund returns? – Are hedge funds truly absolute return 
vehicles or are there risk factors/exposures common to hedge funds that can 
be used to model the return generation process?  − Are these exposures stable over time? As hedge funds undertake dynamic 
trading strategies are static models capable of capturing the return generating 
process? − How should we measure hedge fund performance, is their a reliable 
benchmark? − What factors affect hedge fund survival rates? − Is there evidence of superior performance and is it persistent over time? − How to construct efficient portfolios of hedge funds? 
 
1.2 BIASES IN HEDGE FUND DATABASES 
 
A central issue in hedge fund research is the reliability of the available data, its 
incomplete nature and the existence of various biases. Unlike mutual funds, a database 
of the complete record of the entire hedge fund universe does not exist. There are two 
main reasons for the incomplete nature of the data. Firstly, reporting of hedge fund 
performance is voluntary, because hedge funds are structured as private investment 
vehicles they do not have to disclose their activities to the public. In order to avoid 
being regulated in the same way as mutual funds hedge funds cannot advertise their 
returns and promote themselves as investments for the general public, however most 
funds do report their returns to commercially available databases which allows them to 
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effectively advertise their returns to accredited investors who subscribe to these 
databases. Secondly, the major commercially available hedge fund databases only came 
into existence in the mid 1990s with data prior to that point backfilled and prior to 1994 
none of the databases retained records of funds that had ceased to report. 
 
Fung and Hsieh (2002c) document that the constructions of hedge fund indices or 
portfolios face four potential sources of bias: survivorship, selection, instant history, and 
multi-sampling biases.  
 
1.2.1 SURVIVORSHIP BIAS  
 
Computing the returns of a portfolio (or index) using only those funds in existence at 
the end of the sample period will bias (most likely upwards) the results as it does not 
reflect the true return earned by an investor who would have invested in all funds 
available at the beginning of the period (alive and dead funds at the end of the period). 
The difference in return between a portfolio of only live funds and live plus dead funds 
is called the survivorship bias. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) used data from 
the US Offshore Funds Directory for 1989-1995 and estimated survivorship bias at 3% 
per annum. Fung and Hsieh (2000c) used the TASS database for 1994-1998 and came 
to the same result of 3% per annum. Malkiel and Saha (2005) also used the TASS 
database and using a longer sample of 1994-2003 estimated the bias to be 3.75% per 
annum.  Liang (2000) examined both the TASS and HFR databases for the period 1993-
1997 and found the bias to be 2.24% for TASS but only 0.39% for HFR.  It is clear that 
these numbers (except for Laing) are significantly higher than the 0.8-1.5% estimates 
for US mutual funds (see Malkiel (1995) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995)). Amin and 
Kat (2003b) estimate the survival bias in the TASS database for the period 1994-2001 
leads to an overestimate in performance of approximately 2% per annum, but point out 
that for smaller funds the bias could be much larger (between 4% and 5%), they also 
point out that survivorship bias will introduce a downward bias in the standard 
deviation, an upward bias in the skewness, and a downward bias in the kurtosis. 
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It must be noted however, that in most cases the above estimates are calculated 
assuming that if a fund leaves the database this is due to liquidation, however a hedge 
fund might chose to stop reporting to a database because they are closed to new 
investment and no longer wish to attract capital. 
 
1.2.2 SELECTION BIAS  
 
As already mentioned not all hedge funds choose to report their performance to data 
vendors. Hedge fund managers are free to decide whether or not to report their 
performance and can choose the data vendor to whom they want to report. Therefore, 
the database population might not be representative of the whole population of hedge 
funds.  
 
Selection bias could result in either an upward or downward bias. If one assumes that 
only funds with good performance want to be included in a database, then the resulting 
bias will clearly be upward. However, funds that have performed well in the past could 
have reached their critical size and have no need to attract new investors, hence they 
will have no more interest to report to databases, resulting in a downward bias. By its 
nature this effect is impossible to observe or quantify, although Fung and Hsieh (2000) 
estimate that these two offsetting effects should result in a negligible bias. 
 
1.2.3 INSTANT HISTORY BIAS (OR BACK-FILLING BIAS) 
 
When a new fund is added to a database it is generally accepted practice that the data 
provider back fills its database with the hedge fund historical returns. Before reporting 
to a data vendor, hedge fund managers usually undergo an incubation period during 
which they trade a smaller amount of capital. As it is unlikely that a fund with poor 
initial performance will begin reporting to a database, this back-filling will result in an 
upward instant history bias.   
 
Estimation of the bias simply entails computing the difference between returns 
excluding and returns including the incubation period. Fung and Hsieh (2000) found 
that the median incubation period was 343 days, they went on to estimate the instant 
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history bias by excluding the first 12 months of reported returns and came to the result 
of 1.4% per annum. Malkiel and Saha (2005) actually calculated the difference between 
backfilled and contemporaneously reported returns and came to a much higher result of 
5.84%.  
 
1.2.4 MULTI-PERIOD SAMPLING BIAS 
 
This bias is not so much a function of the data but rather a function of the construction 
of the study. For most statistical work, the researcher will impose a minimum number of 
data points a fund must have to be included in the sample, in most cases this is 24 or 36 
months. Although all researchers will consider this when constructing their study, Fung 
and Hseih (2000) are the only ones who have attempted to quantify it, for the period 
1994-1998 they find that imposing a restriction of 36 months of data biased returns 
upwards by 0.6%. 
 
1.2.5 BIASES IN THE DATA USED FOR THIS THESIS 
 
The empirical studies in this thesis are conducted on data obtained from the TASS 
database. This database comprises of a “live database” which contains hedge funds that 
are currently reporting as well as a “graveyard database” which contains those funds 
that have previously reported but have now ceased reporting.  
 
In all cases I only use data from 1994 onwards (this was when TASS began retaining 
data on graveyard funds) and use a combination of both the live and graveyard 
databases in order to minimise survivorship bias. I have however calculated what the 
impact of survivorship bias would have been had I not chosen to use the graveyard 
funds. The return of an equally weighted portfolio of all funds from January 1994 to 
December 2007 is 12.69% per annum, while the return of an equally weighted portfolio 
of only funds from the live database is 15.20%, thus the impact of survivorship bias is 
2.51% which is in line with the findings of Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999),  
Fung and Hsieh (2000c) and Amin and Kat (2003b) but somewhat lower than  Malkiel 
and Saha (2005). 
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With regard to instant history bias, following the methodology of Malkiel and Saha 
(2005), I find that the return of an equally weighted portfolio of all funds from January 
1994 to December 2007 with all back-filled information excluded is 9.50% per annum. 
Thus the effect of instant history bias is 3.19% which is between the 1.4% that Fung and 
Hsieh (2000) found and the 5.84% Malkiel and Saha (2005) found.   
 
In chapter 2 I restrict my sample to those funds that have at least 36 reported monthly 
returns. I find that the return of an equally weighted portfolio of all funds from January 
1994 to December 2007 with this restriction leads to a return of 13.43% per annum, i.e. 
an upward bias of 0.74% which is in line with the findings of Fung and Hseih (2000). 
 
1.3 HEDGE FUND RETURN DRIVERS 
 
1.3.1 MICRO-FACTORS 
 
Much research has already been done on the effect on performance of fund specific 
factors such as the size and age of the fund and fee structures. Research in this area has 
been active because not only does it provide an insight into the possible agency and 
return generation issues for a fund it also forms the basis for a framework of selecting 
which one would expect to be the better performing funds.  
 
Unfortunately, the results so far have in many cases been contradictory; this could be 
attributable to differences in data providers, sample periods and model specifications. 
 
1.3.1.1 FUND SIZE 
 
The effect of size on the performance of mutual funds has been extensively investigated. 
Perold and Salomon (1991) illustrate how the theoretical economies of scale for back 
office processing, marketing and research can be counteracted by diseconomies of scale 
stemming from the increased costs associated with larger transactions. As assets under 
management increase, position sizes will also increase, and the portfolio return as a 
percentage of assets will decline. This effect was tested empirically by Indro et al 
(1999).  
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 For hedge funds the results have been somewhat contradictory with some studies 
finding that smaller funds outperform their larger counterparts, but others finding that 
regressing performance on size yields a positive coefficient.  
 
The first paper to test the size versus performance relationship was Liang (1999). Using 
the HFR database with a sample period from 1994-96, the requirement of 36 
consecutive monthly return observations meant his sample only contained 385 funds. 
Using a cross-sectional regression of average monthly returns against various fund 
characteristics he found that the coefficient on fund size was positive and significant 
illustrating a positive relationship between fund assets and performance. However, 
because the assets of the funds are taken only at the end of the period, the results could 
be interpreted as suggesting that successful funds attract more money over time and 
therefore have a positive correlation to past performance.  
Using the MAR database with a sample period of 1990-1998, Edwards and Caglayan 
(2001), examine individual fund returns split by investment style. First they derive 
alphas from a six factor model (similar to Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), these 
six-factor alphas are then regressed on several fund specific factors including fund size 
and the reciprocal of size (in order to capture non-linearity in the size–performance 
relationship). For all hedge funds and for all investment styles except ‘global macro’ 
and ‘global’, both size variables are statistically significant. A positive coefficient on the 
size variable together with a negative coefficient on the size reciprocal variable 
indicates that hedge fund performance increases at a declining rate as fund sizes 
increase. 
 
The opposite result was found by Brorsen and Harri (2002) using a dataset provided by 
LaPorte Asset Allocation and a sample period of 1977-1998. The authors included the 
fund size in regressions of returns and Sharpe ratios against past values as well as style 
analysis. In all cases they found the fund size coefficient to be negative and significant. 
They go on to hypothesise that this result is caused by the fact that hedge funds are 
created to exploit market inefficiencies and that the inefficiencies are finite.  
 
Amenc and Martellini (2003) used the CISDM database, taking a sample of 581 funds 
that have returns from 1996-2003. They calculate the alpha based on a number of 
 19
different models, such as the standard CAPM, a CAPM adjusted for the presence of 
stale prices and an implicit factor model extracted from a principal component analysis. 
They then go on to divide the sample into two equally sized groups by assets under 
management which they call large and small funds and calculate the average alpha for 
the two groups. For all models, the average alpha for large funds exceeds the average 
alpha for small funds and in most cases the difference is statistically significant. As with 
Liang (1999), because the assets of the funds are taken only at the end of the period, the 
results could be interpreted as suggesting that successful funds attract more money over 
time and therefore have a positive correlation to past performance, also the separation of 
the data into small and large funds is an extremely simplistic approach in their study. 
 
A much larger sample was considered by Kazemi and Schneeweis (2003) by combining 
5 different databases (HFR, CISDM, Altvest, Hedgefund.net and TASS) with a sample 
period of 1995-2001. Two size-based portfolios are constructed annually and alphas are 
calculated using both a linear explicit multi-factor model and a stochastic discount 
factor model. The authors find that large or small funds do not uniformly outperform the 
other group.  
 
Herzberg and Mozes (2003) use also combined of 3 different databases (Altvest, 
Hedgefund.net and Spring Mountain Capital) with a sample period of 1995-2001. The 
authors find that smaller hedge funds outright performance is better than larger funds 
but barely significantly, while the difference is significantly positive regarding Sharpe 
ratios.  
 
A proprietary database of 265 hedge funds was used by Hedges (2003) with a sample 
period of 1995-2002. Funds were sorted into 3 annually rebalanced size mimicking 
portfolios and the author found that smaller funds outperform larger funds and also that 
mid-sized funds performed the worst. The author hypothesises that this phenomenon is 
caused by the concept of mid-life crises for hedge funds managers.  
 
Gregoriou and Rouah (2003) use the Zurich Hedge Fund Universe and LaPorte Asset 
Allocation System with a sample period of 1994-99. The authors analyse the correlation 
between the size of hedge funds and the geometric mean return, the Sharpe ratio and the 
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Treynor ratio and find no statistically significant correlation. It must be noted however 
that the sample is only composed of 204 hedge funds and 72 funds of hedge funds. 
Using a the combined TASS, HFR and ZCM/MAR databases over the sample period 
1994-2000, Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) find that larger funds are associated with 
poorer future performance and suggest that hedge funds face decreasing returns to scale. 
In a thorough examination of the factors affecting the lifecycle of hedge funds 
Getmansky (2004) used the TASS database with a sample period of 1994-2003. A 
regression of current returns versus previous assets and a square of previous assets 
yields a positive and significant coefficient on the size of assets as well as a negative 
and significant coefficient on the square, thus implying a positive and concave 
relationship between current performance and past asset size. This result implies that 
there is an optimal size for a hedge fund. The author goes on to analyse individual 
strategies and finds that those that involve illiquid assets display a more concave 
relationship than those which involve liquid assets. 
 
The same TASS database with the same sample period of 1994-2003 was used by 
Ammann and Moerth (2008). The authors rank funds according to their size and 100 
asset percentiles are built for each month. The authors find that the bottom percentiles 
(from the 1st to the 20th) display the lowest returns, while the funds from the 21st to the 
50th percentile display the highest returns. A linear regression reveals a significant 
positive relationship between size and average returns, at the 1% level. A subsequent 
quadratic regression finds a significant concave relationship similar to Getmansky 
(2004). 
 
 
1.3.1.2 FUND AGE  
 
In the mutual fund literature the effect of the age of the manager (which could be seen 
as a proxy for the age of a hedge fund) was considered by Chevalier and Ellison (1999). 
They found that older managers have worse performance than younger managers and 
offered two possible explanations, either younger managers work harder because they 
have a longer career ahead of them and are more likely to be fired for poor performance 
or that better managers tend to leave the industry before they get old. The results for 
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hedge funds are inconclusive with some studies finding that younger funds perform 
better while other find that age is either insignificant or that older funds outperform. 
 
Using a cross-sectional regression of average monthly returns against various fund 
characteristics Liang (1999) found that the coefficient on fund age (in months) was 
negative and significant. The author follows Chevalier and Ellison by hypothesising that 
the managers of younger funds work harder to build their reputations and attract assets. 
Using a combination of the HFR and MAR databases with a sample period 1988-95 
Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) test the effect of fund age on the Sharpe 
ratio. When regressing the Sharpe ratio on several fund characteristics including the age 
of the fund, they find that the resulting coefficient was insignificantly different from 
zero.  
 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) found when regressing their six-factor alphas on several 
fund specific factors, the coefficient for age was positive for all fund categories, but 
only statistically significant for global macro and market neutral.  
 
A slightly different approach was applied by Howell (2001) using the TASS database 
with a sample period of 1994-2000. The author sorts the funds into deciles according to 
their maturity and finds that the youngest decile exhibits a return of 23.2%, while the 
whole sample median exhibits a return of 13.4%, a spread of 980 basis points in favour 
of young funds. However, it is clear that this simplistic methodology overestimates the 
spread because a potentially higher failure rate is not taken into account. The authors 
find that the proportion of failure by age is 7.4% for funds of one year or less, 20.3% for 
two-year-old funds, 18.6% for funds of three years or less, 15.8% for four-year-old 
funds, and 12.9% for five-year-old funds and the regression line of these results shows 
that the failure rate reaches a maximum level at 28 months and then declines at a 
constant rate of 2%-3% points per annum. Once the raw returns are adjusted for this 
failure rate, the authors find that the youngest decile exhibits a return of 21.5%, while 
the whole sample median is 13.9%, a slightly smaller spread of 760 basis points 
compared to the unadjusted returns.  Interestingly, the spread between the decile of 
youngest funds and the decile of oldest funds is 970 points. The authors conclude that 
hedge fund performance deteriorates over time, even when the risk of failure is taken 
into account and consequently, the youngest funds seem particularly attractive. 
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 Boyson (2003) used the TASS database with a sample period of 1994-2000 to analyse 
the relationship between hedge fund manager tenure and fund returns. The author 
examines how both return and risk measures are related to manager tenure and age. The 
results are that when manager tenure increases, risk-taking decreases, and when risk-
taking decreases, returns decrease. Regressions show that each additional year of 
experience is associated with a statistically significant decrease in the annual returns of 
approximately -0.8%. The author hypothesises that this is as a result of increasing career 
concerns over time. 
 
1.3.1.3 LEVEL OF FEES 
 
Performance fees are a unique characteristic of the hedge fund industry. As I will 
demonstrate in chapter 2, the incentive fee can be though of as a call option on a 
percentage of the performance of the fund. The manager of the fund is long this option 
which is given to him by the investors as a reward for managing the fund. The objective 
of this compensation structure is to provide the manager with an incentive to generate 
larger returns. The relationship between the size of the incentive fees and the fund 
returns could work in either direction; it could be that the incentive structure works as it 
is designed or alternatively that those funds who have historically generated strong 
performance can justify larger fees. 
 
Using a cross-sectional regression of average monthly returns against various fund 
characteristics Liang (1999) found that the coefficient on incentive fee was positive and 
significant, with a 1% increase in incentive fee increasing the monthly return by 1.3%  
The effect of incentive fees on the Sharpe ratio was considered by Ackermann, 
McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999). When regressing the Sharpe ratio on several fund 
characteristics including incentive fees, they find that the resulting coefficient was 
positive and significant for 2, 4, 6 and eight year time windows. 
 
De Souza and Gokcan (2003) find that incentive fees and performance are positively 
correlated. The authors hypothesise that higher incentive fees generating higher 
performance can either be explained by the fact that incentive fees are increased when a 
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manager improves his performance or by the fact that the best managers in terms of 
performance demand higher incentive fees. 
 
The effect of incentive fees on alpha was considered by Amenc, Curtis and Martellini 
(2003), they found that for all the models used, funds with high incentive fees (greater 
than or equal to 20%) produced higher alpha than the funds with low incentive fees, 
however, in the case of the implicit factor model the result was not statistically 
significant. 
 
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) model the incentive fee as a call option on the value 
of the fund (taking into account high water marks), they calculate the delta which is the 
dollar change in incentive fee for a 1% change in the fund return. When regressed 
against returns the authors find that the coefficient on the lagged delta is positive and 
significant implying that funds with greater managerial incentives are associated with 
better future performance. 
  
1.3.1.4 LOCKUP AND REDEMPTION PERIOD 
 
The majority of hedge funds only provide limited liquidity to investors, as they often 
specify lock-up periods and withdrawals are subject to notice and redemption periods. 
This allows hedge funds to invest in illiquid securities without worrying about having to 
liquidate investments in order to repay investors. Intuitively one would expect that 
funds who offer less liquidity to investors should generate higher returns and the 
empirical research appears to confirm this as the case. 
Using a cross-sectional regression of average monthly returns against various fund 
characteristics Liang (1999) found that the coefficient on lockup period was positive 
and significant, hypothesising that the lockup period prevents early redemptions, 
reduces cash holdings and allows managers to concentrate on relatively long horizons.   
Using the HFR database with a sample period of 1996-2000, Kazemi, Martin and 
Schneeweis (2002) find that the redemption period seems to positively affect the 
returns. For a similar strategy; funds with a quarterly lockup have higher returns than 
those with a monthly lockup 
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Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) regressed returns against several factors including the 
lockup period and found the coefficient to be positive and significant implying that 
funds with impediments to capital withdrawals are associated with better performance.  
 
1.3.2 MACRO FACTORS 
 
1.3.2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF FACTORS 
 
Most of the empirical work on the effect of macro factors upon hedge fund returns 
builds upon the work of Jensen (1968) and Sharpe (1992). Their framework for the 
analysis of mutual funds involved the development of an asset class factor model to 
determine risk exposures in the form of expression (1)  
 
tkt εFβαRt ++= ∑ k
k
        (1) 
where Rt represents the return on the fund at time t, Fkt represents the return on factor Fk 
at time t, βk represent the sensitivity of the fund to factor Fk and α is the value added by 
the manager.  
 
Sharpe regressed mutual fund returns against twelve asset classes returns and 
interpreted the resulting betas as the mutual funds historical exposures to the asset 
classes. Sharpe results showed that only a limited number of major asset classes were 
required to successfully replicate the performance of the universe of U.S. mutual funds. 
Sharpe’s model is the building block of most risk-return research in hedge funds. 
This approach was first applied to hedge funds by Fung and Hsieh (1997). The hedge 
fund data-set was constructed from an amalgamation of the Paradigm LDC and TASS 
databases with a sample period of 1991-95, extracting those funds with at least $5m 
under management and a minimum of 3 years of monthly return produced a sample of 
320 hedge funds and 89 CTAs. The authors applied Sharpe’s asset class factor model to 
this sample as well as a large sample of mutual funds in order to compare their 
respective exposures. The model assumed that hedge funds returns are linearly related 
to eight asset classes (mimicking portfolios), these classes included 3 equity (MSCI  
U.S. equities, MSCI non-U.S. equities and IFC emerging market equities), 2 bond (JP 
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Morgan U.S government bonds and JP Morgan non-US government bonds), 1 
commodity (gold price), 1 currency (Fed TW dollar index) and 1 cash (1-month 
Eurodollar deposit rate) classes. For each hedge fund and mutual fund they regressed 
monthly returns against the eight asset class factors.  
 
The results were strikingly different for hedge funds (and CTAs) compared to mutual 
funds, 47% of the mutual funds had R-squared higher than 75% and 92% had R-squared 
higher 50% while for hedge funds 48% have R-squared below 25%. The authors 
suggest that these low R-squared are due to hedge funds trading strategies; they vary 
exposures over time and may take long and short positions in the same asset classes. In 
order to address this the authors go on to perform factor analysis and extract 5 principal 
components which explain 43% of the cross sectional return variance, they then 
construct five “style factors” using the hedge funds most correlated with these principal 
components. Applying Sharpe’s style regression on these five style factors yields varied 
results, for Value and Distressed the buy and hold approach explains between 56% and 
70% of the returns but for Global Macro and System trading the results are less 
satisfactory. Finally the authors divide the monthly returns of each asset class into 
quintiles and calculate the average return of each asset class as well as each style factor 
for each state. The results show that the relationship between the style factors and 
standard asset classes is non-linear. The authors conclude that mutual funds tend to 
follow buy-and-hold trading strategies whereas hedge funds follow dynamic trading 
strategies and that these dynamic trading creates option-like returns payoffs. 
 
Subsequent work by Fung and Hsieh and other authors has attempted to improve upon 
the explanatory power of the models using different sets of explanatory variables, 
sample periods and hedge fund databases or concentrating on individual strategies to 
reflect the heterogeneous nature of hedge funds but still within the Sharpe framework. 
The majority of the research has concentrated on either the addition of non-linear 
factors such as options or the use of time varying betas by rolling window regressions or 
statistical techniques such as the Kalman filter. 
 
Schneeweis and Spurgin (1998a) used the Laporte database and a sample period of 
1990-95 as well as a number of hedge fund indices.  The authors ran a multi-factor 
regression analysis using thirteen independent variables, including stock, bond, 
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currency and commodity indices as well as the absolute values and intra-month 
volatilities. They add absolute returns as independent variables to take account of timing 
abilities and volatilities to take into account the use of options strategies. The results 
were similar to Fung and Hsieh with the new factors being rarely statistically significant 
and adding little explanatory power.  
 
For a small sample of 385 hedge funds from the HFR database with at least 36 months 
of consecutive monthly returns Liang (1999) regressed hedge fund returns against eight 
asset class factors (slightly different form those used by Fung and Hsieh). The results 
were similar to Fung and Hsieh though with somewhat higher R-squareds ranging from 
23%-77%. 
 
The merger arbitrage strategy was considered in isolation by Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2000). The authors generate their own return series from 4,750 mergers between 1963 
and 1998 as well as examining the HFR merger arbitrage index for 1990-98. They find 
that returns are strongly and positively correlated with market returns during market 
downturns, but only slightly correlated in flat or booming markets. The authors suggest 
that merger arbitrage fund returns are similar to those obtained from writing uncovered 
index put options on the market index.  
 
Trend following Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) were examined by Fung and 
Hsieh (2001). The authors argue that the systematic risk of trend-followers can not be 
simply observed by a linear factor model because returns tend to be large and positive 
during best and worst performing months of markets. They construct portfolios of 
primitive trend-following strategies (PTFS) using lookback straddles on currencies, 
commodities, interest rates, bonds and stock indices to model the performance of a 
perfect foresight trend-follower. When regressing the trend-following fund returns on a 
standard 8 factor model (similar to Fung and Hsieh 1997) the authors find little 
explanatory power with R-squared of less than 1%, but by using the five PTFS 
portfolios returns, they find an adjusted R-squared of 47.9%. The authors conclude that 
the systematic risk of trend-followers can not be simply observed by a linear factor 
model and this is illustrated by better explanatory power the PTFS have than simple 
buy-and-hold strategies.  
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Using the HFR database and a sample period of 1990-98, Agarwal and Naik (2000a) 
attempt to build upon Fung and Hsieh (1997) by capturing returns from trading strategy 
factors by returns on passive options strategies consisting in buying or writing put and 
call options on standard asset classes. The option strategies examined are buying or 
writing 1-month European puts or calls on the Russell 200 index, the MSCI Emerging 
Markets index, the Salomon Brothers World Government Bond index, the Lehman High 
Yield Composite index and the Federal Reserve Bank Trade-Weighted Dollar index, 
with at the money, half and one standard deviation out of the money strikes. The authors 
examine the returns of the ten hedge funds strategies reported in the HFR database 
individually using a stepwise regression procedure to identify the best independent 
variables. At an individual hedge fund level, they find that trading strategy factors are 
the most significant factors in 54% of cases, and the percentage of total R-squared 
attributable to trading strategy factors is approximately 51%. Thus the introduction of 
simple option positions in the factor model helps greatly in explaining the volatility of 
hedge fund returns with R-squares ranging from 37 to 75%. 
 
The non-linearity of hedge fund returns to market factors are examined by Favre and 
Galeano (2002) using the HFR indices with a sample period 1990-99. Using the non-
linear technique, Loess Fit regression they analyse the relationship between 10 hedge 
fund strategies and the LPP Index (a benchmark index for a Swiss institutional investor 
composed of equities and bonds). The authors find a significant degree of non-linearity 
with four of the ten strategies having concave payoffs (similar to selling options) and 
observe that the diversification benefits of hedge funds tend to disappear in cases of 
extremely negative market returns. 
 
 
 
1.3.2.2 STABILITY OF HEDGE FUND EXPOSURES TO FACTORS  
 
The stability (or non-stability) of exposures is certainly as important as finding 
exposures themselves, once hedge funds risk exposures to different factors have been 
defined, researchers would like to know whether they are stable over time, or not.  
Brealey and Kaplanis (2001) use the TASS database and a sample period of 1994-99, 
they examine a sample of 128 funds which have a continuous record of monthly returns.  
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Initially the authors run a multiple regression using 31 independent variables (including 
equity, bond, currency and commodity variables), they regress each hedge fund strategy 
against what they consider the most relevant factor portfolios to identify average 
exposures. They then go on to test the stability of these exposures using recursive least 
squares, for each fund they use the firstr k+1 observations to obtain the first estimate of 
the slope coefficients and then, repeatedly, add one observation to the data set to revise 
the estimate. At each step, the last estimates of the regression coefficients are used to 
provide a one-step ahead forecast for the dependant variable and the recursive residual 
is calculated as the forecast error from this prediction scaled by its standard error. If the 
coefficients were stable then the recursive residuals will be independently and normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance. For the whole sample the null 
hypothesis of stability is rejected in 75% of cases. The authors conclude that although 
they have identified instability in the coefficients, monthly data is insufficient to pick up 
short-term variations due to the trade-off between increasing the number of datapoints 
and using more dated information. They find that 36 months of data minimises the out-
of-sample forecasting error. 
 
Gehin and Vaissie (2005) examine the EDHEC Alternative Indices with a sample 
period 1997-2004. The authors begin by determining a static model for the 9 indices 
identifying the significant factors from a sample of 18 risk factors including volatility, 
credit spread and term spread as well as more traditional factors. They go on to use the 
Kalman Smoother approach to analyse the relative importance of static and dynamic 
betas. They conclude that on average static betas account for 51.5% of the variability in 
returns with dynamic betas accounting for 23.6%. In terms of the level of returns, static 
betas account for almost 100% with the dynamic betas actually being negative. The 
authors give no indication of the statistical significance of the factors or measurement of 
the performance of the models so the results are hard to interpret.  
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1.4 HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE AND ITS 
PERSISTENCE 
 
1.4.1 DO HEDGE FUNDS GENERATE ABNORMAL RETURNS? 
 
Following Sharpe (1992), one can interpret intercept term of asset class factor model 
(Jensen’s alphas) as the unexplained performance or abnormal return of a fund. 
Therefore the fund is deemed to have generated an abnormal return if this intercept is 
significantly positive. Many authors have investigated the abnormal performance of 
hedge funds and the results are inconclusive, no doubt in part because this is a joint test 
of performance and of the model employed.  
 
Using an eight factor model Liang (1999) finds abnormal positive returns for 7 out of 16 
hedge fund strategies. Performance ranges from 0.64% to 1.26% per month (7.68% to 
15.12% per year). For 2 strategies (growth and market neutral), he finds abnormal 
negative returns (-5.22% and -1.56% per month respectively). For the 7 others, he does 
not find any significant alpha. These figures are corrected for survivorship bias, but not 
for other biases.  
 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) employ a six factor model and find significant positive 
alphas for 25% of individual funds. The average alpha ranges from 1.08% to 2.38% per 
month (12.96% to 28.56% per year). These figures are corrected for survivorship and 
instant history biases, but the authors mention that a selection bias may exist in the 
performance measure.  
 
Using the HFR database for the sample period 1990-98 (adjusting for survivorship bias 
of 0.3%pm), Agarwal and Naik (2000a) find significant positive alphas for 35% of 
hedge funds. Dividing the sample into 2 equal sub-periods they find that 38% had 
significant alpha in the first period while only 28% had in the second period. 
Agarwal and Naik (2000b) examine the ten HFR hedge fund indices for the sample 
period 1994-98 using an eight factor model. The authors find that all of the indices 
(which are adjusted for survivorship bias) had significant positive alpha ranging from 
0.53% to 1.25% per month. 
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An alternative approach to the performance problem is taken by Amin and Kat (2003a). 
The authors note that traditional measures such as Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe Ratio 
assume the normality of asset return distributions and the linearity of the relationship 
with respect to selected benchmarks which is not the case with hedge funds. Instead 
they propose a so-called efficiency test based on the payoff distribution pricing model 
of Dybvig (1988). The authors analyse the returns of 13 hedge fund indexes and 77 
individual funds taken from the MAR database from May 1990 to April 2000 and find 
that the average hedge fund makes for quite an inefficient investment, but that a major 
part of the inefficiency costs of individual funds can be diversified away by investing in 
a portfolio of hedge funds or index. 
 
Ibbotson and Chen (2005) use the TASS database with a sample period 1994-2004. The 
authors use a three factor model (factors used S&P 500 total return, U.S. Intermediate 
Government Bond returns, and U.S. Treasury Bills), with the constraint that all style 
weights sum to one but allowing individual weights to be negative or above one to 
account for shorting and leverage. They also include lagged betas as well as 
contemporaneous betas to control for the stale pricing impact on hedge fund returns. 
The results are that the pre-fee return from an equally weighted index of hedge funds is 
12.8%, which consisted of fees (3.8%), alpha (3.7%) and returns from the betas (5.4%). 
The authors conclude that although the returns from the systematic betas exceeded the 
post-fee alpha, the alpha was approximately equal to the amount paid in fees giving 
what they consider to be a reasonable result that during the period the excess returns 
(gross alpha) were almost shared equally between the managers and the investors. 
 
1.4.2 MARKET TIMING 
 
Given the evidence above that hedge funds follow dynamic trading strategies it is 
logical to attempt to identify if this dynamic trading is profitable i.e. can hedge fund 
mangers time the market? Market timing is a performance-enhancing strategy that 
adjusts fund beta based on the manager’s market return forecast and there is a large 
strand of academic literature that examines this for traditional mutual fund mangers 
which has could be extended to examine hedge funds. Two widely applied models of 
market timing are Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981). 
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 Treynor and Mazuy (1966) argued that if a fund manager possesses the market timing 
skills, he will hold a greater proportion of the market portfolio whenever the return on 
the market is expected to be high and vice versa. Thus, the portfolio return will be a 
nonlinear function of the market return as described by expression (2) 
 ( ) ( ) tiftmTMftmiifti RRRRRR ,2,,, ετβα +−+−+=−           (2) 
 
If TMτ is positive and significant then the fund manager possesses timing ability. 
 
An alternative approach was proposed by Henriksson and Merton (1981). This model 
assumes the mutual fund manager has information about the direction of the market 
returns only, and not about the size of the return. Accordingly, the manager is assumed 
to receive a binary signal, which can take two distinct values depending on the true 
outcome of the market return, and based on those two signals, one of the two values of 
the portfolioβ  is chosen. In this case, the portfolio return can be expressed as a function 
of the market return by expression (3) 
 ( ) ( )[ ] tiftmHMftmiifti RRMaxRRRR ,,,, 0; ετβα +−−+−+=−           (3) 
 
where ( )[ ]0;, ftm RRMax −−  is an indicator function, which takes the value of one when 
the market return is above the risk-free rate and zero otherwise. Once again if TMτ is 
positive and significant then the fund manager possesses timing ability 
 
Chen and Liang (2007) test the market timing ability of a sample off 221 hedge funds 
who classify their strategy as market timing using both the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
and the Henriksson and Merton (1981) approaches. The authors find that the market 
timing coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level for both specifications. 
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1.4.3 IS THERE EVIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE? 
 
Testing for performance persistence is of major interest to both academics and 
practitioners. For academics measurement is a question of efficiency while for 
practitioners it is a question as to whether it is correct to base their allocation decisions 
on the track record of a fund. In the case of hedge funds it is extremely important to 
examine whether persistence is sensitive to the length of return measurement intervals 
because of the lockup and redemption periods demanded by the managers. Even if 
performance persistence is proven, if the persistence is shorter than the lock-up or 
redemption frequency then allocation based upon this will not be profitable.  
 
Although some studies present conflicting results, there are some clear themes to the 
findings. There appears to be fairly strong evidence of short-term persistence, for 
horizons of up to six months, but this persistence weakens as one lengthens the 
measurement horizon.  
 
Persistence can be tested by either a parametric or non-parametric methods. A 
parametric test for performance persistence involves regression of the return of the 
current period (explained variable) against the return for the previous period or periods 
(explanatory variable). When returns are regressed against lagged returns, if the result is 
a statistically significant positive coefficient then this is evidence of performance 
persistence. i.e. a hedge fund that performs well/badly over the previous period will also 
perform well/badly in the current period.  
 
Non-parametric tests for performance persistence are based on the construction of a 
two-way winner-and loser contingency table. Winners are funds whose return is higher 
than the median return of all the funds following the same strategy over this period, and 
losers are funds whose return is lower. Persistence is defined as funds that are either 
winners over two consecutive periods (WW) or funds which are losers over two 
consecutive periods (LL) while non-persistence will be either WL or LW. 
 
Once the contingency tables have been constructed there are a number of different 
methods to test the significance of the results. 
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 Under the cross product ratio (CPR) test, the CPR is defined by expression (4) 
 
)*(
)*(
LWWL
LLWWCPR =               (4) 
 
Under the null hypothesis of no persistence, the ratio is equal to 1 because each of the 
four categories WW, LL, WL and LW represent 25% of all the funds. The statistical 
significance of CPR is tested via the calculation of the Z-statistic from expression (5)   
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A Z-statistic greater than 1.96 indicates significant persistence at a 5% confidence level. 
An alternative to the CPR approach is to use a chi-squared test which compares the 
distribution of observed frequencies of the four categories with the expected frequencies 
of the distribution. 
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where Oi is the observed number of funds in each case of the contingency table, and Ei 
is the expected number of funds in each case, the degree of freedom is equal to 1 in the 
case of a table with 2 lines and 2 columns. 
 
Using the TASS database with a sample period 1995-1998 Agarwal and Naik (2000b) 
investigate performance persistence by both a parametric (regression) and non-
parametric (contingency table) methodology. Comparing abnormal returns and appraisal 
ratios for each e fund to the average return of funds following the same strategy, they 
find some degree of persistence. However it appears that this is mainly due to losers 
remaining losers rather than winners remaining winners.  
 
Agarwal and Naik (2000c) use the HFR database with a sample period of 1982-98. 
Using a similar framework to Agarwal and Naik (2000b) the authors begin by analysing 
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hedge fund performance persistence for quarterly, half yearly and yearly intervals. They 
find evidence of persistence in short run (quarterly returns) but this reduces when one 
moves to yearly returns and persistence does not seem to be related to the hedge fund 
strategy. The authors then go on to analyse persistence in a multi-period framework 
using the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, they find that the level of persistence is 
considerably smaller in a multi-period framework than in the two period framework. 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) also investigate performance persistence using both a 
parametric (regression) and non-parametric (contingency table) methodologies over a 
one and two year horizon. The authors find evidence of persistence at both one and two 
year horizons for both winners and losers.  
 
A proprietary database provided by Financial Risk Management with a sample period of 
1992-2000 was used by Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2003). Using a non-parametric test 
they analyse performance persistence over 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 12-month 
time horizons by comparison to the median performance of funds following the same 
strategy. The authors find that as the time horizon lengthens the percentage of managers 
who show relative persistence decreases, at the one month horizon 25% of funds display 
persistence (13% positive and 12% negative) while at the 1 year horizon only 12% 
display persistence (6% positive and 6% negative). They also note that for most 
strategies the proportion of managers consistently performing above or below the 
median is generally equally distributed. The authors go on to test the performance 
persistence of hedge fund portfolios, using 1, 3, 5, 12, 18 and 36 month formation and 
holding period for hedge fund portfolios. The funds are ranked according to 
performance and then 10 portfolios of 20 funds are formed (5 best and 5 worst 
performing) , once again they find strong evidence of short term persistence comparable 
to the “hot hands” effect documented by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) for 
mutual funds. Finally the authors test for persistence in alpha using a model based on 
PCA factors. Using a 36 month formation period they find little evidence of 
performance persistence. 
 
By combining the MAR and HFR databases Capocci and Hubner, (2003) obtain a 
sample of 2,796 funds for the period of 1984-2000. They investigate persistence by 
ranking funds into deciles based on the estimated alpha from a multi-factor model and 
testing the significance of the spreads of returns between the deciles. The authors find 
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no evidence of persistence in annual mean returns for best and worst performing funds 
they do however find evidence of persistence for middle decile funds. They hypothesize 
that this might be because although some hedge fund managers take large risks which 
cause them to have very high or low returns for short periods, the majority of hedge 
fund managers follow less risky strategies, which allow them to outperform the market 
for longer periods of time. 
 
Kat and Menexe (2002) use the TASS database with a sample period 1994-2001. On the 
basis of the mean returns from the June 1994-November 1997 and December 1997-May 
2001 periods, and according to the CPR test, they find no evidence of persistence for all 
the hedge funds considered as a group and for the strategies analysed one by one. 
Parametric tests indicate significant persistence for funds of funds and emerging market 
strategies. 
 
The TASS database is also used by Baquero, G., Horst, J. and M. Verbeek, (2005) with 
a sample period 1994-2000. At a 3 month horizon they find evidence of positive 
persistence in raw fund returns, with the best performing 20% to 30% of the funds are 
expected to provide above average returns in the subsequent evaluation period. At a 12 
month horizon the pattern is also consistent with positive persistence, though not 
statistically significant. After adjusting for risk by subtracting from the raw hedge fund 
returns the return of the corresponding style benchmark, at the quarterly and annual 
horizons, they find that on average the top deciles outperform their style benchmark 
 
1.5 HEDGE FUND SURVIVAL RATES 
 
Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) found the annual attrition rate to be 20% per 
year for the period 1989-95 using the US Offshore Funds Directory, but subsequent 
studies using other databases have found much lower rates. Liang (2000) finds that the 
annual hedge-fund attrition rate is 8.3% for the 1994–1998 sample period using TASS 
data, and Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2005) find a slightly higher rate of 8.6% for the 
1994–2000 sample period. Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001b) find that half-life of 
the TASS hedge funds is exactly 30 months, while Brooks and Kat (2002) estimate that 
approximately 30% of new hedge funds do not make it past 36 months and Amin and 
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Kat (2003b) find that 40% of hedge funds do not make it to the fifth year. Howell 
(2001) observed that the probability of hedge funds failing in their first year was 7.4%, 
only to increase to 20.3% in their second year.  
 
Liang (2000), Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2002b), Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2005) and 
Getmansky, Lo, and Mei (2004) all find that surviving funds outperform non-surviving 
funds.  The authors also find that investment style, size, and past performance are 
significant factors in explaining survival rates. Getmansky (2004) finds that the 
liquidation probabilities of individual hedge funds depend on fund-specific 
characteristics such as past returns, asset flows, age, and assets under management.  
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003),  De Souza and Gokcan (2003), Agarwal, Daniel, 
and Naik (2004) and Getmansky (2004), all find that funds with higher returns tend to 
receive higher net inflows and funds with poor performance suffer withdrawals and, 
eventually, liquidation. 
 
1.6 STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF HEDGE FUND 
RETURNS 
 
Brooks and Kat (2002) carried out a comprehensive study of 48 hedge fund indices 
from various providers for a sample period of 1995-2001. The authors found that in a 
traditional mean-variance framework hedge fund indices appear superior to traditional 
asset classes. However they also find that most hedge fund index returns are not 
normally distributed and exhibit negative skewness and excess kurtosis, the implication 
being that the Sharpe ratio overestimates the benefits of hedge funds. The authors also 
find that most of the indices exhibit significant positive autocorrelation coefficients 
(possibly as a result of marking to market of illiquid securities), which will result in the 
volatility of hedge fund returns being biased downwards. The authors implement a 
methodology commonly used in the real estate finance literature to unsmooth the hedge 
fund’s data series in order to assess the impact of autocorrelation, the result being 
significantly higher standard deviation estimates and consequently lower Sharpe ratios. 
The authors also illustrate that hedge funds do not appear to be perfectly un-correlated 
with traditional asset class returns, hedge fund returns are generally low and negatively 
correlated with bond indexes, but they present relatively high and positive correlation 
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coefficients with equity indexes (especially the Russell 2000), the implication being that 
part of the hedge funds’ systematic risk is market risk.  
 
Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) further investigate the issue of serial correlation 
using a sample of 908 funds from the TASS database with at least five years of returns 
history during the period 1977-2001. The authors find that 3 possible sources of serial 
correlation in hedge fund returns: time-varying expected returns, time-varying leverage 
and incentive fees with high-water marks cannot fully explain the high levels of serial 
correlation and so focus on the combination of illiquidity and smoothed returns. The 
authors propose methods for estimating the smoothing, a moving-average process and a 
simpler model based on linear regression under the assumption that true returns are 
generated by the linear single-factor model. 
 
Agarwal , Daniel and Naik (2006) merge the CISDM, HFR, MSCI and TASS databases 
for the sample period 1994-2002 and find that average hedge fund return in December is 
two and a half times the average for the rest of the year. The authors investigate whether 
this December spike can be explained by an increase in the funds’ risk exposures, by 
higher factor risk premiums or by funds’ free-riding on end-of-year gaming by mutual 
funds but find that instead the spike arises due to funds managing their returns upwards 
in December. This is achieved by adding back in December the under-reported returns 
during earlier months of the year and by borrowing from future returns. The authors 
also find that the spike is more pronounced among funds whose incentive fee contracts 
are near-the-money and whose performance lags their peers, indicating that incentives 
may be driving the return management behaviour. 
 
1.7 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
As already mentioned the findings of Brooks and Kat (2002) and Getmansky, Lo and 
Makarov (2004) imply that the Sharpe ratio overestimates the benefits of hedge funds. 
Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2002) focus on methods to manipulate 
portfolio returns to achieve high Sharpe ratios and related measures. They derive the 
optimal strategy and show that the payoff structure resembles a portfolio that is short 
different fractions of out-of-the-money puts and calls, such that the fund distribution is 
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left skewed because high Sharpe ratio strategies are, by definition, strategies that 
generate regular, modest profits punctuated by occasional crashes. 
 
Bacmann and Scholz (2003) use various hedge fund indices and a sample period of 
1994-2003 to compare the efficiency of the various performance indicators. The authors 
examine the ranking of the performance of 44 indices by the Sharpe ratio, the Sortino 
ratio, the Omega and the Stutzer index. The authors find that when compared to the 
Sharpe ratio rankings, using Sortino ratio 28 have the same ranking, 8 are upgraded and 
8 are downgraded. Using Omega 36 have the same ranking, 3 are upgraded and 5 are 
downgraded and using Stutzer 37 have the same ranking, 3 are upgraded and 4 are 
downgraded.  These results imply that despite its drawbacks, generally the Sharpe ratio 
does an adequate job of ranking funds. 
 
1.8 CAPACITY 
 
The question of capacity at individual fund level has been addressed by many authors 
who have considered whether fund size affects performance. Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 
(2004), Getmansky (2004) and Ammann and Moerth (2008) all find decreasing returns 
to scale for individual funds. More specifically the latter 2 papers find that the 
relationship is concave implying that there is an optimal fund size. 
 
Gehin and Vaissie (2005) examine the EDHEC Alternative Indices with a sample 
period 1997-2004. After identifying significant factors from a sample of 18 risk factors 
including volatility, credit spread and term spread as well as more traditional factors, the 
authors calculate alpha from both a static model and a dynamic model using the Kalman 
Smoother approach. The authors term the alpha from the static model “total alpha” and 
from the dynamic model “pure alpha”. They hypothesise that the level of pure alpha 
depends on the quantity of market opportunities that are available to hedge fund 
managers (market capacity), while the level of value added through dynamic betas 
depends on the ability of hedge fund managers to time factors (fund capacity). When 
examining time series of total alpha and pure alpha the authors come to two major 
conclusions; firstly there is no clear evidence of a declining trend for alpha which 
indicates that the recent lower returns are not as a result of a capacity effect, secondly 
because in most cases the trend of dynamic betas is much more pronounced than that of 
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pure alpha, hedge fund strategies' alpha is more limited by manager capacity than by 
market capacity. 
 
Belratti and Morana (2005) use the TASS database with a sample period of 1984-2004 
to and examine the linkage between flows and returns for nine categories of hedge fund 
strategies in order to determine whether hedge funds contribute to market efficiency 
through a negative correlation between flows and returns and specifically whether we 
are “in a phase of exhaustion of arbitrage opportunities” (capacity constrained). The 
authors use a construct a VAR model which incorporates time variability of the 
intercept and allows measurement of the interaction between flows and both returns and 
excess returns. They find, flows tend to depend positively on lagged returns, while 
returns tend to depend negatively on lagged flows only in 60% of the cases and 
conclude that the results are not consistent with the view that an excess supply of 
arbitrage capital has exhausted the set of available opportunities (capacity constraint). 
 
1.9 FUNDS-OF-FUNDS AND DIVERSIFICATION 
 
A fund-of-funds (FOF) is a hedge fund that invests in other hedge funds. Data from 
HFR shows that between 1994 and 2008 the number of FOFs has grown from 291 to 
2,368 and as of the end of 2008 assets managed by funds-of-funds represents 
approximately 40% of the total assets managed by the hedge fund industry. A similar 
structure called a manager-of-managers exists in the mutual fund world but has been 
much less popular; there are several possible explanations for this 
 
i. FOFs can allow investors to obtain exposure to hedge fund investments 
that are otherwise closed to individual investors. 
ii. Funds-of-funds generally have much lower required investment 
minimums than those required by individual hedge funds 
iii. Funds-of-funds provide investors access to a diversified portfolio of 
hedge funds which would otherwise require a prohibitively large amount 
of capital to replicate. 
iv. Funds-of-funds provide access to information and professional due 
diligence that would otherwise be difficult and expensive to obtain. 
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However, despite all of the advantages listed above, investors in funds-of-funds pay a 
significant price. Not only does a FOFs pass on all of the fees charged by the underlying 
hedge funds in the FOFs’ portfolio, they also charge their own management and 
performance fees. In the TASS database, the average management fee charged by 
funds-of-funds is 1.56% and the average FOFs’ incentive fee is 7.89%. These fees are 
on top of an average management fee of 1.48% and an average incentive fee of 18.45% 
for individual hedge funds, so a FOFs investor is paying a total management fee of over 
3% as well as foregoing over one quarter of the upside performance. 
 
Brown, Goetzmann and Liang, (2003) use the TASS database with a sample period 
1989-2000 to investigate the performance of  FOFs compared to individual hedge funds 
and the impact of double layer of fees. The authors find that FOFs do indeed provide 
significant diversification benefits, the standard deviation of monthly FOF returns are 
one third lower than for individual hedge funds (2.86% versus 4.75%). However they 
also find that the average monthly after-fee return for FOFs is 0.86%, compared to the 
1.38% return for hedge funds over the same period (the authors note that some of this 
discrepancy may be due to some extreme outliers as the median monthly after-fee return 
for FOFs is 0.79% versus 1.05% for hedge funds. Thus the Sharpe ratio is lower for 
FOFs than for individual hedge funds. They go on to analyse the impact of fees both at 
the individual fund and FOF level and conclude that the major reason for the 
underperformance of FOFs is the fee structure, mainly because the ultimate investor, 
not the FOF manager, bears the cost of incentive fees incurred whether or not the FOF 
makes money. They propose an alternative fee structure where the FOF would absorb 
the incentive fees generated by the individual managers in return for an enhanced 
incentive fee at the FOF level which would better incentivize the FOF manager. 
 
Ineichen (2002) undertakes a largely qualitative assessment of the FOF industry as well 
as quantitave examples of FOF portfolio construction. The author concludes that FOFs 
add value because the hedge fund market is “informationally inefficient”, however he 
goes on to point out that over time the fees are correlated with the set of exploitable 
opportunities. 
 
A number of authors have replicated the methodology pioneered by Evans and Archer 
(1968) for portfolios of stocks and applied it to portfolios of hedge funds. Both Amin 
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and Kat (2002) and L’Habitant and Learned (2002) examine the time series standard 
deviation of returns of randomly selected equally weighted portfolios of hedge funds of 
increasing size. The authors find that that the mean standard deviation of the portfolios 
falls at a decreasing rate as the number of hedge funds in the portfolio increases and 
conclude that portfolios of between 10 and 15 funds are adequately diversified. In 
chapter 4 I demonstrate that due to the nature of these studies, it is inevitable that their 
conclusions about the number of hedge funds coincide with the findings of Evans and 
Archer (1968) for portfolios of stocks. 
 
Kat (2004) investigates whether it is possible for a FOF to offer investors access to a 
diversified basket of hedge fund whilst at the same time offering protection against 
negative skewness. The author proposes two possible solutions, either buying stock 
index puts plus leveraging or buying puts on the fund itself. The author concludes that 
though neither strategy is perfect they can both achieve the desired outcome. 
 
Alexander and Dimitriu (2005) use the HFR database with a sample period 1990-2003 
and attempt to develop a fund selection and optimal allocation process for FOFs. The 
authors apply 4 different factor models to identify alpha; a "base case" model that only 
has two factors (U.S. equities and Bonds), a “broad fundamental” model (using 17 
factors covering equities, bonds, currencies, commodities and volatility), an “HFR” 
model (using the HFR indices as factors) and a “PCA” model (using investable 
portfolios replicating the first four orthogonal components from principal components 
analysis). Although the authors find substantial differences in the alphas estimated from 
the four different factors models, they find significant agreement on the sign of alpha 
and on the rank of a funds' alpha. They go on to test the performance of minimum 
variance portfolios based on selecting those funds with alpha significant at the 10% 
level versus both an equally weighted portfolio of all funds and to that of a randomly 
selected minimum variance portfolio. Using the period 1990-97 to calibrate and 1998-
2003 as the out of sample test with six monthly rebalancing, the authors find that  the 
performance of the portfolio based on alpha is superior to that of an equally weighted 
portfolio of all funds and to that of randomly selected minimum variance optimal 
portfolio. 
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1.10 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS TO THE 
LITERATURE 
 
This thesis contributes to a growing academic literature on hedge funds using both 
theoretical and empirical studies in several ways.  
In Chapter 2 I outline how the particular nature of hedge fund fee contracts affects the 
distribution of hedge fund returns and how using net of fee returns will lead to biased 
results when applying factor models. These facts have been completely ignored thus far 
in the literature as academics have generally applied the same techniques that have been 
previously used for mutual funds. I quantify the effect of ignoring the fee structure by 
replicating several empirical studies using both net and gross returns.  
In Chapter 3 I present an extensive empirical study of how the hedge fund managers 
adjust the risk of their funds in response to both their past returns relative to their high-
water mark and their past returns relative to their peer group. I then attempt to reconcile 
these results with the various theoretical models that have been proposed.  
In Chapter 4 I examine the disparity between academic theory and practitioner 
behaviour with regard to the number of hedge funds required in a portfolio to 
adequately diversify risk. I identify a number of shortcomings in the original literature 
and demonstrate that due to the nature of the previous studies their conclusions were 
inevitable. I go on to present my own empirical study which suggests that practitioner 
behaviour of holding much more diverse portfolio is actually rational.  
In Chapter 5 I address the issues documented in the literature with factor models of 
hedge fund returns. As hedge funds follow dynamic trading strategies they tend to 
exhibit non-linear relationships to the standard asset classes. I attempt to overcome this 
problem by introducing time variation and non-linearity in two ways, firstly by using an 
asymmetric factor model where the factor exposures vary according to the state of 
economy and secondly by applying a two state Markov regime switching regression 
model. Adopting these approaches not only leads to an improvement the fit of the factor 
models, it also allows me to investigate if hedge funds alpha varies over time and to 
ascertain whether they deliver this alpha when investors need it most, namely in times 
of recession when the marginal utility of wealth is higher.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE GROSS TRUTH ABOUT HEDGE FUND  
PERFORMANCE AND RISK: THE IMPACT 
OF INCENTIVE FEES 
 
Abstract 
Factor models are frequently applied to hedge fund returns in an attempt to separate 
the return from identified risk factors (beta) and from manager skill (alpha). More 
recently, these same techniques have been used to replicate the returns from hedge fund 
strategies with varying degrees of success. In this chapter I show that due to the 
particular nature of hedge fund incentive contracts, the use of net of fee returns can 
lead to considerably biased estimates of factor exposures which can distort the picture 
of fund manager performance. The solution I propose is to model the gross returns of 
hedge funds and the incentive fees independently, which gives a truer representation of 
the underlying return generating process. Using a large sample of hedge funds, I 
quantify the effect of this bias on both performance attribution and replication.  I find 
that using net of fee returns understates the return attributable to beta by up to 58 basis 
points per annum. Following from this I find that some of the additional beta exposure 
can be captured by basing replication on gross rather than net returns. I also 
investigate the distribution of returns conditional upon the delta of the incentive option 
and find that the standard deviation is considerably higher for those managers who find 
themselves significantly above or below their high water mark, which could be 
interpreted as evidence of increased risk taking. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the key differences between hedge funds and traditional investments is the fee 
structure. While mutual funds charge only a management fee that is a flat percentage of 
the assets under management, hedge funds generally also charge an incentive fee that is 
a proportion of  any positive returns. 
 
In this chapter I will demonstrate that this incentive fee is effectively a call option on a 
proportion of the performance of the fund which is given to the hedge fund manager by 
the investors. I will also demonstrate that the fact that incentive fees are usually 
accompanied by a high-water mark provision means that hedge fund fees are both time-
varying and path-dependent, and hence the relationship between gross and net of fee 
returns is non-linear.  
 
These facts have extremely important implications for the analysis of hedge fund 
performance as all of the reported returns are net of fees. Firstly, a flat management fee 
structure will simply cause the mean net return to be lower than the gross return leaving 
all other moments of the distribution unchanged, whereas the introduction of an 
incentive fee will affect all moments of the distribution. Secondly, since incentive fees 
are a function of the gross return, using net of fee returns can lead to considerably 
biased estimates of factor exposures which can distort the picture of fund manager 
performance. I illustrate these facts both by the use of stylised examples and empirical 
hedge fund data.  
 
The solution I propose is to model the gross returns of hedge funds and the incentive 
fees independently, which gives a truer representation of the underlying return 
generating process. In order to do this I present an algorithm that can be used to 
calculate gross returns from the information contained in the TASS hedge fund 
database.  
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2.2 HEDGE FUND FEE CONTRACTS 
 
Investors in hedge funds are generally charged an annual management fee that can 
range anywhere from 1% to 3% of assets under management, and also an incentive fee 
which is typically between 10% and 30% of annual profits, based upon the fund’s 
overall performance. It is argued that the annual management fee is designed to cover 
the fund’s operating costs while the incentive fee “incentivizes” the manager to produce 
absolute returns. This incentive fee is typically subject to two constraints: a “hurdle 
rate” and a “high-water mark”. The hurdle rate is a benchmark return that must be 
exceeded before the performance incentive fees are payable.  In practice, this hurdle rate 
is often set at zero, although benchmarks such as LIBOR are also common. The high-
water mark means that each investor only pays performance fees when the value of their 
investment is greater than its previous highest value, which ensures that an investor only 
pays an incentive fee for positive performance once any previous underperformance has 
been recouped.   
 
Figure 2.1: Management and Incentive Fees Payable Relative to Gross Fund 
Performance 
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This figure depict fees payable to a hedge fund manager who charges a 2% management fee and a 20% incentive fee for various 
levels of gross return. 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates how the total fees payable for a fund that charges a 2% 
management fee and 20% incentive fee (with no high-water mark) vary according to 
performance. Until the fund generates a return of 2% to cover the management fee, no 
incentive fee is payable; thereafter, the incentive fees are 20% of the total performance 
above the 2% threshold. The payoff profile of this fee contract is identical to a call 
option on 20% of the fund performance with a strike of 2%. 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates how a high-water mark provision means that the incentive fees not 
only depend upon the total return of the fund, but also on how these returns evolve over 
time. In the first year, the fund is profitable and incentive fees that accrue throughout 
the year are paid at the end of year one; at this point, a high-water mark is set. During 
the first part of the second year, fees continue to accrue, but these fees reverse when the 
performance turns negative, with the result that no fees are payable at the end of the 
year. Only when the high-water mark set at the end of year one is passed do fees begin 
to accrue once more. The effect of the high-water mark is that the strike price of the 
incentive fee option is no longer simply the return required to cover the management 
fee, but instead is the return required to reach the high-water mark where incentive fees 
will begin to accrue. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Effect of a High-Water Mark Provision on Incentive Fees 
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This figure illustrates the effect of a high-watermark provision on the incentive fees that are payable over a three year period for a 
hypothetical hedge fund. 
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The existence of such incentive fees and high-watermark provisions means that hedge 
fund fees are both time-varying and path-dependent, and therefore that the relationship 
between gross and net of fee returns is non-linear.  
 
2.3 THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVE FEES ON THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNS 
 
In order to investigate the effect of incentive fees on the distribution of returns I use 
Monte Carlo simulation. I simulate the gross return of 5,000 funds over a 100 year 
history, assuming that the underlying gross returns are 1% per month with a 5% 
standard deviation (comparable to historical equity market returns), and then compare 
the effect on net returns of only charging a 2% annual management fee with the effect 
of charging both a 2% management fee and a 20% incentive fee (with a high-water 
mark). The results of this simulation are presented in figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Monte-Carlo Simulation of the Effect of Incentive Fees 
 
Gross Return Net Return Gross Return Net Return
Mean 1.00% 0.83% Mean 1.00% 0.70%
Standard Deviation 5.00% 5.00% Standard Deviation 5.00% 4.67%
Skew 0.00 0.00 Skew 0.00 -0.07
Kurtosis 3.00 3.00 Kurtosis 3.00 3.08
Summary Statistics Summary Statistics
2% Annual Management Fee Only 2% Annual Management Fee +
20% Incentive Fee with High-Water Mark
-20% -16% -12% -8% -4% 0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20%
Gross Return Net Return
20% -16% -12% -8% -4% 0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20%
Gross Return Net Return
 
This figure presents the results of a Monte Carlo simulation of 5,000 funds over a 100 year period where the gross returns have a 
monthly mean return of 1% with a standard deviation of 5%. The left panel assumes a 2% annual management fee (paid monthly) 
while the right hand panel assumes both a 2% management fee and a 20% incentive fee with a high-water mark provision.  
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For funds that charge only an annual management fee (for example, mutual funds), the 
distribution is simply moved to the left by 0.17% per month with all other moments 
unchanged. However, introducing a 20% annual incentive fee that is accrued monthly 
and paid annually with a high-water mark provision, leads to a more significant change 
in the distribution. First, the mean net return is 0.70%, implying that the mean incentive 
fee payable is 0.13% per month, which is clearly less than 20% of the 0.83% return net 
of management fees because fees are only payable on positive returns above the high-
water mark. Second, the standard deviation of net returns is 4.67%, which is lower than 
the 5% for gross returns. This is because the fees act to smooth returns over time. So if, 
for example, the returns net of management fees but before incentive fees for two 
consecutive months are +1% and -1%, the net returns will be +0.8% and -0.8%. Third, 
the net returns exhibit negative skew because incentive fees will be charged on positive 
but not on negative returns. Finally, net returns exhibit excess kurtosis since the 
incentive fees have the impact of pushing the distribution away from the shoulders into 
the centre, and the standard deviation is lower.  
 
In chapter 1 I highlighted that authors such as Brooks and Kat (2002) have found that 
hedge fund returns are not normally distributed and exhibit negative skewness and 
excess kurtosis. From the above it would appear that even if the gross returns 
themselves were normally distributed, the fee structure would lead to exactly these 
statistical properties, namely negative skewness and excess kurtosis. 
 
2.4 PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTION AND THE EFFECT 
OF INCENTIVE FEES ON THE RISK EXPOSURES OF AN 
INVESTOR 
 
Most of the empirical work on the effect of market or risk factors on hedge fund returns 
builds upon the work of Sharpe (1992). His framework for the analysis of mutual funds 
involved the development of an asset class factor model to determine risk exposures of 
the form: 
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where Rt represents the return on the fund at time t, Fi,t represents the return on factor 
Fi at time t, βi,t represents the sensitivity of the fund to factor Fi at time t and α is the 
value added by the manager.  
 
Sharpe regressed mutual fund returns against twelve asset class returns and interpreted 
the resulting betas as representing the mutual funds’ historic exposures to the asset 
classes. Sharpe’s results showed that only a limited number of major asset classes were 
required to successfully replicate the performance of the universe of U.S. mutual funds. 
Sharpe’s model is the building block of most risk-return research in hedge funds. This 
approach was first used in the hedge fund arena by Fung and Hsieh (1997), who applied 
Sharpe’s asset class factor model to a sample of hedge funds and mutual funds using 
eight asset classes. The results were strikingly different for hedge funds compared to 
mutual funds: 47% of the mutual fund regressions had R-squared values higher than 
75%, and 92% had R-squared figures higher than 50%.  For the hedge fund regressions, 
48% had R-squared values below 25%.   
 
Subsequent work by Fung and Hsieh and other authors has attempted to improve upon 
the explanatory power of the models using different sets of independent variables, 
sample periods and hedge fund databases.  Most of this work has been conducted within 
Sharpe’s general framework. Some have concentrated on the addition of non-linear 
factors such as options (Agarwal and Naik (2000)) while others have estimated time-
varying betas using either rolling window regressions (Fung and Hsieh (2004)), or by 
using statistical techniques such as the Kalman filter (Gehin and Vaissie (2006)).  
However, all of this work has been undertaken using net of fee returns and linear 
regression techniques, where the resulting betas are interpreted as representing the 
exposure of the investor to a specific source of systematic risk.  
 
For mutual funds, the only difference between net and gross returns is the management 
fees that are a fixed percentage of the assets under management. As equation (2) 
illustrates, in this case the beta is the same for both the investor and the fund because 
the fees are independent of the fund return, and so the fees affect only the fund’s alpha.  
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 However, because hedge funds also charge incentive fees which are a fixed percentage 
of the profits above a certain threshold, the fees are not independent of the fund’s return. 
For this reason, the beta of the fund and the beta of the investor can be different 
depending upon the performance of the fund, as represented by equation (3). 
 
eeIncentiveFFundInvestor βββ −=             (3) 
 
As I have already demonstrated, the incentive fee can be thought of as a call option on a 
percentage of the performance of the fund.  The investor is short this option while the 
fund manager has the corresponding long position.  Armed with this information, it is 
relatively simple to calculate eeIncentiveFβ  from equation (4), where ptionIncentiveOδ  is the 
delta of the incentive option,  is the percentage fee charged by the fund 
and 
%eeIncentiveF
Fundβ  is the beta of the fund calculated by regressing the gross returns against the 
risk factor/factors. 
 
FundptionIncentiveOeeIncentiveF eeIncentiveF βδβ *%*=          (4) 
 
If, for example, the fund charges a 20% incentive fee, then the boundary conditions are 
as follows: 
i) when the fund is a long way below the high-water mark - all gains 
and losses from the fund will accrue to the investor with no incentive 
fees payable. ptionIncentiveOδ  will be close to zero and the exposures of the 
investor are the same as the exposures of the fund; 
ii) when the fund is a long way above the high-water mark - all gains 
will result in further incentive fees being payable and losses will result in 
a reduction in the fees. ptionIncentiveOδ  will be close to 1, and hence the 
exposure of the investor will be 20% smaller than the exposure of the 
fund. 
 
It is clear, then, that using net of fee returns to calculate betas will lead to biased 
estimates. The correct approach would be to model the gross returns of the fund and 
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incentive fees separately. The possible consequences of modelling net rather than gross 
returns is best illustrated with a stylised example. 
 
2.4.1 A STYLISED EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM: BETA 
PARTNERS 
 
Suppose that a hypothetical hedge fund called “Beta Partners” was established in 
January 1975, and unbeknown to its investors, the fund simply invested 100% of its 
assets on a passive basis in the S&P 500 index.  Beta Partners charges the standard 2% 
management fee, a 20% performance fee with a hurdle rate of 0% and a high-water 
mark provision.  
 
Applying the approach suggested by Ibbotson and Chen (2006) to separate the sources 
of return into alpha, beta and costs (or fees) by a static linear regression of the net 
returns from Beta Partners against the S&P500 index yields a slope coefficient of 0.91 
and an alpha estimate of -0.23% per month. This implies that over the 31 year period, 
the returns of Beta Partners comprise an alpha of -2.67% p.a., beta of 11.95% p.a. and 
fees of 4.32% p.a. However, in this stylized example we know that all of Beta Partners’ 
returns are driven by beta and it is the fees that are distorting the picture. From equation 
(2) we know that the management fees will only affect the alpha estimate, however the 
introduction of incentive fee will mean that the beta estimate is also affected.  
 
The correct approach would be to use the gross returns to calculate the alpha and beta 
estimates before subtracting the fees. This approach, as one would expect, yields an 
alpha estimate of zero and a slope coefficient of 1. Thus the compound annual returns 
are comprised of alpha of 0%, beta of 13.45% and fees of 4.03%.  
 
The above illustrates that using returns net of fees understates both the alpha and beta 
components of the return of the fund. While it is clear that the investor does not receive 
all of these returns due to the fee structure, separating out the effect of fees from the 
fund returns gives the investor a far truer representation of the underlying return 
generating process of the fund and of the performance of the fund manager.  If an 
investor were to follow the methodology of Fung and Hsieh (2004) in an attempt to 
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analyse the exposure of Beta Partners to the S&P 500 using a 24-month rolling window 
regression on the net of fee returns, the results would be as shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4: Beta Partners – Rolling Window Regression 
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
B
E
T
A
 S
&
P
5
0
0
Beta SP500 Using Net Returns
 
This figure presents slope coefficient of a rolling 24 month window regression of the net returns generated by the hypothetical fund 
Beta Partners on the S&P 500 index. 
 
 
The rolling regression results show how the beta varies between a maximum of 1 and a 
minimum of 0.82 over the sample period. On the basis of this information an investor 
might conclude that Beta Partners is varying its exposure to the market over time but by 
construction, the actual beta of the fund is 1.0 at all times. All of the variation in 
exposure is actually coming from the change in the delta of the incentive fee option.   
 
The true beta of the investor can easily be calculated from equations (3) and (4) once I 
have identified the delta of the incentive option. In this example, the incentive option is 
simply a 1-month call option on the S&P 500 with a strike set at the current high-water 
mark, and thus the delta can easily be calculated using the Black-Scholes equation. 
Figure 2.5 shows how the beta of the investor evolves over time.  
 
As one would expect, from the boundary conditions outlined above, the investor’s beta 
is always between 0.8 and 1. When the incentive option has zero delta, the investor and 
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fund betas are the same. When the incentive option has a 100% delta, then the investor 
beta is 20% lower than that of the fund. The evolution of the investor’s exposure is far 
less smooth using this procedure compared to using net returns; part of the reason for 
this is the re-setting of the high-water mark each January after incentive fees are paid.  
In fact, using net returns simply results in a moving average of the true investor beta.  
 
Figure 2.5: Beta Partners – Investor Beta  
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This figure presents difference between the investor’s true beta and the result obtained from using net returns. The red line is the 
slope coefficient of a rolling 24 month window regression of net returns on the S&P 500 index. The blue line is the investor beta 
calculated from slope coefficient of a rolling 24 month window regression of gross returns on the S&P 500 index and then applying 
equations (3) and (4) 
 
 
2.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NET AND GROSS HEDGE 
FUND RETURNS 
 
I now propose a technique for recovering gross of fee hedge fund returns and apply this 
to individual hedge fund performance data. The hedge fund return data are extracted 
from the TASS live and graveyard databases from January 1994 through to December 
2006. More specifically, I extract monthly Net Asset Values (NAV) and fee structure 
details for all hedge funds that are denominated in US Dollars, that report monthly and 
that have at least 37 data points. These criteria result in a total sample of 2,837 funds of 
which 1,433 are currently reporting and 1,404 are no longer reporting. I recognise that 
 54
this data will be subject to the various biases described by Fung and Hsieh (2002) and 
others, namely survivorship, instant history and selection bias. I minimise survivorship 
bias by using both the live and graveyard databases and by using data only from January 
1994 when TASS began collecting data on graveyard funds. Instant history bias has 
been estimated by Fung and Hsieh to be approximately 1.4% pa. I estimate the size of 
the selection bias by comparing the return on the equally weighted return of my sample 
to the equally weighted return on all funds in the database. I estimate this to be 0.83% 
p.a.  
 
Using these NAVs it is relatively straightforward to calculate monthly net and gross 
returns by making a number of realistic assumptions. To do this, the following 
assumptions are required: 
i) Management fees are calculated and paid on a monthly basis 
ii) Incentive fees are accrued on a monthly basis, but are only paid at 
the end of the calendar year 
iii) Unless specified otherwise, the fund applies a high-water mark 
provision 
iv) The fund implements an ‘Equalisation Credit /Contingent 
Redemption’ approach to calculating the NAV such that it is the same 
for all investors (for a more thorough explanation see McDonnell 
(2003)). 
 
The net hedge fund return for period t is calculated using expression (5): 
 ( )
1
1
−
−−=
t
tt
NET NAV
NAVNAV
R
t
            (5) 
 
The gross return calculation is calculated as follows:  
 ( ) ( )( )11 11 −− −− + −++−= tt tttttGROSS entFeeAccruedIncNAV entFeeAccruedIncentFeeAccruedIncMgtFeeNAVNAVR t      (6) 
 
where 
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and { } ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−×−= 1%1 1,0max eeIncentiveFarkHighWaterMNAVentFeeAccruedInc tt           (8) 
at the end of each year, the accrued incentive fee is reset to zero and if necessary, the 
high-water mark moved upwards to reflect this. 
 
Equation (6) is simply the change in the gross value of the fund calculated by adding 
back the management fees calculated from equation (7) and the incentive fees calculated 
from equation (8). In equation (8), because the incentive fees are only paid annually 
they are accrued every month until December when, if any fees are accrued they are 
paid and the high-water mark is adjusted upwards to reflect this payment.  
 
By applying this technique to the NAV data extracted from the TASS database, I 
construct equally weighted indices for the ten strategies reported in the database as well 
as a broad index of all hedge funds in my sample.  
 
2.5.1 THE STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF NET AND GROSS 
RETURNS 
 
Table 2.1 contains the summary statistics for the net and gross returns in the sample. 
Clearly, by construction, the compound annual, gross returns are higher than the net 
returns with the difference between the two being the fees. For my sample, the average 
fee charged has been 5.15% p.a., ranging from 2.57% for dedicated short bias to 6.07% 
for managed futures.  
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 Table 2.1 The Statistical Properties of Net and Gross Returns 
 
Panel A
Live Graveyard Total
Convertible Arbitrage 72               69               141             
Dedicated Short Bias 15               14               29               
Emerging Markets 118             114             232             
Equity Market Neutral 94               92               186             
Event Driven 203             150             353             
Fixed Income Arbitrage 78               73               151             
Global Macro 66               93               159             
Long Short Equity 591             575             1,166          
Managed Futures 115             176             291             
Multi Strategy 81               48               129             
All Hedge Funds 1,433          1,404          2,837          
Panel B
Compound Annualised
Annual Ret Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Probability
Convertible Arbitrage 10.38% 4.23% -0.80 5.15 46.69 0.00%
Dedicated Short Bias -0.79% 18.06% 0.70 4.65 30.59 0.00%
Emerging Markets 14.41% 15.50% -1.06 8.07 196.46 2.61%
Equity Market Neutral 11.01% 2.51% 0.50 2.67 7.29 0.00%
Event Driven 12.91% 4.41% -1.61 10.40 422.76 0.00%
Fixed Income Arbitrage 9.16% 3.51% -2.97 20.46 2210.69 0.00%
Global Macro 9.18% 5.99% 0.90 4.31 43.54 0.00%
Long Short Equity 16.29% 9.18% 0.03 4.54 15.41 0.05%
Managed Futures 9.83% 11.04% 0.30 2.81 2.57 27.68%
Multi Strategy 13.42% 4.70% -0.39 5.45 43.11 0.00%
All Hedge Funds 13.17% 5.93% 0.05 4.07 7.54 2.31%
Panel C
Compound Annualised
Annual Ret Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Probability
Convertible Arbitrage 14.32% 4.81% -0.65 4.88 33.99 0.00%
Dedicated Short Bias 1.77% 19.50% 0.84 5.31 52.87 0.00%
Emerging Markets 19.86% 16.75% -0.85 6.90 117.89 0.00%
Equity Market Neutral 15.42% 2.96% 0.54 2.76 7.90 1.92%
Event Driven 17.43% 5.07% -1.44 9.37 317.91 0.00%
Fixed Income Arbitrage 13.43% 3.83% -2.64 17.79 1602.94 0.00%
Global Macro 13.62% 6.92% 1.01 4.62 32.35 0.00%
Long Short Equity 21.76% 10.47% 0.18 4.56 16.60 0.02%
Managed Futures 15.89% 12.59% 0.37 2.96 3.55 16.94%
Multi Strategy 18.45% 5.34% -0.26 4.95 26.47 0.00%
All Hedge Funds 18.31% 6.72% 0.19 3.86 5.71 5.75%
Net
Gross
Sample Size
 
 
The table presents summary statistics for equally weighted strategy indices constructed from a sample of funds from the TASS live 
and graveyard databases that are denominated in US Dollars, report monthly and that have at least 37 data points. Panel A 
presents the number of funds in each strategy. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the net returns calculated from equation 
(5). Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the gross returns calculated from equations (6), (7) and (8).  
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When examining the standard deviation of returns, the empirical results are in line with 
the earlier Monte Carlo simulation, and in all cases the gross returns exhibit higher 
annualised standard deviation than net returns with the average difference being 0.78%. 
For skewness, the empirical results are also as expected with an average increase of 
0.14. With regard to kurtosis the results are much less clear cut, with increases for some 
strategies and decreases for others. Overall, however, there is a reduction in kurtosis of 
0.21. The combination of all of this means that gross hedge fund returns look far more 
“normal” than net returns and in fact, contrary to Brooks and Kat (2002), for my sample 
it would appear that on average hedge fund returns display positive skewness and do not 
exhibit significantly excess kurtosis. 
 
2.6 PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTION  
 
In order to attribute hedge fund returns between alpha, beta and fees, Ibbotson and Chen 
(2006) carry out regressions on net of fee hedge fund returns, using S&P 500 total 
returns (including both concurrent and with a one-month lag), U.S. Intermediate-term 
Government Bond returns (including one-month lag), and cash (U.S. Treasury Bills) as 
benchmarks. They constrain all style weights to sum to one, but allow individual style 
weights to be negative or above one to account for shorting and leverage. Once they 
have calculated alphas, they deducted this from the net return to give the return from 
beta. Then, using the median management and incentive fee levels, they estimate what 
the fees on this total net return would have been to “gross it up”. 
 
I replicate Ibbotson and Chen’s methodology using the net of fee returns for my sample 
of hedge funds and the following risk factors:  
- the total return of the Wilshire 5000 composite index;  
- the total return of Lehman US Aggregate Index; and  
- one month USD LIBOR.  
 
I then compare this to the results I obtain by calculating the gross return before 
performing the regressions. The results are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 which are 
directly comparable to Tables 5 and 6 in Ibbotson and Chen (2006). 
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Table 2.2 Analysis of Sources of Return for Equally Weighted Hedge Fund Indices 
Regression Results: 1994-2006
Compound 
Annual 
Return 
Annual 
Alpha Betas (Sum of Betas = 1)
Stocks Bonds Cash RSQ
Using Net Returns 10.38% 3.87% ** 0.20 0.27 0.53 31.1%
Using Gross Returns 14.32% 7.38% ** 0.22 0.31 0.47 29.6%
Using Net Returns -0.79% 4.10% -1.12 0.21 1.91 76.1%
Using Gross Returns 1.77% 7.89% ** -1.22 0.17 2.05 77.0%
Using Net Returns 14.41% 4.27% 0.87 -0.17 0.30 41.7%
Using Gross Returns 19.86% 8.86% ** 0.94 -0.16 0.22 41.5%
Using Net Returns 11.01% 5.75% ** 0.07 0.08 0.85 24.3%
Using Gross Returns 15.42% 9.89% ** 0.08 0.08 0.84 22.6%
Using Net Returns 12.91% 5.76% ** 0.31 0.05 0.64 59.8%
Using Gross Returns 17.43% 9.64% ** 0.36 0.07 0.57 59.1%
Using Net Returns 9.16% 3.84% ** 0.07 0.11 0.82 9.6%
Using Gross Returns 13.43% 7.79% ** 0.08 0.13 0.79 10.7%
Using Net Returns 9.18% 2.81% * 0.18 0.37 0.45 16.2%
Using Gross Returns 13.62% 6.78% ** 0.20 0.43 0.36 15.8%
Using Net Returns 16.29% 7.51% ** 0.59 -0.07 0.48 69.3%
Using Gross Returns 21.76% 12.21% ** 0.66 -0.09 0.43 66.6%
Using Net Returns 9.83% 5.05% -0.10 0.94 0.17 11.5%
Using Gross Returns 15.89% 10.88% ** -0.12 1.10 0.03 12.2%
Using Net Returns 13.42% 6.91% ** 0.25 0.01 0.74 49.5%
Using Gross Returns 18.45% 11.46% ** 0.28 0.01 0.71 48.1%
Using Net Returns 13.17% 5.69% ** 0.37 0.09 0.54 58.6%
Using Gross Returns 18.31% 10.20% ** 0.41 0.11 0.48 56.5%
Convertible Arbitrage
Dedicated Short Bias
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
All HF
Multi-Strategy
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/Short Equity
Managed Futures
 
This table presents the results of regressions of both net and gross hedge fund index  returns on three risk factors. Stocks is defined 
as the total return of the Wilshire 5000 composite index, Bonds is the total return of Lehman US Aggregate Index and Cash is one 
month US Dollar LIBOR. The Betas are the slope respective slope coefficients and the alphas are the intercepts of the regression. 
Alpha values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Analysis of Sources of Return for Equally Weighted Hedge Fund Indices 
Sources of Return: Alpha, Beta, and Cost 1994-2006
Pre-Fee 
Return Fees
Post-Fee 
Return Alpha
Systematic 
Betas
Using Net Returns 14.98% 4.60% 10.38% 3.87% 6.51%
Using Gross Returns 14.32% 3.94% 10.38% 7.38% 6.94%
Using Net Returns 1.01% 1.80% -0.79% 4.10% -4.89%
Using Gross Returns 1.77% 2.57% -0.79% 7.89% -6.12%
Using Net Returns 20.01% 5.60% 14.41% 4.27% 10.13%
Using Gross Returns 19.86% 5.46% 14.41% 8.86% 11.00%
Using Net Returns 15.76% 4.75% 11.01% 5.75% 5.26%
Using Gross Returns 15.42% 4.41% 11.01% 9.89% 5.53%
Using Net Returns 18.14% 5.23% 12.91% 5.76% 7.16%
Using Gross Returns 17.43% 4.52% 12.91% 9.64% 7.79%
Using Net Returns 13.46% 4.29% 9.16% 3.84% 5.33%
Using Gross Returns 13.43% 4.26% 9.16% 7.79% 5.64%
Using Net Returns 13.47% 4.29% 9.18% 2.81% 6.37%
Using Gross Returns 13.62% 4.45% 9.18% 6.78% 6.84%
Using Net Returns 22.37% 6.07% 16.29% 7.51% 8.78%
Using Gross Returns 21.76% 5.47% 16.29% 12.21% 9.56%
Using Net Returns 14.28% 4.46% 9.83% 5.05% 4.78%
Using Gross Returns 15.89% 6.07% 9.83% 10.88% 5.01%
Using Net Returns 18.77% 5.35% 13.42% 6.91% 6.50%
Using Gross Returns 18.45% 5.03% 13.42% 11.46% 6.99%
Using Net Returns 18.46% 5.29% 13.17% 5.69% 7.48%
Using Gross Returns 18.31% 5.15% 13.17% 10.20% 8.12%
Convertible Arbitrage
Dedicated Short Bias
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
All HF
Multi-Strategy
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/Short Equity
Managed Futures
 
This table presents the results of separating the total return of the hedge fund indices into that which is attributable to alpha, beta 
and fees with the alphas taken from table 2.2. 
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By construction, the alpha estimate for gross returns will be larger by at least the 
management fees, although in all cases, the increase is much larger than this (the 
average increase being 4.51% p.a.). For my sample using gross returns, alpha is 
significant at the 5% level for all 10 strategies, whereas when using net returns it is only 
significant for 6 of them.  For all strategies, the magnitude of beta for the risky assets 
(stocks and bonds) is greater and consequently the return attributable to beta is also 
larger (the average increase being 0.64% p.a.). This implies that although the major 
impact of fees is indeed on alpha, the effect on beta is not insignificant. 
 
2.7 FACTOR MODEL SPECIFICATION AND 
REPLICATION 
 
Using gross rather than net of fee returns when attempting to duplicate hedge fund 
performance via factor replication should produce better results for two main reasons. 
First, as I have already demonstrated, the use of net of fee returns for performance 
attribution leads to an underestimation of the return that is attributable to beta, and 
hence it follows that using gross returns in attempting to replicate hedge fund returns 
should produce better results by capturing this additional beta return. Second, the 
option-like nature of incentive fees creates a non-linear payoff to the factors which 
should be eliminated by using gross returns. 
 
In order to assess the difference between replicated net and gross hedge fund returns, I 
employ a methodology similar to that of Hasanhodzica and Lo (2007). However, 
whereas Hasanhodzica and Lo and others have used the same small number of factors 
for every strategy, I start with a large set of 11 candidate factors and undertake a 
procedure to identify the significant factors for each strategy individually. This is 
because of the heterogeneous nature of hedge fund strategies and the advantage is that it 
avoids the use of superfluous factors in the regressions.  Table 2.4 shows the set of 11 
candidate factors. These factors were chosen because they provide a broad cross section 
of risk exposures which have all been identified in previous studies as significant.  
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Table 2.4 Candidate Factors for Replication 
Factors Requiring Investment Cash Neutral Factors
Name Description
Datastream 
Mnemonic Name Description
Datastream 
Mnemonic
MKT Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Composite 
Total Return
WILEQTY SMB Dow Jones Wilshire Small Cap Minus 
Dow Jones Wilshire Large Cap (Both 
Total Return)
WILDJSC & 
WILDJLC
CMDTY GSCI Commodity Total Return GSCITOT USD Finex-US Dollar Index Return NDXCS00
BOND Lehman US Agggregate Total Return LHAGGBD CREDIT Lehman US Credit Intermediate Bond 
Index Minus Lehman Government 
Intermediate (Both Total Return)
LHCRPIN & 
LHGOVIN
EMERGING MSCI Emerging Markets Index Total 
Return
MSEMKFL SLOPE Lehman US Treasury: 20+ Year Index 
Minus Lehman Short Treasury Index 
(Both Total Return)
LHTR20Y & 
LHSHORT
GLOBAL_STOCKS JP Morgan Global Broad Excluding 
U.S. Total Return
JPMBXUS
GLOBAL_BONDS MSCI  World Excluding U.S. Total 
Return
MSWFXU
DVIX Change In CBOE VIX Index CBOEVIX
 
This table presents the set of candidate factors to be used for the hedge fund replication with their DataStream mnemonic. The 
factors are categorised as either requiring a cash investment or being cash neutral.    
 
Importantly, all of the factors are investable via traditional funds, exchange traded funds 
or futures which is essential if they are to be used for replication. I classify the factors 
into two groups: those that require investment and those that are cash neutral. To ensure 
that when I construct clones and restrict the sum of betas to be equal to one, this 
restriction only applies to factors that require investment.  
 
In order to identify the significant factors for each strategy, I first extract monthly 
returns for live and graveyard funds from the TASS database for January 1990 to 
December 1994 and construct equally weighted strategy indices. Although this sample 
will be severely affected by survivorship bias, because I am only looking to identify the 
factors that drive returns rather than making any judgements about performance, I feel 
that this is an acceptable approach. Next I run regressions for all possible combinations 
of one to eleven factors, a total of 211 = 2,048 regressions, in order to identify the most 
parsimonious model, which I define as the one with the lowest Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). The results are shown in table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 Results of Factor Selection 
AIC R
2
MKT SMB USD CMDTY BOND CREDIT SLOPE EMERGING
GLOBAL  
STOCKS
GLOBAL  
BONDS DVIX
-0.1676 4.7782 0.3358
(0.0761) (1.1339) (0.1400)
-0.4704
(0.1512)
0.1741 1.7949 0.1918
(0.0895) (0.8859) (0.0465)
0.0976 0.2139 0.0903 0.0219
(0.0559) (0.0688) (0.0336) (0.0643)
0.1432 0.0979 0.2597 1.3747 0.0589 0.0373
(0.0659) (0.0568) (0.1718) (0.5388) (0.0275) (0.0616)
0.3530 -0.1130 1.5706 0.5375 -0.0704
(0.1421) (0.0409) (0.6105) (0.1492) (0.0733)
-0.2030 2.4284 0.0731 -0.1027 0.3253
(0.1227) (0.7591) (0.0443) (0.0625) (0.1232)
0.2698 0.1895 0.1387 0.0800 0.0890 0.0771 -0.0388 0.1854
(0.0457) (0.0582) (0.0895) (0.0248) (0.0719) (0.0219) (0.0297) (0.1116)
0.4379 0.0000 -0.1298 0.6477
(0.2274) (0.0737) (0.2698)
0.3873 0.1032 0.7322 -3.6661 0.1485
(0.0940) (0.0542) (0.2531) (0.9248) (0.0431)
5.02%
31.16%
-4.46
-5.01
28.00%
12.82%
49.04%
18.97%
57.78%
38.55%
21.59%
76.17%
-6.09
-5.44
-5.08
-6.60
-4.23
-3.43
-4.86
-6.00
Managed Futures
Multi-Strategy
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/Short Equity 
Convertible Arbitrage
Dedicated Short Bias
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
 
The table presents the results of the factor selection process. In each case the model with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) was chosen. The figures in the body of the table are the resulting coefficients and the figures in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
 
The findings are in line with what one would expect. Equity based factors are identified 
as significant for those strategies that involve equities such as long/short equity, 
dedicated short bias and event driven. Bond or credit factors are identified as significant 
for fixed income strategies such as convertible arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage. 
The R-squared of the regressions ranges from 5.2% for managed futures to 76.17% for 
long/short equity, showing that factor models appear to perform much more 
satisfactorily for some strategies than for others. 
 
Having identified the factors that drive hedge fund returns for each individual strategy, I 
now attempt to construct linear clones using rolling window regressions. In addition to 
the factors identified above, I also introduce another factor, 1 month U.S. Dollar 
LIBOR, to allow for leverage. Using the factors identified above plus the LIBOR factor, 
for each individual hedge fund strategy I run a rolling window regression using a 24 
month window from January 1995 to December 2006 as shown in equation (9) 
 
tti
n
i
tit FR εβα ++= ∑= ,1 ,              (9) 
 
subject to  for those factors classified as requiring investment plus LIBOR. ∑= =ni ti1 , 1β
The estimated regression coefficients  are then used as portfolio weights to construct 
simple clone returns  using equation (10) 
*
itβ
*
itR∑== ni tiitR 1 ,** β             (10) 
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Since the volatility of these simple clones is unlikely to match the volatility of the hedge 
fund indices they are designed to replicate, using the simple clone returns from equation 
(10) I calculate a leverage factor γ  from equation (11). This equation is the ratio of the 
historical volatility of the hedge fund indices to the volatility of the simple clones using 
a 24 month rolling window.  
 
∑∑ = −= − −−= 241 2**
24
1
2
23/)(
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k itkit
k itkit
it
RR
RRγ          (11) 
This leverage factor is then used to calculate the clone returns  using equation (12) itRˆ
 ( ) ( ) titititit LIBORRR γγ −−= 1ˆ *           (12) 
 
This procedure was repeated for the indices and individual funds using both net and 
gross returns, which results in a clone series running for 10 years from January 1997 to 
December 2006, the results are presented in table 2.6. 
 
In all cases, the return on the gross clones is greater in magnitude than for the net clones 
(more negative for dedicated short bias) although the standard deviation of the return is 
also slightly higher. The average improvement in return for the gross clones over the net 
clones is 0.24% for indices and 0.36% for individual funds. The improvement in 
performance of the gross clones would appear to be proportional to the goodness of fit 
of the model. The biggest improvement is seen in strategies such as long/short equity 
and event driven where the R-squared values of the regressions are high and the 
smallest improvement is for strategies such as equity market neutral and fixed income 
arbitrage where the R-squared is much lower. The correlation between the clone and 
fund returns is extremely high at over 85%, although there is no significant difference 
between the net and gross clones in either correlation or R-squared. 
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Table 2.6 Replication of Indicesand Individual Funds 
Panel A -  Replication of Indices 1997-2006
Compound 
Annual 
Return
Annual 
Standard 
Deviation
Compound 
Annual 
Return
Annual 
Standard 
Deviation
Mean R2 of 
Regression
Correlation 
Between 
Clone & 
Index
Using Net Returns 10.10% 4.27% 5.65% 4.64% 20.97% 29.15%
Using Gross Returns 14.03% 4.89% 5.95% 5.35% 20.01% 28.35%
Using Net Returns -1.74% 18.80% -4.56% 20.88% 80.38% 87.91%
Using Gross Returns 0.64% 20.23% -5.71% 22.42% 81.19% 88.52%
Using Net Returns 15.02% 16.12% 6.53% 16.38% 73.48% 83.28%
Using Gross Returns 20.66% 17.37% 6.47% 17.87% 72.91% 82.90%
Using Net Returns 9.48% 2.25% 4.47% 2.61% 23.65% 41.88%
Using Gross Returns 13.46% 2.63% 4.61% 3.07% 23.28% 41.76%
Using Net Returns 12.12% 4.65% 7.16% 4.72% 66.02% 71.21%
Using Gross Returns 16.55% 5.33% 7.78% 5.39% 64.67% 71.31%
Using Net Returns 7.87% 3.34% 5.27% 3.71% 22.02% 50.36%
Using Gross Returns 11.75% 3.63% 5.48% 3.99% 23.70% 50.74%
Using Net Returns 8.36% 5.28% 8.58% 6.89% 53.47% 61.82%
Using Gross Returns 12.68% 6.07% 9.25% 8.01% 53.30% 62.18%
Using Net Returns 15.22% 9.73% 8.03% 10.79% 91.90% 90.55%
Using Gross Returns 20.51% 11.08% 8.64% 12.38% 90.70% 89.98%
Using Net Returns 9.23% 10.70% 10.72% 12.39% 26.14% 32.30%
Using Gross Returns 14.98% 12.30% 11.75% 14.19% 26.50% 32.77%
Using Net Returns 13.54% 4.87% 6.04% 5.12% 65.39% 69.49%
Using Gross Returns 18.54% 5.53% 6.34% 5.81% 63.67% 68.94%
Using Net Returns 12.54% 6.20% 7.44% 6.91% 65.58% 86.69%
Using Gross Returns 17.51% 7.01% 7.68% 7.71% 64.85% 85.54%
Panel B -  Replication of Individual Funds 1997-2006
Compound 
Annual 
Return
Annual 
Standard 
Deviation
Compound 
Annual 
Return
Annual 
Standard 
Deviation
Mean R2 of 
Regression
Correlation 
Between 
Clone & 
Index
Using Net Returns 10.10% 4.27% 5.28% 4.75% -99.50% 29.40%
Using Gross Returns 14.03% 4.89% 5.59% 5.40% -4.21% 29.06%
Using Net Returns -1.74% 18.80% -4.92% 25.54% 55.52% 88.55%
Using Gross Returns 0.64% 20.23% -6.17% 27.19% 56.29% 89.12%
Using Net Returns 15.02% 16.12% 6.83% 21.07% 36.41% 83.43%
Using Gross Returns 20.66% 17.37% 6.82% 22.98% 36.22% 83.17%
Using Net Returns 9.48% 2.25% 5.11% 3.10% 12.68% 40.15%
Using Gross Returns 13.46% 2.63% 5.27% 3.57% 13.00% 39.78%
Using Net Returns 12.12% 4.65% 8.55% 5.50% 26.31% 65.45%
Using Gross Returns 16.55% 5.33% 9.41% 6.31% 26.02% 65.55%
Using Net Returns 7.87% 3.34% 5.02% 4.26% 12.71% 51.08%
Using Gross Returns 11.75% 3.63% 5.20% 4.65% 13.18% 51.18%
Using Net Returns 8.36% 5.28% 8.47% 8.59% 21.67% 57.04%
Using Gross Returns 12.68% 6.07% 9.04% 9.94% 21.75% 56.96%
Using Net Returns 15.22% 9.73% 8.05% 13.07% 40.17% 90.14%
Using Gross Returns 20.51% 11.08% 8.77% 14.95% 39.90% 89.71%
Using Net Returns 9.23% 10.70% 12.40% 13.45% 17.36% 34.25%
Using Gross Returns 14.98% 12.30% 13.36% 15.44% 17.66% 34.27%
Using Net Returns 13.54% 4.87% 7.23% 6.56% 23.51% 69.29%
Using Gross Returns 18.54% 5.53% 7.61% 7.44% 23.51% 68.59%
Using Net Returns 12.54% 6.20% 7.99% 8.46% 24.02% 86.53%
Using Gross Returns 17.51% 7.01% 8.35% 9.45% 28.75% 85.45%
All HF
Global Macro
Long/Short Equity
Managed Futures
Multi-Strategy
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Index Clone
Convertible Arbitrage
Dedicated Short Bias
Index Clone
Convertible Arbitrage
Dedicated Short Bias
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
All HF
Global Macro
Long/Short Equity
Managed Futures
Multi-Strategy
 
Panel A presents the results of the factor replication of the hedge fund indices while Panel B presents the results for individual 
funds. The replication is achieved by applying equations (9) to (12) to the factors identified in table 2.5. 
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2.8 THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVE FEES ON THE RISK 
TAKING BEHAVIOUR OF FUNDS 
 
I have already demonstrated how the payoff profile of hedge fund performance fees is 
identical to a call option on a percentage of the fund’s performance.  The rationale for 
this fee arrangement is to “incentivize” the hedge fund manager to produce absolute 
returns. However, the reality is that the arrangement encourages managers to maximise 
the value of this fee option; their motivations could be different depending upon the 
delta of the option. When the delta is high, the bulk of the value in the option comes 
from its moneyness and little from its volatility.  But when the delta is low, the reverse 
is true. Authors such as Scanlan and Siegel (2006) have suggested that managers who 
are significantly below their high water mark might have an incentive to increase risk.  
 
This has been investigated for CTAs by Fung and Hsieh (1997a) and by Brown, 
Goetzmann, and Park (2001), who both find little evidence of increased risk taking by 
managers below their high water mark. They hypothesise that career and reputation 
concerns as well as the increased risk of redemptions offset the adverse risk-taking 
incentives created by the incentive fee contract. 
 
In order to investigate whether this is the case for the hedge funds in my sample, I 
examine the distribution of returns conditional upon the delta of the incentive option. 
Calculation of the exact delta of the fee option is problematic because I do not have an 
appropriate model or a true estimate of the implied volatility, so instead I use the 
“moneyness” of the option as a proxy for delta.  Moneyness is defined as  
 
t
t
t
arkHighWaterM
NAV
Moneyness
t
=
         (13) 
 
For my sample of 2,837 funds, I calculate the moneyness at each data point giving us a 
total of 229,101 observations. In order to investigate the relationship between the delta 
of the incentive option and the distribution of returns I divided the moneyness into 3 
sub-samples: 
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- “At The Money” (ATM) where moneyness is greater than 95% and less 
than 105% 
- “In The Money” (ITM) where moneyness is greater or equal to 105%  
- “Out  Of The Money” (OTM) where moneyness is less than or equal to 
95%  
 
Using these sub-samples, I examine the properties of the distribution of gross returns at 
time t+1 conditional upon the moneyness at time t, the results are presented in Figure 
2.6.  
 
Figure 2.6: The Effect of Incentive Fees on the Risk Taking Behaviour of Funds 
ATM ITM OTM Whole Sample
Mean 1.25% 1.71% 0.98% 1.38%
Standard Deviation 4.94% 6.41% 8.51% 6.16%
Skew 3.86 1.65 1.95 2.41
Kurtosis 110.53 35.42 57.01 68.64
 Observations 109,813         84,608           34,680           229,101         
Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
OTM ATM ITM
0.1403 0.1398
(0.000) (0.000)
0.1403 0.1033
(0.000) (0.000)
0.1398 0.1033
(0.000) (0.000)
OTM
ATM
ITM
Summary Statistics
-20% -16% -12% -8% -4% 0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20%
ATM ITM OTM
 
This figure  presents the distribution of returns at time t+1 conditional upon the moneyness of the incentive option at time t for three 
sub samples of the data. These sub-samples are  defined as “At The Money” (ATM) where moneyness is greater than 95% and less 
than 105%, “In The Money” (ITM) where moneyness is greater or equal to 105% and “Out  Of The Money” (OTM) where 
moneyness is less than or equal to 95%. The tables present summary statistics for the three samples as well as pair-wise 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the null hypothesis that the samples are the same. 
 
The three distributions appear to be very different. This is confirmed by the results of 
pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, and in all cases I can reject the null hypothesis that 
the distributions are the same. The standard deviation of the OTM sample is statistically 
larger than for either the ATM or the ITM samples, which appears to support the 
hypothesis that hedge funds increase their risk when they are below their high water 
mark. However, it also appears that ITM funds also increase their risk, so it might be 
that funds who are ATM actually reduce their risk.  
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2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that estimating the factor exposures of hedge funds 
using net of fee returns will lead to biased results due to the non-linear impact of 
incentive fees. I have proposed an alternative procedure to estimate the exposures of the 
fund using gross returns and the effect of fees independently that is simple to 
implement. I have also illustrated, via a stylised example that the proposed procedure 
will lead to far more accurate estimates of investor exposures when the return 
generation process is known.   
 
Using a large sample of hedge fund returns, I have shown that using net of fee returns 
understates the return attributable to beta by up to 58 basis points per annum. Following 
from this, I have demonstrated that some of this additional beta exposure can be 
captured by basing replication on gross rather than net returns.  
 
I have also investigated the distribution of returns conditional upon the moneyness of 
the incentive option and found that the standard deviation is considerably higher for 
those managers who find themselves significantly above or below their high water 
mark. These results could be interpreted as evidence of increased risk taking and I will 
investigate this result further in the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
LOCKING IN THE PROFITS OR PUTTING IT 
ALL ON BLACK?   
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOUR OF HEDGE 
FUND MANAGERS  
 
 
Abstract 
The ideal fee structure aligns the incentives of the investor with those of the fund 
manager. Mutual funds typically only charge a management fee which is a proportion 
of the funds under management. Hedge funds on the other hand generally change an 
incentive fee which is a fraction of the fund's return each year in excess of the high-
water mark. The justification generally given for these incentive fees is that they provide 
the manager with the incentive to target absolute returns. As these incentive fees can be 
considered a call option on the performance of the fund (the fee structure gives the 
managers the positive fees with profits but no negative fees with losses), it is possible 
that the managers incentives might vary according to the delta of this option. A number 
of recent papers have examined the optimal investment strategies of money managers in 
the presence of incentive fees within a theoretical framework with seemingly conflicting 
results. In this chapter, using a large database of hedge fund returns, I examine the risk 
taking behaviour of hedge fund managers in response to both their past returns relative 
to their high-water mark and their past returns relative to their peer group. I then 
attempt to reconcile these results with the theoretical frameworks proposed. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The ideal fee structure aligns the incentives of the investor with those of the fund 
manager.  Investors will normally be looking to maximise their risk-adjusted return 
while fund managers will seek to maximise their fees.  Mutual funds typically only 
charge a management fee which is a proportion of the funds under management.  This 
traditional fee structure can only align fund manager and investor objectives to a limited 
degree: if the investor is unsatisfied with the performance of the manager they can 
usually withdraw their funds thus reducing the fee to zero.  Hedge funds on the other 
hand generally charge both a management fee and an incentive fee which is a fraction of 
the fund's return each year in excess of a high-water mark.  It is clear that this structure 
aligns the objectives of these two parties more closely since they both stand to benefit 
from incrementally better performance. 
 
However hedge fund incentive fees are a contentious issue for two important reasons. 
First the fees can be very large as a proportion of the fund and can therefore be a drag 
on the performance of the fund1.  Depending upon the variance of returns Goetzmann et 
al (2003) estimate that the performance fee effectively costs investors between 10 and 
20 percent of the portfolio.  Clearly investing in a hedge fund would only be rational if 
they provide a large, positive risk-adjusted return which compensates for these fees. 
 
The second and perhaps more interesting issue is whether the incentive fees provide the 
manager with the right incentives anyway. On the one hand Anson (2001), who 
describes incentive fees as a “free option”, argues that the option-like nature of the 
incentive fee will lead the manager to increase the volatility of returns in order to 
maximise the value of this option. This is a view that is partially supported by 
Goetzmann et al (2003) who state that “the manager has the incentive to increase risk 
provided other non modelled considerations are not overriding”. An opposing view is 
presented by L’Habitant (2007) who considers the incentive fee as an option premium 
paid to the hedge fund manager by the investor. This premium ensures that the manager 
will optimise the size of the fund to keep returns high because the incentives for 
superior performance can be greater than for asset growth. He argues that the absence of 
incentive fees (for example in mutual funds) leads the manager to maximise funds under 
                                                 
1
 In the previous chapter for the period from 1994 to 2006 I found fees cost on average 5.15% pa. 
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management, which is not necessarily in the interests of the investor who is seeking to 
maximise risk-adjusted returns. 
 
Several academic papers have examined the effect that incentive fees have upon the 
optimal dynamic investment strategies of fund managers within a theoretical 
framework. Typically these papers present a framework with one risky and one riskless 
asset and then examine the allocation the manager would make to each asset under 
various scenarios. The theoretical results provide a range of possible behaviour 
depending upon: the assumptions made about manager preferences’; the possibility of 
fund liquidation; and the assumed level of the management’s stake in the fund.  Thus 
the models illustrate the importance of what Goetzmann et al (2003) describe as “non-
modelled considerations”, or what could also be described as implicit rather than 
explicit contract terms.  
 
The explicit terms of the compensation contract are that investors agree to pay the 
manager a fixed percentage of positive returns while accepting all of the downside, if 
the contract was this simple then the manager would, as Anson (2001) describes, simply 
possess a call option on the future performance of the fund which would provide the 
manager with an incentive to increase risk. However, there are also many implicit terms 
to the contract that are more difficult to model, some of which will mitigate this 
problem and others that may exacerbate it. For example, investors will expect the hedge 
fund manger to invest a substantial percentage of their own net worth in the fund and 
penalise them for poor performance (or for excessive risk taking) by withdrawing their 
funds (just as a mutual fund client would).  This will mitigate some of this risk taking. 
However, risk taking might be exacerbated if as has been illustrated using mutual fund 
flow data, fund flows are a convex function of past performance where good 
performance leads to significant fund inflows, but where poor performance leads to 
smaller net outflows.  This results in manager compensation having a call option-like 
feature that can induce the manager to indulge in excessive risk-taking. 
 
In this chapter I present empirical evidence of the influence of the hedge fund industry’s 
typical fee structure on the risk taking behaviour of hedge fund managers.  My analysis 
takes explicit account of the option-like features of the compensation structure.  I also 
analyse the various hedge fund strategies separately rather than assuming that manager 
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behaviour is effectively unaffected by their strategies, which is often the implicit 
assumption of other work in this area.  Amongst other things, my results enable me to 
distinguish between and to say something about the competing theoretical models that 
seek to identify the relationship between incentives and hedge fund manager behaviour.  
To do this I use a large database of hedge fund returns and identify each fund’s position 
relative to its peer group and to its high-water mark. After identifying the position of 
each fund in each of these two ways I can then examine whether hedge fund managers 
adjust the volatility of their fund in response to their performance relative to other hedge 
funds or the “moneyness” of the performance option.  
 
I aim to answer questions of the following kind: do those funds that find that their 
incentive option is out of the money “put it all on black” and increase risk; do they 
maintain risk levels; or do they reduce them?  I then attempt to reconcile these results 
with the theoretical frameworks proposed. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
literature related to my analysis, Section 3 outlines the data and construction 
methodology, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2 A REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL MODELS OF 
BEHAVIOUR IN THE PRESENCE OF INCENTIVE FEES 
 
The conflicting results of theoretical models of fund manager behaviour in the presence 
of incentive fees and the importance of the implicit terms is clearly illustrated by 
contrasting the findings of Carpenter (2000), Goetzmann et al (2003), Hodder and 
Jackwerth (2007) and Panageas and Westerfield (2008). Carpenter (2000) examined the 
optimal risk taking behaviour of a risk-averse mutual fund manager who is paid with a 
call option on the assets they control (similar to hedge fund incentive fees). She found 
that a manager paid with an incentive fee increases the risk of the fund’s investment 
strategy if the fund’s return is below the hurdle rate and decreases the risk if the fund is 
above the hurdle rate. Carpenter’s analysis is for a single evaluation period and does not 
consider the possibility of the fund being liquidated unless the value goes to zero. 
Goetzmann et al (2003) provide a closed-form solution to the cost of hedge fund fee 
contracts subject to a number of assumptions in a continuous time framework. They 
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model incentive fees as an option and find that the cost of the contract rises as the 
portfolio’s variance rises and hence conclude that the manager has the incentive to 
increase risk “provided other non modelled considerations are not overriding”. The 
authors include the possibility that the fund can be liquidated if its value falls below a 
specified boundary and show that as the fund’s value approaches this boundary the 
manager will reduce risk. So whereas Carpenter’s theoretical manager would increase 
(decrease) risk as the fund value falls (rises) Goetzmann et al’s would decrease 
(increase) risk as it falls (rises).  
 
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) consider the optimal risk-taking behaviour of an 
expected-utility maximising manager of a hedge fund who is compensated by both a 
management fee and an incentive fee. The authors also examine the effect of several 
implicit terms including the manager’s own investment in the fund, a liquidation barrier 
where the fund is shut down due to poor performance and the ability of the manager to 
voluntarily shut down the fund as well as to enhance the fund’s Sharpe Ratio through 
additional effort. Using a numerical approach they find that seemingly slight 
adjustments to the compensation structure can have dramatic effects on managerial risk 
taking behaviour. Specifically, they find that the existence of a liquidation barrier and 
an assumption that the managers own a percentage of the fund inhibits excessive risk 
taking as the fund value falls. 
 
Panageas and Westerfield (2008) find that a manager compensated with an incentive fee 
and a high-water mark will place a constant fraction in the risky asset if they are 
operating in an infinite horizon setting. The intuition behind this is that the manager 
does not optimise just one option but an infinite time series of options, a manager who 
is below the high-water mark could increase the value of the current option by taking 
excessive risk today. However this will decrease the value of future options because it 
will also increase the probability of negative returns while the high-watermark is still 
fixed. 
 
In Figure 3.1 I present a stylised summary of the differences between Carpenter’s 
(2000), Goetzmann et al’s (2003), Hodder and Jackwerth’s (2007) and Panageas and 
Westerfield’s (2008) models of fund manager behaviour in the presence of incentive 
fees. 
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Figure 3.1 
Comparison of Risk Choices Under Various Theoretical Models of Behaviour  
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This figure shows how the optimal proportion of assets held in the risky asset varies with fund value under four different theoretical 
models of behaviour, Carpenter (2000), Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003),  Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) and Panageas and 
Westerfield (2008) 
 
Figure 3.1 clearly illustrates the striking difference between Carpenter’s and Goetzmann 
et al’s models of behaviour. Carpenter assumes that the fund will only be liquidated if 
the fund value goes to zero hence as the value of the fund falls the manager increases 
risk to increase the chance of collecting incentive fees without fearing liquidation. On 
the other hand, Goetzmann et al have a fixed liquidation boundary, thus as the fund 
value approaches this boundary the manager decreases risk in order to reduce the 
probability of liquidation. In the model of  Panageas and Westerfield the manager holds 
a constant level of risk.  Hodder and Jackwerth’s model lies somewhere between the 
other three. 
 
However, even in the absence of incentive fees there are implicit terms to the 
compensation contract that could encourage excessive risk taking. Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) showed that if fund flows are a convex function of past performance, that is to 
say that more money flows into strong performers than out of weak performers, because 
the management fees are a fixed percentage of assets under management they will 
display call option like features. This in turn creates incentives for fund managers to 
increase or decrease the risk of the fund that are dependent on the fund's year-to-date 
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return. Sirri and Tufano (1998) and others have confirmed that flows in and out of 
mutual funds do exhibit this convexity, superior relative performance leads to the 
growth of assets under management while there is no substantial outflow in response to 
poor relative performance. This flow/performance relationship was investigated for 
hedge funds by Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) who find that funds in the top quintile 
of performers exhibit an inflow of 63%, while the bottom quintile exhibits an outflow of 
only 3%.   
 
An empirical investigation of the risk taking behaviour of mutual funds for the 16 year 
period from 1976 to 1991 was undertaken by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996). Using 
a contingency table approach they showed that mutual fund managers undertake what 
they termed as “tournament behaviour”, with funds whose mid-year returns were below 
the median (losers) increasing volatility in the latter part of the year by more than those 
funds whose mid-year returns were above the median (winners). The authors concluded 
that this behaviour was a direct consequence of the adverse incentives described above. 
Managers who have performed poorly by mid-year have incentives to increase their risk 
level to try and improve their ranking by the year-end; whereas managers with strong 
mid-year performance appeared to reduce risk in order to maintain their ranking.  
 
The empirical relationship between risk taking and incentives in hedge funds has been 
examined by Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Brown, Goetzmann 
and Park (2001) and many others. Using a regression approach Ackerman et al (1999) 
found a positive and significant relationship between the Sharpe ratio and the level of 
incentive fees but no statistically significant relationship between the level of risk (as 
measured by the standard deviation of returns) and the level of incentive fees. The 
authors concluded that this was evidence that the incentive structure was effective 
because it attracted top managers while not increasing their propensity to take on risk. 
Using a sample of hedge funds and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) from the TASS 
database Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) showed that survival probability depends 
on absolute and relative performance, excess volatility, and on fund age. Perhaps not 
surprisingly the authors found that excess risk and poor relative performance 
substantially increased the probability of termination which they argue is a cost 
sufficient to offset the adverse incentive of excessive risk taking provided by the fee 
contract. Using a contingency table approach similar to Brown, Harlow and Starks 
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(1996) they found that funds tend to increase (decrease) their risk in response to poor 
(strong) relative performance but not in response to their absolute performance.  
 
3.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 DATA 
A major limitation of earlier studies is that they implicitly assume that hedge funds are a 
homogenous asset class. In practice however, the term “hedge fund” refers to the 
structure of the investment vehicle rather than the investment strategy being followed. 
Different strategies have varying levels of risk and historic return which makes a 
strategy level comparison essential if the results are to be meaningful.  The data that I 
use in this study has been extracted from the TASS live and graveyard databases from 
January 1994 through to December 2007. More specifically, I extract monthly Net 
Asset Values (NAV), strategy details and inception dates for all hedge funds that are 
denominated in US Dollars, that report monthly and that have reported for at least one 
full calendar year over this sample period. These criteria result in a total sample of 
4,990 funds of which 2,449 are currently reporting and 2,541 are no longer reporting.  
The data are summarised in Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics for Hedge Fund Sample 1994-2007 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Convertible Arbitrage 26       38       40       47       51       64       75       81       104     120     122     105     97       66       
Dedicated Short Bias 11       13       12       14       17       17       22       18       18       19       20       19       20       15       
Emerging Markets 46       72       101     120     132     149     155     149     144     144     166     190     219     228     
Equity Market Neutral 12       20       31       41       55       77       106     116     148     170     175     188     194     163     
Event Driven 63       80       104     134     162     174     194     215     233     273     314     341     319     284     
Fixed Income Arbitrage 19       30       41       55       55       67       69       77       91       115     144     166     159     132     
Global Macro 48       55       61       68       83       87       76       77       89       112     135     139     147     131     
Long/Short Equity Hedge 175     225     278     375     468     554     659     762     840     899     968     1,015  1,055  950     
Managed Futures 156     175     169     179     186     176     178     172     160     172     188     210     217     214     
Multi-Strategy 20       25       36       51       62       73       85       101     119     153     176     192     238     266     
Total 576     733     873   1,084 1,271 1,438 1,619 1,768 1,946 2,177 2,408  2,565  2,665 2,449
Median Fund Size ($m) 6.6 5.5 6.1 8.0 11.0 11.3 15.6 18.9 20.0 20.7 27.0 28.9 31.2 60.0
Mean Fund Size ($m) 56.4 46.4 51.4 62.2 79.2 64.2 69.8 79.9 86.3 93.3 127.6 143.3 169.5 250.8
Median Age (months) 24       27       29       30       33       36       39       41       41       42       41       43       45       52       
Mean Age (months) 37       38       40       41       44       47       49       51       52       54       56       58       61       68        
 
This table presents summary information for the sample of hedge funds collected from the TASS database. Only funds that are 
denominated in US Dollars, report monthly performance and that have a return history spanning at least one full calendar year are 
included. The statistics for fund size are based on funds that report this information and thus do not represent every fund in the 
sample. Fund age is calculated based on the reported inception date of the fund. 
 
The total number of funds has increased rapidly over time from just over 500 in 1994 to 
approximately 2,500 in 2007, of which the long/short equity category comprised 950. 
The mean and median fund sizes have also increased over time, the difference between 
 75
these two statistics indicate that the sample is dominated by smaller funds. There is a 
similar but less pronounced pattern in the fund age.   
 
Using the net asset values (NAVs) of each fund as reported in the TASS database I 
calculate the monthly gross returns of each hedge fund over time using the a the 
procedure outlined in Chapter 3.  I use gross rather than net returns in order to isolate 
changes in risk that are a result of manager behaviour rather than being due to the 
mechanics of the incentive contract since as I demonstrated in the previous chapter 
incentive fees can have the effect of lowering the standard deviation of observed net 
returns when a fund is above its high-water mark which could clearly bias the results. 
 
Calculation of the exact delta of the fee option is problematic because I do not have an 
appropriate model or a true estimate of the implied volatility, so instead I use the 
“moneyness” of the option as a proxy for delta.  Moneyness is defined as: 
 
fMy
fMy
fMy
arkHighWaterM
NAV
Moneyness =      (1) 
 
where MoneynessfMy defines fund f’s value after M months of the year relative to its 
previous maximum value as represented by its high water mark at time, 
HighWaterMarkfMy 
 
3.3.2 METHODOLOGY 
One has to be extremely careful when interpreting the relationship between the risk 
choices of a fund manager in response to returns because the two are inherently linked. 
In the previous chapter, figure 6 showed the distribution of hedge fund returns 
conditional upon the moneyness of the incentive option for three sub-samples defined as 
“at the money” (ATM), “in the money” (ITM) and “out of the money” (OTM). The 
standard deviation of both the OTM and the ITM samples were statistically larger than 
for the ATM sample, which could support the hypothesis that hedge funds increase their 
risk when they are significantly below or above their high-water mark as defined in 
expression (1).  
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However there is an alternative explanation for the above result: funds that produce high 
return volatility are more likely to have extremely positive (or negative) performance 
and hence more likely to be classified as in (or out) of the money. Whereas funds with 
low return volatility are less likely to have had extreme return outcomes and hence are 
more likely to be classified as at the money.  In order to investigate this I calculate the 
annualised standard deviation of gross returns for the funds in my sample for each 
calendar year as well as the moneyness of the incentive option at the end of the year. I 
then split the sample into 12 sub-samples based on levels of moneyness between 0.70 
and 1.30 and calculate the median standard deviation for each sub sample. The results 
are presented in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 
Median Annualised Standard Deviation by Moneyness of Incentive Option 
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This figure shows the median historical annualised standard deviation of returns versus various levels of moneyness measured at 
the end of each calendar year. 
 
The “V” shape of figure 3.2 illustrates that the alternative explanation of my earlier 
results is extremely possible. Those funds with historically lower standard deviation are 
more likely to be closer to “at the money” whereas those with higher standard deviation 
are more likely to be significantly in or out of the money. 
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In order to examine whether funds adjust the risk of their portfolios in response to their 
performance I need to examine the standard deviation of returns before and after a 
specific assessment point in time.   
 
Using gross monthly hedge fund returns I calculate the annualised performance of fund 
f between January and month M.  Specifically, for each fund f in a given year y, I 
calculate the M-month cumulative return as follows: ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 11......11Return 1221 −+++++= MfMyyfyffMy rrr         (2) 
 
where rf is the monthly gross return for hedge fund f. In my initial analysis I set M to 6 
(June), but I also allow month M to vary between April and August so that the return is 
measured over periods ranging from four to eight months.  I refer to this period as the 
“assessment period”, that is, the period over which I assess the performance of each 
fund. 
 
In order to analyse whether hedge funds adjust the risk of their portfolios in the post 
assessment period, that is from month M to December, I follow Brown et al (1996) and 
calculate the Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR) using the following expression: 
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where RARfy represents the RAR of fund f in year y.  Expression (3) is simply the ratio 
of the standard deviation of returns for the post assessment period to the standard 
deviation of returns over the assessment period. In my base case the assessment period 
is from January to June (M=6).  This analysis is conducted using non-overlapping 
assessment and post assessment periods. 
 
As well as assessing the performance of the fund from January to month M, I also 
calculate the moneyness of the incentive fee option at the end of month M.  The 
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performance of any fund over the assessment period might be above the median return 
for its strategy, but still may not be sufficient to lift the fund’s performance above its 
high water mark and therefore may not be enough for the manger to be able to claim a 
performance fee.  By using moneyness as a way of categorising the position of the fund 
and therefore the fund manager’s attitude to risk, I can assess the influence not only of 
relative performance, but also the value of the incentive option on manager behaviour.   
 
I analyse the post-assessment performance of fund f relative to the performance of the 
hedge fund strategy to which it belongs. I therefore ask whether the funds adjust their 
behaviour relative to their peer group. I normalise the post assessment return and the 
RAR by using the following expressions: 
 [ ]sMyfMyfMy turnMedianturnturnNormalised ReReRe −=         (5) 
 [ ]sMyfMyfMy RARMedianRARRARNormalised −=         (6) 
 
where s is one of the ten individual strategies being considered such that Normalised 
Return  and Normalised RAR are measures of how fund f either performed or changed 
risk relative to other funds following the same strategy for a particular period. A value 
greater (less) than zero for each expressions (5) and (6) should therefore be taken to 
indicate that the fund in question has either outperformed (underperformed) its peer 
group, or increased (decreased) its risk by more (less) than its peer group for the 
particular period in question. 
 
Using the variables calculated above I construct 2x2 contingency tables in order to test 
whether hedge funds adjust their risk in response to either their relative performance or 
the moneyness of their incentive option. Specifically I construct two 2x2 tables where I 
split the funds into those with high (Normalised RAR>0) or low (Normalised RAR<0) 
Risk Adjustment Ratios conditioned upon either past performance or moneyness. The 
null hypothesis in each case is that the percentage of the sample population falling into 
each of the high or low RAR categories is independent of either the return or the 
moneyness. The statistical significance of these frequencies is tested in 2 ways: 
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i) a chi-square test having one degree of freedom (though this might be 
mis-specified as it assumes the cell counts are independent); and  
ii) the log odds ratio, which is robust to the misspecification of the chi-
square test and also provides additional information regarding the 
direction and level of dependence. 
 
Although the contingency table approach will identify whether there is any directional 
relationship between the Risk Adjustment Ratio and either past performance or the 
moneyness of the incentive option, this approach assumes that the relationship is linear. 
In order to examine further this relationship I construct tables where Normalised RAR is 
conditioned upon either: 
 
i) 12 levels of moneyness between 0.70 and 1.30, and 
ii) 10 Deciles of relative performance 
 
For each of these sub-samples I then test whether the median Normalised RAR is 
significantly different from zero using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. 
 
3.4 RESULTS 
 
In panel A of Table 3.2 I present summary statistics of the median annualised return for 
each strategy and for all funds on an annual basis using a 6 month assessment period; in 
Panel B I present the median moneyness for the same break down of funds over the 
assessment period; while in Panel C I present the RAR for the assessment period for the 
same stratification. 
 
These results clearly illustrate the heterogeneous nature of the ten hedge fund strategies 
being examined. For example consider a global macro hedge fund in 1994 that 
produced an annualised return of 1% in the first half of the year and had a RAR of 0.80. 
Treating hedge funds as one homogenous group would classify this as being below the 
1.5% median return and below the 0.85 median RAR, yet it is considerably above the 
median return of -8.3% and above the median RAR of 0.74 for funds following the 
same strategy, namely global macro.  Additionally market conditions at particular points 
in time can affect different strategies in different ways, for example the median RAR for 
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fixed income arbitrage funds during the 1998 LTCM/Russian debt crisis was 2.93, but it 
was only 1.33 for global macro funds and 1.84 for all hedge funds.   
 
 
Table 3.2 
Summary Statistics Return, Moneyness and Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR) 
1994-2007 
 
Panel A:  Median (Annualised) Gross Return
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Convertible Arbitrage -5.4% 18.6% 24.9% 19.3% 14.4% 19.9% 28.2% 22.4% 11.3% 16.5% 1.4% -7.3% 17.4% 12.5%
Dedicated Short Bias 57.1% -8.7% -4.7% 2.7% -2.6% -14.5% -16.1% 7.2% 39.9% -18.5% -4.3% 7.8% -0.3% -8.1%
Emerging Markets -5.0% -0.8% 38.5% 51.5% -19.2% 47.2% 8.4% 15.5% 20.7% 42.3% 7.3% 12.0% 17.3% 29.8%
Equity Market Neutral 6.9% 17.4% 23.0% 20.6% 14.5% 12.7% 20.5% 12.8% 6.9% 7.6% 5.1% 7.8% 14.5% 13.3%
Event Driven 9.7% 23.8% 25.5% 20.1% 17.8% 23.6% 21.6% 11.5% 4.2% 23.5% 10.3% 8.1% 17.7% 18.2%
Fixed Income Arbitrage 9.5% 17.6% 20.3% 21.2% 11.7% 19.6% 12.1% 15.8% 15.7% 12.8% 9.1% 7.7% 12.9% 11.9%
Global Macro -8.3% 19.9% 13.5% 14.1% 8.5% 4.7% 6.3% 11.3% 11.9% 18.5% 1.0% 6.2% 7.6% 15.2%
Long/Short Equity Hedge -0.3% 32.6% 35.6% 27.7% 24.5% 42.0% 20.2% 8.2% 2.5% 18.1% 6.8% 6.1% 14.2% 24.1%
Managed Futures 2.7% 22.1% 4.7% 16.4% 4.9% 7.4% -3.0% 5.1% 13.0% 22.3% -8.3% -0.5% 15.8% 12.4%
Multi-Strategy -2.5% 18.6% 20.5% 21.1% 16.7% 23.0% 28.1% 14.9% 6.6% 14.8% 6.2% 4.1% 14.5% 18.9%
All Funds 1.5% 21.6% 23.7% 22.5% 15.2% 24.3% 15.8% 11.3% 7.3% 17.5% 5.9% 6.3% 14.5% 18.9%
Panel B:  Median Moneyness
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Convertible Arbitrage 0.97 1.04 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.03 1.06 1.01 0.94 1.04 1.0
Dedicated Short Bias 1.11 1.00 0.83 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.98 0.89 0.71 0.65 0.61 0.53
Emerging Markets 0.97 0.96 1.06 1.09 0.90 0.83 0.92 0.97 1.04 1.07 1.02 1.02 1.06 1.08
Equity Market Neutral 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.0
Event Driven 1.02 1.06 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.06 1.02 1.01 1.06 1.07
Fixed Income Arbitrage 1.03 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.0
Global Macro 0.92 1.00 1.05 1.03 1.03 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.0
Long/Short Equity Hedge 1.00 1.06 1.13 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.0
Managed Futures 0.98 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.01 0.97 1.10 0.98 0.96 1.04 1.0
Multi-Strategy 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.06
All Funds 1.00 1.04 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.0
Panel C:  Median RAR
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Convertible Arbitrage 1.00 0.78 1.14 1.27 2.09 1.03 0.90 0.67 1.84 0.89 0.59 0.72 0.54 2.1
Dedicated Short Bias 0.92 1.09 1.59 0.92 2.06 1.24 1.01 1.19 1.39 0.84 1.50 1.18 0.88 1.34
Emerging Markets 0.89 0.59 0.72 1.65 1.75 1.02 0.74 1.29 0.94 0.86 0.70 1.18 0.51 1.68
Equity Market Neutral 0.96 1.25 0.96 0.97 1.65 0.87 0.75 0.80 1.44 1.01 0.99 1.05 0.83 1.4
Event Driven 0.85 0.97 0.97 1.02 2.58 0.93 0.70 1.09 1.20 0.77 1.10 1.08 0.85 1.62
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.88 0.86 1.00 1.14 2.93 1.09 0.84 1.24 1.14 1.20 0.81 0.87 0.92 1.9
Global Macro 0.74 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.33 1.14 0.89 0.87 0.99 0.98 0.93 1.09 0.72 1.8
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.87 1.31 1.15 1.08 1.78 1.02 0.66 0.92 1.25 0.88 1.09 1.06 0.65 1.6
Managed Futures 0.80 0.85 1.01 1.36 1.81 0.96 1.50 1.10 1.17 0.68 0.74 1.02 0.83 1.3
Multi-Strategy 0.82 1.07 0.85 1.33 1.97 1.07 0.79 0.86 1.35 0.90 0.89 1.14 0.66 2.13
All Funds 0.85 0.97 1.00 1.17 1.84 1.01 0.76 0.97 1.24 0.86 0.95 1.05 0.71 1.6
4
4
4
3
8
2
6
8
0
3
7
8
3
8  
This table presents median values for various statistics for both individual strategies and for all funds in the sample using a 6 month 
assessment and post assessment period.  Panel A presents the median annualised return for M=6 calculated from equation (2) in the 
text. Panel B presents the median moneyness for M=6 calculated from equation (4).  Panel C presents the median risk adjustment 
ratio calculated from equation (3) for M=6. 
 
Although I do calculate the performance statistics described in Section 3 above treating 
all hedge funds as one group, I believe that the results are more meaningful when they 
are considered by strategy. 
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3.4.1 CONTINGENCY TABLES 
 
Table 3.3 shows the contingency table results using the period from January to the end 
of June in each full year as the assessment period (M=6) categorised by their returns 
over the assessment period (Panel A) and by moneyness at the end of June (Panel B), 
and therefore the period from July to December as the post assessment period. 
 
Panel A shows that over the full sample period I can reject the null hypothesis of 
independence between the relative return and RAR.  More specifically, the Low 
Return/High RAR and High Return/Low RAR cells have statistically significantly 
larger frequencies than the other two outcomes. This result is in line with the findings of 
Brown et al (1996) for mutual funds: those funds that have generated returns that are 
below the median for their strategy over the first six months of the year are likely to 
increase risk more than the median fund possibly in order to try and improve their 
whole-of-year ranking; while those funds that have achieved above median returns for 
their strategy are more likely to decrease risk, possibly in order to protect their returns 
and relative performance rankings. Taking each year individually, the log odds ratio 
shows that the relationship is in the same direction for 12 out of the 14 years in the 
sample and is statistically significant for ten of these years. 
 
Panel B shows that for the full 14 year sample period I can reject the null hypothesis of 
independence between moneyness and the subsequent RAR with the Below HW 
Mark/High RAR and Above HW Mark/Low RAR cells having statistically significant 
and larger frequencies than the other two outcomes implying that those funds that find 
themselves below their high-water marks after six months increase risk relative to the 
median risk during the post assessment period, and those funds above it decrease risk. 
When I look at individual years, the log odds ratio shows that the relationship is only in 
the same direction for 11 out of the 14 years in the sample and is only statistically 
significant for 5 of them.  In fact in 2007 the relationship is statistically significant and 
in the opposite direction – implying that in this year funds that were below their high 
water mark after 6 months reduced their risk relative to the median risk during the post 
assessment period.  
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 Proportions in the body of the table give the proportion of funds that fall into each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete return
history for each calendar year. Above and below median measures are defined as Normalised Return or RAR greater or less than zero. The log odds
ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the second and third columns to the product of the first and fourth with standard error and the t-value
measures the significance of this ratio. The chi-square number represent the statistics from the 2x2 contingency tables with 1 degree of freedom.
Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **.  
Table 3.3 -Contingency Tables of Relative Returns, Moneyness and Risk Adjustment Ratio
Panel A
Observations Lower RAR Higher RAR Lower RAR Higher RAR
1994 576                   25.69% 23.96% 24.65% 25.69% -0.1113 0.1667 -0.67 0.45
1995 733                   21.96% 26.74% 28.38% 22.92% 0.4103 0.1486 2.76 7.65**
1996 873                   20.39% 27.26% 29.90% 22.45% 0.5769 0.1369 4.21 17.87**
1997 1,084                21.86% 27.86% 28.41% 21.86% 0.5044 0.1225 4.12 17.06**
1998 1,2                
1999 1,4                
2000 1,6                
2001 1,7                
2002 1,9                
2003 2,1                
2004 2,4                
2005 2,5                
2006 2,6                
2007 2,4                
1994-2007 23,              
Panel B
1994                    
1995                    
1996                    
1997 1,0                
1998 1,2                
1999 1,4                
2000 1,6                
2001 1,7                
2002 1,9                
2003 2,1                
2004 2,4                
2005 2,5                
2006 2,6                
2007 2,4                
1994-2007 23,              
t-value Chi-SquareLog Odds Ratio
Std Error Log 
Odds
Below Median Return Above Median Return
71 23.92% 25.18% 26.28% 24.63% 0.1162 0.1123 1.04 1.07
38 20.38% 27.96% 29.83% 21.84% 0.6283 0.1068 5.88 34.87**
19 22.30% 26.25% 27.86% 23.59% 0.3293 0.0998 3.30 10.91**
68 23.53% 25.57% 26.64% 24.26% 0.1764 0.0952 1.85 3.43
46 22.51% 26.16% 27.60% 23.74% 0.3007 0.0910 3.31 10.95**
77 20.26% 28.25% 29.86% 21.64% 0.6547 0.0869 7.53 57.24**
08 22.84% 25.71% 27.20% 24.25% 0.2329 0.0817 2.85 8.14**
65 25.03% 22.92% 25.07% 26.98% -0.1613 0.0791 -2.04 4.16*
65 22.78% 26.38% 27.35% 23.49% 0.2992 0.0777 3.85 14.85**
49 23.23% 24.50% 26.87% 25.40% 0.1093 0.0809 1.35 1.82
572 22.68% 25.91% 27.47% 23.94% 0.2708 0.0261 10.37 107.61**
Lower RAR Higher RAR Lower RAR Higher RAR
576 25.52% 25.17% 24.83% 24.48% 0.0004 0.1667 0.00 0.00
733 15.14% 18.01% 35.20% 31.65% 0.2795 0.1574 1.78 3.16
873 9.51% 11.68% 40.78% 38.03% 0.2759 0.1664 1.66 2.76
84 8.39% 9.32% 41.88% 40.41% 0.1401 0.1593 0.88 0.77
71 14.63% 14.24% 35.56% 35.56% -0.0272 0.1238 -0.22 0.05
38 11.89% 15.79% 38.32% 34.01% 0.4027 0.1188 3.39 11.55**
19 16.12% 17.11% 34.03% 32.74% 0.0984 0.1056 0.93 0.87
68 17.48% 18.55% 32.69% 31.28% 0.1039 0.0991 1.05 1.10
46 20.40% 20.91% 29.70% 28.98% 0.0494 0.0921 0.54 0.29
77 12.68% 15.34% 37.44% 34.54% 0.2712 0.0958 2.83 8.04*
08 16.74% 19.27% 33.31% 30.69% 0.2228 0.0851 2.62 6.87*
65 18.87% 15.36% 31.23% 34.54% -0.3066 0.0836 -3.67 13.50**
65 7.69% 10.81% 42.44% 39.06% 0.4229 0.1010 4.19 17.68**
49 5.76% 4.29% 44.34% 45.61% -0.3229 0.1358 -2.38 5.69
572 13.85% 14.78% 36.30% 35.07% 0.0997 0.0288 3.46 11.96**
Above High-Water Mark
t-value Chi-SquareLog Odds Ratio
Std Error Log 
Odds
Below High-Water Mark
        
   
8
3
These results imply that although hedge fund managers adjust their risk in response to 
both their relative returns and according to the moneyness of the incentive option the 
effect is more pronounced in the former rather than the latter case.  This is borne out by 
the fact that the log odds ratio of 0.2708 is greater overall when performance is 
benchmarked against the median performance (last row, column (7) of Table 3.3, Panel 
A) compared with a logs odds ratio of 0.0997 when performance is assessed as a 
function of the moneyness of the fund at the start of the post assessment period (last 
row, column (7) of Table 3.3, Panel B). 
 
After considering the case of M=6 I now consider other assessment and post assessment 
periods.  My original choice of M=6 was a relatively arbitrary one.  It may be that funds 
change their risk exposures in response to their performance relative to their peers, or 
because of the moneyness of the incentive option earlier, or later in the year.  In Table 4 
I present results analogous to those in Table 3 but with M=4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.  My 
assessment periods are therefore either from January to April (M=4) or from January to 
May (M=5) etc; and I calculate the moneyness of the fund at the end of April (M=4) or 
at the end of May (M=5) etc.  The results are all for the full 14 year sample rather than 
for individual years2. 
 
Panel A in Table 3.4 shows that for all assessment periods the effect of relative return 
on normalised RAR is statistically significant but at a declining rate, as evidenced by 
the declining value of the log odds ratio that falls from 0.2401 to 0.1597. This result 
suggests that fund managers are more likely to change their risk taking behaviour earlier 
on in the year rather than later in the year – and most likely halfway through the year. 
The effect of moneyness (presented in panel B) appears to be only statistically 
significant for M=6 and M=8, with the log odds ratio increasing from -0.0024 to 0.0931 
as we move from M=4 to M=8.  
 
These results imply that hedge fund managers care more about relative return early in 
the year but more about the value of their incentive option (absolute return) later on in 
the year. One possible explanation for this is that as the year moves towards its end 
managers have less chance or opportunity to improve their ranking but can attempt to 
                                                 
2
I repeat the results for M=6 here for completeness.  Yearly results for each value of M are available on 
request. 
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Proportions in the body of the table give the proportion of funds falling into each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete return history for each calendar year. Above 
and below median measures are defined as Normalised Return or RAR greater or less than zero. The log odds ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the second and third columns to 
the product of the first and fourth with standard error and the t-value measuring the significance of this. The chi-square number represents the statistics from the 2x2 contingency tables 
with 1 degree of freedom. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
Table 3.4 - Contingency Tables of Relative Returns, Moneyness and Risk Adjustment Ratio Varying the Assessment Period
Panel A
Obs Lower RAR Higher RAR Lower RAR Higher RAR
(4,8) 23,574   22.82% 25.68% 27.32% 24.18% 0.2401 0.0261 9.20 84.65**
(5,7) 22.64% 25.88% 27.50% 23.98% 0.2704 0.0261 10.35 107.34**
(6,6) 22.68% 25.91% 27.47% 23.94% 0.2708 0.0261 10.37 107.61**
(7,5) 23.31% 25.44% 26.83% 24.42% 0.1819 0.0261 6.97 48.63**
(8,4) 23.56% 25.41% 26.59% 24.44% 0.1597 0.0261 6.13 37.54**
Panel B
Obs Lower RAR Higher RAR Lower RAR Higher RAR
(4,8) 23,574   15.92% 15.81% 34.22% 34.05% -0.0024 0.0280 -0.08 0.01
(5,7) 14.94% 15.52% 35.20% 34.34% 0.0633 0.0283 2.24 5.01
(6,6) 13.85%
(7,5) 14.40%
(8,4) 14.33%
t-value Chi-Square
Below High-Water Mark Above High-Water Mark
Log Odds Ratio Std Error Log Odds t-value Chi-Square
Below Median Return Above Median Return
Log Odds Ratio Std Error Log OddsAssessment Period
Assessment Period
14.78% 36.30% 35.07% 0.0997 0.0288 3.46 11.96**
14.94% 35.74% 34.92% 0.0599 0.0286 2.09 4.38
15.21% 35.82% 34.64% 0.0931 0.0286 3.26 10.62**
                                
8
5
maximise the fees they will receive by increasing risk, though the data does not support 
this. The proportion of funds that are below their high-water mark that increase risk 
actually falls from 15.81% over the (4,8) assessment period to 15.21% over the (8,4) 
assessment period.  Rather the result appears to be driven by the proportion of funds 
that are above their high-water mark who reduce risk which increases from 34.22% to 
35.82%. 
 
3.4.2 DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS 
Having ascertained that there appears to be a relationship between the risk taking 
decisions of hedge fund managers and both their relative performance and the value of 
their incentive option using 2x2 contingency tables I now examine the relationship 
across a broader cross-section of relative returns and moneyness. 
 
Table 3.5 presents the results for the effect of relative performance on Normalised RAR 
for M=6. These results are shown in Figure 3.3 too.  Although the funds in the top four 
performance deciles reduce risk this reduction is only statistically significant for the 
first and fourth deciles. Meanwhile there is a statistically significant increase in risk for 
the fifth to the ninth performance deciles. This confirms my previous results and is 
consistent with the mutual fund literature that shows that fund managers react to their 
implicit incentives to increase (decrease) risk in order to improve (maintain) their 
ranking by year end. 
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This figure shows the median normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile with statistically significant values in red and others in grey 
Table 3.5 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Performance Decile 
 
8
7
Observations 2,132        2,275        2,304        2,378        2,363        2,427        2,397        2,438        2,432        2,426        
Median Normalised RAR -0.0088** 0.0726** 0.0475** 0.0624** 0.0470** 0.0441** -0.0036** -0.0397 -0.0484 -0.1449**
Wilcoxon Statistic -2.9985 -10.3075 -9.2600 -10.6714 -9.5400 -8.6747 -5.2503 -0.6152 -0.3410 -8.1947
p-Value 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5384 0.7331 0.0000
1234
(6,6)
Assessment 
Period
Performance Decile 10 9 678 5
The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile  as well as the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median. Values significant at the 5% level are 
denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **.with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
Figure 3.3 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Performance Decile
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Table 3.6 presents the results for the effect of the moneyness of the incentive option 
(absolute performance) on subsequent Normalised RAR for M=6.  These results are 
shown in Figure 3.4 too.  
Here we see that there is evidence of a statistically significant change in risk behaviour 
across the moneyness categories. For moneyness above 1.15, that is for fund’s that are  
15% above the high-water mark half way through the year, there appears to be a 
statistically significant risk reduction, this is in line with the theoretical models 
presented by Carpenter (2000) and Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) who describe this as 
“locking in” behaviour. However for moneyness between 1.05 and 0.90 that is 5% 
above to 10% below the high - water mark after six months there is a statistically 
significant increase in risk. More interestingly we can see that for funds that are more 
than 10% below their high water mark after the first half of the year there is a reduction 
in risk taking behaviour and this reduction in risk is statistically significant for levels of 
moneyness down to 0.80.  These results clearly do not support Carpenter’s model but 
are much closer to the model proposed by Hodder and Jackwerth. 
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This figure shows the median normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance level of moneyness with statistically significant values in red and others in grey 
Table 3.6 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Moneyness 
 
8
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Figure 3.4 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Moneyness
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Observations 244           300           460           810           1,358        2,796        6,292        5,140        2,420        1,197        691           342           
Normalised RAR -0.0037 -0.0332 -0.0171* -0.0074* 0.0207** 0.0481** 0.0437** 0.0133** -0.0678 -0.0665* -0.1334** -0.1387**
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.1305 -0.4416 -2.0408 -2.5126 -4.7442 -9.4457 -15.7107 -9.3987 -0.3358 -1.9776 -3.9762 -2.9477
p-Value 0.2583 0.6588 0.0413 0.0120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7370 0.0480 0.0001 0.0032
0.70-0.75 0.75-0.80 1.05-1.10 1.10-1.150.80-0.85 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00
Assessment 
Period
Moneyness 1.20-1.25 1.25-1.301.15-1.20
(6,6)
1.00-1.05
0.75-0.80 0.80-0.85 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00 1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15 1.15-1.20 1.20-1.25 1.25-1.30
Moneyness
The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile  as well as the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median. Values significant at the 5% level are 
denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **.
3.4.3 VARYING THE ASSESSMENT PERIOD  
Table 3.7 presents the results for the effect of relative performance on Normalised RAR 
for a assessment periods ranging from (4,8) to (8,4). The results are broadly consistent 
across all assessment periods with a large negative and significant normalised RAR for 
the top performing decile and smaller positive normalised RAR for lower deciles. 
 
Table 3.8 presents the results for the effect of moneyness on Normalised RAR for a 
assessment periods ranging from (4,8) to (8,4). In contrast to the results for the response 
to relative performance, here I find significant changes in response as I vary the 
assessment period. As the assessment period increases from M=4 to M=8, although the 
results for above 1.10 moneyness are broadly consistent, with a normalised RAR 
significantly below zero, managers that are below their high-water mark appear to 
change their behaviour. In the early part of the year normalised RAR is below zero for 
levels of moneyness below 0.85 (in some cases this is statistically significantly), 
however as we move towards August (8,4) there is a significant increase in risk, in fact 
for the (8,4) assessment period the median normalised RAR is significantly above zero 
for all levels of moneyness below 1.15.  
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Table 3.7 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Performance Decile, Varying the Assessment Period 
Observations 2112 2293 2303 2365 2361 2434 2403 2441 2417 2445
Median Normalised RAR -0.0163** 0.0259** 0.0425** 0.0593** 0.0571** 0.0463** -0.0008** -0.0156** -0.0452 -0.1382**
Wilcoxon Statistic -4.3230 -8.8680 -10.1317 -11.3619 -11.3571 -11.2073 -7.1557 -4.7867 -1.6422 -7.1910
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1006 0.0000
Observations 2117 2279 2321 2382 2338 2435 2416 2422 2434 2430
Median Normalised RAR -0.0173** 0.0470** 0.0603** 0.0492** 0.0402** 0.0397** -0.0001** -0.0253** -0.0585 -0.1336**
Wilcoxon Statistic -3.2537 -9.9317 -10.8222 -10.7923 -9.2358 -9.6500 -5.4474 -2.8691 -0.0705 -7.5317
p-Value 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 0.9438 0.0000
Observatio
Median Normalised RA
Wilcoxon Statist
p-Valu
Observatio
Median Normalised RA
Wilcoxon Statist
p-Valu
Observatio
Median Normalised RA
Wilcoxon Statist
p-Valu
6
(5,7)
78
(6,6)
(7,5)
Assessment 
Period
9Performance Decile 12
(4,8)
5 4 3
(8,4)
10
ns 2132 2275 2304 2378 2363 2427 2397 2438 2432 2426
R -0.0088** 0.0726** 0.0475** 0.0624** 0.0470** 0.0441** -0.0036** -0.0397 -0.0484 -0.1449**
ic -2.9985 -10.3075 -9.2600 -10.6714 -9.5400 -8.6747 -5.2503 -0.6152 -0.3410 -8.1947
e 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5384 0.7331 0.0000
ns 2158 2288 2317 2371 2359 2428 2391 2427 2412 2423
R -0.0134** 0.0430** 0.0354** 0.0406** 0.0347** 0.0364** -0.0011** -0.0053** -0.0412 -0.1496**
ic -3.7883 -7.3760 -8.3569 -8.5266 -8.1039 -8.1704 -5.2824 -4.1589 -1.8652 -7.1575
e 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0622 0.0000
ns 2199 2295 2328 2366 2355 2417 2376 2402 2423 2413
R 0.0323** 0.0288** 0.0089** 0.0233** 0.0450** 0.0022** 0.0106** 0.0113** -0.0420 -0.1461**
ic -7.0864 -7.5212 -6.1737 -7.2004 -7.8144 -5.8398 -6.2301 -4.5616 -1.7225 -4.9008
e 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0850 0.0000
The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile  as well as the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median. Values significant at the 5% level 
are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
Observations 209 310 498 795 1533 3347 7943 4528 1828 802 359 223
Median Normalised RAR -0.0040* -0.0206 -0.0643 0.0000** -0.0018** 0.0228** 0.0597** -0.0077** -0.0713 -0.0551 -0.1348** -0.1303*
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.99 -0.45 -0.24 -3.11 -5.04 -9.26 -21.42 -8.19 -0.65 -1.41 -3.19 -2.13
p-Value 0.05 0.65 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.16 0.00 0.03
Observations 246 311 479 805 1387 3190 7029 4935 2095 1016 520 265
Median Normalised RAR -0.0392 0.0019 -0.0277 0.0248** 0.0120** 0.0281** 0.0499** 0.0000** -0.0690 -0.0831* -0.0699* -0.1458**
Wilcoxon Statistic -0.42 -0.64 -1.88 -3.11 -4.68 -9.77 -17.97 -8.31 -1.14 -2.51 -2.15 -3.31
p-Value 0.68 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.00
Observations 244 300 460 810 1358 2796 6292 5140 2420 1197 691 342
Median Normalised RAR -0.0037 -0.0332 -0.0171* -0.0074* 0.0207** 0.0481** 0.0437** 0.0133** -0.0678 -0.0665* -0.1334** -0.1387**
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.13 -0.44 -2.04 -2.51 -4.74 -9.45 -15.71 -9.40 -0.34 -1.98 -3.98 -2.95
p-Value 0.26 0.66 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.05 0.00 0.00
Observations 261
Median Normalised RAR 0.0395
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.84
p-Value 0.07
Observations 284
Median Normalised RAR 0.1052*
Wilcoxon Statistic -2.99
p-Value 0.00
0.90-0.950.70-0.75
(7,5)
(8,4)
Assessment 
Period
0.75-0.80 0.80-0.85 0.85-0.90
(6,6)
(5,7)
1.20-1.25 1.25-1.30Moneyness 1.15-1.20
(4,8)
0.95-1.00 1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15
361 528 828 1452 2637 5700 4976 2547 1314 780 421
-0.0116 0.0507** 0.0264** -0.0079** 0.0118** 0.0276** 0.0212** -0.0211** -0.0436 -0.1118 -0.1123**
-1.53 -3.62 -3.56 -3.51 -6.50 -12.73 -10.25 -2.61 -0.59 -1.50 -3.03
0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.13 0.00
361 554 829 1380 2607 5193 4881 2698 1417 825 504
* 0.1201** 0.0158** 0.0035** 0.0046** 0.0220** 0.0290** 0.0032** 0.0005** -0.0431 -0.0689 -0.0863
-5.04 -2.72 -3.06 -3.85 -6.53 -11.76 -8.27 -5.02 -0.60 -0.42 -1.65
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.67 0.10
The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance level of moneyness  as well as the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median. Values significant at 
the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
Table 3.8 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Moneyness Varying the Assessment Period 
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3.4.4 SIZE AND AGE EFFECTS 
The previous analysis has shown that managers do appear to change their risk taking 
behaviour according to both relative performance and as a function of the value of their 
incentive option, with the former having the largest impact.   As suggested by the 
theoretical literature on this topic, the implicit terms of the compensation contract do 
appear to inhibit excessive risk taking by fund managers who find themselves 
substantially below their high-water mark.   
 
In the next section of the chapter I examine whether fund characteristics such as size 
and age have any impact on risk taking behaviour. 
 
3.4.4.1 SIZE 
Using a Probit regression Liang (2000) shows that fund size is an important factor in 
determining fund survival with smaller funds more likely to liquidate. With this in mind 
I now examine whether small and large funds differ in their risk taking behaviour in 
response to relative performance and dependent upon the moneyness of their incentive 
option. Using the fund size data reported in Table 3.1, I split the sample by defining 
large funds as those which are in the top quartile of assets and small funds as in the 
bottom quartile of assets under management. I then carry out the same contingency 
analysis as in the previous section on these sub-samples. 
 
In Table 3.9 and Figure 3.5 I present the results for the effect of relative performance on 
Normalised RAR for both large and small funds. The pattern of risk taking is similar for 
both the large and small fund samples with a normalised RAR of below zero for the first 
to third deciles and above zero for the fifth to ninth deciles. It is interesting to note that 
for the fifth, sixth, seventh deciles the median normalised RAR for the small fund 
sample is more positive, which suggests that smaller funds are more likely to increase 
risk, however the difference is not statistically significant. 
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 Table 3.9 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Performance Decile and Size
Figure 3.5 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio Performance Decile and Size
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Large
Small
Observations 321 314 303 335 343 356 360 332 350 320
Median Normalised RAR -0.0279 0.0917** 0.0469** 0.0465** 0.0333* 0.0324** 0.0299** -0.0154 -0.0045 -0.1826**
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.1079 -4.1535 -3.4364 -3.0948 -2.2909 -3.3899 -3.8732 -0.4925 -1.5033 -5.9635
p-Value 0.2679 0.0000 0.0006 0.0020 0.0220 0.0007 0.0001 0.6224 0.1328 0.0000
Observations 316 285 299 296 269 292 300 335 333 335
Median Normalised RAR 0.0282 0.0758** -0.0124 0.0759** 0.0814** 0.0528** -0.0141 -0.0465 -0.0380 -0.1553**
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.7392 -3.3250 -1.8508 -3.8803 -4.1628 -3.5853 -1.6791 -0.2421 -0.0849 -3.3331
p-Value 0.0820 0.0009 0.0642 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0931 0.8087 0.9323 0.0009
0.4364 0.2374 0.28240.4129 0.1448 0.7060 0.1202
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for 
Equal Medians p-value
0.7541 0.6050 0.2444
2 1
Small
6 5 4 310 9 8 7
Large
Performance Decile
r aPerfo m nce Decile 10 9 678 12345
The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile, the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median as well as the p-values for the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum test of equal medians between the two samples. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
This figure shows the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile and size with statistically significant values in bold colour and others in faint  
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FTable 3.10 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Moneyness and Size 
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igure 3.6 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Moneyness and Size 
Observations 23 38 55 93 181 363 933 804 350 147 94 40
Median Normalised RAR -0.0918 -0.0864 -0.0559 -0.0007 0.0251 0.0097* 0.0930** 0.0133** -0.0513 -0.0948* -0.1097* -0.1362
Wilcoxon Statistic -0.2433 -1.1674 -0.2932 -0.8138 -0.9985 -2.4175 -7.7977 -3.7271 -0.2035 -1.9724 -2.0646 -1.0081
p-Value 0.8078 0.2430 0.7693 0.4157 0.3180 0.0156 0.0000 0.0002 0.8387 0.0486 0.0390 0.3134
Observations 38 61 67 114 182 399 761 633 306 135 90 48
Median Normalised RAR 0.1699* -0.0276 -0.1402 -0.0537 -0.0066 0.0758** 0.0536** 0.0092** -0.0246 -0.1492 -0.1851** -0.2821
Wilcoxon Statistic -2.1246 -0.7219 -0.8808 -0.0410 -1.5926 -3.4845 -5.9742 -2.8281 -1.0474 -1.4451 -2.6000 -1.7566
p-Value 0.0336 0.4704 0.3784 0.9673 0.1112 0.0005 0.0000 0.0047 0.2949 0.1484 0.0093 0.0790
0.28720.4111 0.5843 0.3613 0.7121
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for 
Equal Medians p-value
0.1427 0.5057 0.8209 0.4906 0.5770 0.4436
1.20-1.25
0.4522
1.25-1.30
Small
1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15 1.15-1.200.80-0.85 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00Moneyness 0.70-0.75 0.75-0.80
0.95-1.00Moneyness 0.70-0.75 0.75-0.80 1.20-1.25 1.25-1.30
Large
1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15 1.15-1.200.80-0.85 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95
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The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by level of moneyness, the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median as well as the p-values for the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum test of equal medians between the two samples. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **.
This figure shows the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile and size with statistically significant values in bold colour and others in faint 
In Table 3.10 and in Figure 3.6 I present the results for the effect that the moneyness of 
the incentive option has on Normalised RAR for both large and small funds. For the 
funds that are significantly above their high-water mark (moneyness greater than 1.15), 
the median normalised RAR is more negative for the small fund sample suggesting 
smaller funds are more susceptible to “locking in” behaviour though this difference is 
not statistically significant. For those funds that are at or slightly below their high-water 
marks the median normalised RAR for the small fund sample is more positive than for 
large funds suggesting smaller funds are more prone to risk shifting behaviour, however 
for funds that are significantly below their high-water mark (moneyness of between 
0.80 and 0.90) this patter is reversed. This result would appear to be consistent with the 
literature because it could be the possibility of liquidation that prevents small funds 
from increasing risk once they are significantly below their high-water mark. 
 
3.4.4.2 FUND AGE 
Both Liang (2000) and Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) identify age as an 
important factor in determining fund survival with younger funds more likely to 
liquidate. With this in mind I now examine whether young and old funds differ in their 
risk taking behaviour in response to relative and absolute returns. Using the fund age 
data reported in Table 3.1, I split the sample by defining old funds as those which are in 
the top quartile of fund age and small funds as in the bottom quartile of fund age. I then 
carry out the same analysis as in the previous section on these sub-samples. 
 
Table 3.11 and Figure 3.7 present the results for the effect of relative performance on 
Normalised RAR for both young and old funds. The pattern of risk taking is almost 
identical for both the old and young fund samples with a normalised RAR of below zero 
for the first to third deciles and above zero for the fifth to ninth deciles and no statistical 
difference between the two samples for any decile. It is interesting to note that for the 
eighth, ninth and tenth deciles the median normalised RAR for the old fund sample is 
more positive suggesting that younger funds are less likely to increase risk following 
poor relative performance perhaps because they face a higher probability of liquidation. 
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Table 3.11 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Performance Decile and Age 
Figure 3.7 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio Performance Decile and Age
Observations 643 697 680 717 658 686 689 647 594 493
Median Normalised RAR 0.0241** 0.1168** 0.0555** 0.0458** 0.0467** 0.0798** -0.0140 -0.0380 -0.0379 -0.1492**
Wilcoxon Statistic -2.9036 -6.6506 -5.5035 -4.2515 -5.0717 -5.2879 -1.6818 -0.0684 -0.2484 -5.2388
p-Value 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0926 0.9455 0.8038 0.0000
Observations 372 360 416 410 412 482 439 485 551 674
Median Normalised RAR -0.0174 0.0616** 0.0487** 0.0454** 0.0532** 0.0748** 0.0086** -0.0474 -0.0380 -0.1582**
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.4823 -3.9925 -3.7809 -3.5777 -5.0333 -4.4316 -3.2604 -1.0448 -0.3694 -4.1649
p-Value 0.1383 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.2961 0.7118 0.0000
0.7059 0.8948 0.75450.6743 0.3229 0.9895 0.1812
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for 
Equal Medians p-value
0.6967 0.4473 0.9403
678 12345
7
Young
Performance Decile
Performance Decile 10 9
2 1
Old
6 5 4 310 9 8
The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by level of moneyness, the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median as well as the p-values for the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum test of equal medians between the two samples. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
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This figure shows the normalised risk adjustment ratio by performance decile and size with statistically significant values in bold colour and others in faint 
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Table 3.12 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio by Moneyness and Age 
Figure 3.8 - Median Normalised Risk Adjustment Ratio Moneyness and Age 
Observations 107           116           161           268           409           780           1,666        1,388        602           309           162           75             
Median Normalised RAR 0.0009 0.1208** 0.0397 0.0078 0.0649** 0.0595** 0.0480** 0.0062** -0.0729 -0.0787* -0.1538** -0.1415*
Wilcoxon Statistic -1.6122 -2.8045 -1.9520 -1.7680 -3.1199 -5.5015 -8.4206 -3.5949 -0.2641 -1.9637 -2.7501 -2.2759
p-Value 0.1069 0.0050 0.0509 0.0771 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.7917 0.0496 0.0060 0.0229
Observations 21             29             53             119           192           508           1,259        1,034        569           277           170           91             
Median Normalised RAR -0.1298 -0.2176 -0.0981 -0.0580 0.0000 0.0382** 0.0666** 0.0607** -0.0929 -0.0552 -0.1649* -0.2061
Wilcoxon Statistic -0.9559 -1.7190 -0.9107 -0.6205 -1.1812 -4.2391 -7.8290 -6.0565 -0.5757 -0.8951 -2.2383 -1.6304
p-Value 0.3391 0.0856 0.3625 0.5349 0.2375 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5648 0.3707 0.0252 0.1030
0.64960.0247* 0.3855 0.6031 0.90210.3289 0.6448 0.9980 0.5117
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for 
Equal Medians p-value
0.1532 0.0019** 0.7089
1.20-1.25 1.25-1.30
Young
1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15 1.15-1.200.80-0.85 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00Moneyness 0.70-0.75 0.75-0.80
0.95-1.00Moneyness 0.70-0.75 0.75-0.80 1.20-1.25 1.25-1.30
Old
1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15 1.15-1.200.80-0.85 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95
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MoneynessThis figure shows the normalised risk adjustment ratio by level of moneyness and size with statistically significant values in bold colour and others in faint 
The table presents the normalised risk adjustment ratio by level of moneyness, the test statistics for a Wilcoxon signed rank test of this median as well as the p-values for the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum test of equal medians between the two samples. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
Young
Old
Table 3.12 and Figure 3.8 present the results for the effect of the moneyness of the 
incentive option has on Normalised RAR for both young and old funds. Once again 
there is no statistically significant difference between the two samples for any level of 
moneyness. However it is worth noting that for both levels of moneyness above 1.20 
and below 0.90 the young fund sample has a more negative normalised RAR, implying 
that younger funds are more prone to “locking in” and less prone increasing risk 
following poor performance. Once again this result is consistent with the literature 
because if it is the threat of liquidation that is preventing excess increasing of risk, and 
younger funds have a higher probability of liquation, then they are less inclined to 
increase risk. 
 
3.5 CHANGES IN ALPHA AND BETA  
 
Having identified that hedge fund managers appear to adjust the risk profile of their 
funds in response their prior performance, in this section I examine whether it is the 
alpha, the beta or both components of the return that varies. 
 
With a maximum of 6 data points in the pre and post assessment periods the use of 
multi-factor models is not practical. To overcome this problem I construct an equally 
weighted return index for each strategy from the funds in my sample and run the 
following regression for both the pre and post assessment periods 
tt εβSαRft ++=               (7) 
where is the fund return in month t and is the return on the relevant strategy index 
in month t. 
ftR tS
 
By construction, for the whole universe of funds in my sample the mean beta will be 
one & the mean alpha will be zero. However by applying the same disaggregated 
analysis I used for the standard deviation of returns in the previous section across 
different levels of relative and absolute performance I should be able to shed some light 
on how the components of return vary in the pre and post assessment periods. For each 
sub sample I calculate the median value of alpha and beta for both the pre and post 
assessment periods, I test the significance of each median using a Wilcoxon signed rank  
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Table 3.13 - Median Beta by Performance Decile 
Observations 2,132        2,277        2,304        2,378        2,363        2,427        2,397        2,438        2,432        2,426        
Median Beta Pre Assessment 0.9799** 0.7167** 0.6911** 0.6205** 0.6418** 0.6298** 0.7275** 0.8871** 1.0403** 1.4689**
Median Beta Post Assessment 0.9351** 0.7848** 0.7094** 0.6874** 0.6474** 0.6518** 0.7584** 0.7863** 1.0170** 1.2734**
Change in Median -0.0448 0.0681* 0.0183 0.0670* 0.0056 0.0219 0.0309 -0.1008** -0.0233 -0.1955**
1
Assessment 
Period
(6,6)
5 4 3 29 8 7 6Performance Decile 10
Figure 3.9 - Median Beta by Performance Decile
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This figure shows median beta for the pre and post assessment period by performance decile 
The table presents the median beta calculated from expression (7) for the pre and post assessment periods by performance decile. The statistical significance of each median is tested by a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test and the difference between the medians by a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test.s. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
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Table 3.14 - Median Alpha by Performance Decile 
This figure shows median alpha for the pre and post assessment period by performance decile 
Figure 3.10 - Median Alpha by Performance Decile
Observations 2,132        2,277        2,304        2,378        2,363        2,427        2,397        2,438        2,432        2,426        
Median Alpha Pre Assessment -0.0252** -0.0105** -0.0057** -0.0023** 0.0002 0.0032** 0.0052** 0.0083** 0.0128** 0.0241**
Median Alpha Post Assessment -0.0037** -0.0018** -0.0009** 0.0003 0.0017** 0.0020** 0.0023** 0.0028** 0.0014* 0.0029**
Change in Median 0.0215** 0.0088** 0.0048** 0.0026** 0.0015** -0.0012** -0.0030** -0.0054** -0.0114** -0.0212**
1
Assessment 
Period
(6,6)
5 4 3 29 8 7 6Performance Decile 10
The table presents the median alpha calculated from expression (7) for the pre and post assessment periods by performance decile. The statistical significance of each median is tested by a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test and the difference between the medians by a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test.s. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
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and then test whether the medians in the pre and post assessment periods are equal using 
the Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
 
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 present the results for alpha and beta categorised by performance 
deciles, the results are also presented graphically in figures 3.9 and 3.10.  
 
Examining beta first, funds in the top 3 deciles have a lower beta in the post assessment 
period while funds in the fourth to the ninth deciles have a higher beta, the difference 
being statistically significant for the first, third, seventh and ninth deciles. This pattern 
of betas for the pre and post assessment periods is consistent with my previous results, 
the top performing funds reduce risk and the lower performing funds increase risk. The 
“U” shape of figure 3.9 also consistent with my previous findings with regard to the 
level of risk (see figure 3.2), higher beta funds are more likely to be at the extremes of 
performance while lower beta funds are more likely to be nearer the median.  
 
Turning to alpha, for the pre assessment period alpha is positive and significant for the 
top five deciles while it is negative and significant for the bottom four deciles. This 
pattern is to be expected because I am sorting the funds by performance. For the post 
assessment period alpha is positive and significant for the top six deciles while it is 
negative and significant for the bottom three deciles, this would suggest that there is 
some persistence in alpha between the pre and post assessment periods. The change in 
alpha is statistically significant for all deciles, funds in the top six deciles exhibit a 
decrease in alpha (though remaining positive) while those funds in the bottom four 
deciles exhibit an increase in alpha (though remaining negative for deciles eight to ten).  
 
These results augment my previous findings for the changes in RAR across 
performance deciles showing that those funds that increase (decrease) risk not only 
increase (decrease) their beta but also increase (decrease) alpha. 
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Table 3.15 - Median Beta by Moneyness 
Figure 3.11 - Median Beta by Moneyness
Observations 245           300           460           810           1,358        2,796        6,292        5,140        2,420        1,197        691           342           
Median Beta Pre Assessment 1.0272** 1.0721** 1.0745** 1.0076** 0.8463** 0.7437** 0.5829** 0.6488** 0.9610** 1.0582** 1.4170** 1.6421**
Median Beta Post Assessment 1.1125** 1.1209** 1.0061** 0.9600** 0.8755** 0.7544** 0.6317** 0.6520** 0.8754** 1.0416** 1.1756** 1.2713**
Change in Median 0.0854 0.0487 -0.0684 -0.0477 0.0291 0.0107 0.0488* 0.0032 -0.0856* -0.0166 -0.2414* -0.3708
1.25-1.30
Assessment 
Period
(6,6)
1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15 1.15-1.20 1.20-1.250.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00 1.00-1.05Moneyness 0.70-0.75 0.75-0.80 0.80-0.85
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Moneyness
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The table presents the median beta calculated from expression (7) for the pre and post assessment periods by level of moneyness. The statistical significance of each median is tested by a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test and the difference between the medians by a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test.s. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
This figure shows median beta for the pre and post assessment period by level of moneyness 
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Table 3.16 - Median Alpha by Moneyness 
Observations 245           300           460           810           1,358        2,796        6,292        5,140        2,420        1,197        691           342           
Median Alpha Pre Assessment -0.0147** -0.0251** -0.0182** -0.0162** -0.0117** -0.0057** 0.0013** 0.0075** 0.0111** 0.0153** 0.0176** 0.0211**
Median Alpha Post Assessment -0.0081** -0.0062** -0.0037** -0.0038** -0.0018** -0.0007** 0.0013** 0.0030** 0.0030** 0.0015 -0.0003 0.0056
Change in Median 0.0067** 0.0188** 0.0146** 0.0124** 0.0099** 0.0050** 0.0000* -0.0045** -0.0081** -0.0138** -0.0179** -0.0155**
1.25-1.30
Assessment 
Period
(6,6)
1.05-1.10 1.10-1.15 1.15-1.20 1.20-1.250.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00 1.00-1.05Moneyness 0.70-0.75 0.75-0.80 0.80-0.85
Figure 3.12 - Median Alpha by Moneyness
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The table presents the median alpha calculated from expression (7) for the pre and post assessment periods by level of moneyness. The statistical significance of each median is tested by a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test and the difference between the medians by a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test.s. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
This figure shows median alpha for the pre and post assessment period by level of moneyness 
  
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 present the results for alpha and beta categorised by moneyness, 
the results are also presented graphically in figures 3.11 and 3.12.  
 
Once again the pattern for beta is broadly consistent with my previous results for risk. 
For levels of moneyness above 1.10 beta is lower in the post assessment period and for 
moneyness between 0.9 and 1.10 beta is higher in the post assessment period, for these 
same levels of moneyness I found negative and positive normalised RAR.  
 
Alpha for the pre assessment period is positive and significant for levels of moneyness 
above one while it is negative and significant for levels of moneyness below one; once 
again this pattern is to be expected because I am effectively sorting the funds by 
performance. Similar to the results for relative performance, the change in alpha 
between the pre and post assessment periods is statistically significant for all categories 
of moneyness, funds with levels of moneyness above 1.05 exhibit a decrease in alpha 
while those funds with levels of moneyness below 1.05 exhibit an increase in alpha. 
However the impact is more severe, in the post assessment period alpha is no longer 
statistically significant for funds with levels of moneyness above 1.15 and it remains 
negative and significant for levels of moneyness below one. 
 
Once again these results illustrate that my previous findings for the changes in RAR 
relative to moneyness are driven by both alpha and beta, those funds that increase 
(decrease) risk not only increase (decrease) their beta but also increase (decrease) alpha. 
 
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter I have found evidence to suggest that hedge fund managers adjust the 
risk profile of their funds in response to their performance relative to their peers, with 
managers of relatively poor (strong) performing funds increasing (decreasing) the risk 
profile of their funds. This is in line with the findings of Brown, Harlow and Starks 
(1996) for mutual funs but somewhat surprising as hedge funds have generally been 
portrayed as pursuing absolute returns. This may well be a consequence of the actions 
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of fund of fund managers and other investors who make their own investment decisions 
based upon the relative performances of the funds in which they seek to invest.  It may 
well be an unintended consequence of the way in which investors choose to invest in a 
fund. 
 
My results with regard to how hedge fund managers adjust the risk profile of their fund 
given the moneyness of their incentive option are more complex. Managers whose 
incentive option is well in the money decrease risk.  Relatively speaking these managers 
are protecting the value of this option towards the end of the year.  For investors who 
wish their managers to take risks in a consistent manner regardless of the month of the 
year, this result may come as a disappointment.  It suggests that there is an element of 
“locking in” behaviour particularly towards the end of the calendar year.  Perhaps of 
more interest is the risk taking behaviour of those fund managers who find their 
incentive option to be well out of the money.  I find that these managers do not “put it 
all on black” in order to “win” back earlier losses and to increase the value of their 
incentive option.  This should be good news for hedge fund investors.  This 
conservative behaviour may be due to the implicit terms of the manager’s contract.  As 
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) suggest, these implicit terms may include the risk of 
liquidation as investors withdraw funds and may also be due to the often substantial 
management stake in the fund that discourages the fund manager from “swinging the 
bat”. 
 
My analysis of the alpha and beta exposures of the funds shows that the changes in risk 
outlined above are driven by both alpha and beta. Those funds that increase (decrease) 
risk as measured by the risk adjustment ratio not only increase (decrease) their beta but 
also increase (decrease) alpha. 
 
My results are of significance for the design of hedge fund manager compensation 
contracts.  It would appear that the concern that incentive fees encourage excessive risk 
taking behaviour may be misplaced, however there does appear to be an incentive to 
“lock in” previous gains by reducing the risk profile of the fund. It is possible that this 
locking in behaviour could be reduced by introducing a rising scale of incentive fees. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
PORTFOLIOS OF HEDGE FUNDS: IN 
SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL NUMBER 
 
 
Abstract 
Over 40% of the total assets of the hedge fund industry are controlled by Funds of 
Hedge Funds. The main reason for their popularity is the ability to form portfolios of 
hedge funds that diversify risk by spreading capital among several managers. Using the 
approach first proposed by Evans and Archer (1968) several researchers have 
demonstrated that the majority of the diversifiable time series standard deviation of 
returns can be eliminated by holding between 5 and 15 individual funds in a portfolio. 
However surveys of practitioner behaviour indicate that only a small proportion of 
funds of hedge funds hold portfolios of less than 15 funds and that many hold portfolios 
of over 30 funds. In this chapter I examine why there should be such a disparity between 
theory and practice. I illustrate that due to the nature of the original studies, the 
conclusions reached about the size of the portfolio required to reduce risk are inevitable 
and it is no coincidence that the number of hedge funds recommended is the same as the 
earlier recommendations about portfolios of equities. I go on to show empirically that 
there are statistically significant benefits to holding portfolios of a much larger size. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Amin and Kat (2002) investigated the properties of naively diversified portfolios of 
hedge funds and concluded that no more than 15 funds were required to diversify away 
specific risk approach the population values for return and standard deviation of return. 
 
Using broadly the same approach and techniques L’Habitant and Learned (2002) 
conclude that in terms of naive diversification, that most of the diversification benefits 
are achieved by forming fund of funds comprising just five to ten individual hedge 
funds. 
 
However in a survey of 61 European alternative multi-management companies, 
representing a total volume of Euro 136 bn of alternative assets under management, the 
Edhec European Alternative Multimanagement Practices Survey (2003) found that 
practitioner behaviour appear to contradict this research. Figure 4.1 below shows the 
number of individual funds held by the fund of funds surveyed. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Number Of Underlying Funds Held By Fund Of Fund Managers 
 
More Than 20
43%
10 to 20
38%
No Answer
6% Fewer than 10
13%
 
Source Data: Edhec European Alternative Multimanagement Practices Survey (2003) 
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Only 13% of respondents hold fewer than 10 funds and while 38% of the respondents 
hold between 10 and 20 funds, 43% invest with more than 20 underlying funds. 
 
In this chapter I examine why there should be such a disparity between academic theory 
and practitioner behaviour. I illustrate algebraically that due to the nature of the original 
studies, the conclusions reached about the size of the portfolio required to reduce risk 
are inevitable and it is no coincidence that the number of hedge funds recommended is 
the same as the earlier recommendations about portfolios of equities. I go on to examine 
empirically the traditional risk measure such as portfolio standard deviation, but rather 
than relying upon arbitrary analysis of charts in order to ascertain the point at which the 
marginal impact of increasing portfolio size is no longer significant, I instead introduce 
a bootstrap procedure to calculate confidence intervals for the difference in means for 
various portfolio sizes. I also consider alternative measures of risk including terminal 
wealth standard deviation, shortfall probability and illustrate that due to the distribution 
of individual hedge fund returns there are substantial benefits to holding portfolios of 
more than 15 funds that have been recommended by earlier authors. 
 
4.2 NAÏVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE BENEFITS OF 
NAÏVE DIVERSIFICATION 
 
4.2.1 IS DIVERSIFICATION IN HEDGE FUNDS REALLY A FREE 
LUNCH? 
 
As I will prove later, the standard deviation of a portfolio of assets will be lower than 
the mean standard deviation of the component assets while the mean return will be the 
same. For this reason diversification has been described as the only free lunch in 
finance. However, this lunch is only free if there are no costs involved in constructing 
the portfolio and if the mean return and standard deviation are the only two factors 
being considered. 
 
In the case of hedge funds there are significant costs involved in constructing a 
portfolio. Firstly there is costly search, because hedge funds are not allowed to advertise 
the only way of finding hedge funds that are open to new investment is to subscribe to 
one or more of the industry databases. Once these eligible hedge funds have been 
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identified there are costs involved in performing due diligence to ensure that the 
operational risk is minimised and the hedge fund manager is reliable. Finally once the 
portfolio has been constructed there are ongoing monitoring costs.  
 
Several previous studies have also found that for portfolios of hedge funds, as the 
portfolio size increases so does the correlation with equities which will reduce their 
diversification benefits. In some cases they also found that increasing portfolio size can 
lead to lower skewness.  
 
As a consequence of the above, even if mean variance analysis suggests that it is 
optimal to hold a portfolio of the entire universe of hedge funds  a rational investor 
should only increase the number of hedge funds in their portfolio as long as the 
marginal benefit of adding them is greater than the marginal cost. In this chapter I 
attempt to measure the marginal benefit of increasing portfolio the portfolio size using 
various measures of risk, I also measure the cost in terms certain risks as well but the 
absolute costs are beyond the scope of my study. For this reason, in the absence of 
reliable data on the costs of search, due diligence and monitoring, my conclusions about 
the optimal size of a hedge fund portfolio might overstate the true optimal portfolio size. 
 
4.2.2 IS IT NAÏVE TO EXAMINE NAÏVE DIVERSIFICATION? 
 
Naïve diversification whereby an investor invests in N assets in equal proportions 1/N 
will (as I will later prove) lead to lower portfolio variance as the number of assets 
increases. However critics would point out that this strategy is sub-optimal and better 
results can be obtained by using some form of optimised diversification strategy, such 
as mean-variance optimisation. This criticism is valid if, and only if, the proposed 
optimisation method can be proven to be optimal, which in the case of hedge funds is 
unlikely to be the case for several reasons.  
 
Firstly, as already mentioned, the most common optimisation method is mean-variance, 
which by definition ignores higher moments such as skew and kurtosis. It is well 
documented that hedge fund returns exhibit excess kurtosis and negative skewness and 
although as I demonstrated in chapter 2 that some of this is the effect of the incentive 
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fees, ignoring these moments in the optimisation process could lead to portfolios that 
appear to be superior in terms of mean and variance but are in fact inferior in terms of 
skewness and kurtosis.  
 
Even if higher moments are considered in the optimisation procedure, the results might 
not be superior to naïve diversification. All optimisation methods depend upon efficient 
and unbiased estimates of the inputs, for example, expected returns, expected variances 
and expected correlations While I cannot dispute that an optimised approach to 
diversification would be superior to naïve diversification if the true values of the inputs 
were know, this is unlikely to be the case. In a recent paper examining the performance 
of various optimisation strategies in stock portfolios DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 
(2007) found that naïve diversification often outperformed more complex strategies out 
of sample. The reason proposed by the authors was that the large estimation error for the 
inputs overwhelmed the gains from optimization and so simple allocation strategies 
outperformed. In the case of hedge funds these measurement errors are likely to be even 
larger due to the short histories, monthly reporting and dynamic nature of the trading 
strategies. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the marginal benefits of diversification in hedge 
funds by increasing the portfolio size, while I accept that a naïve diversification strategy 
could in certain cases be improved upon, for the above reasons I believe it serves as a 
useful benchmark. 
 
4.2.3 WHY IS 10-20 ALWAYS THE MAGIC NUMBER UNDER THE 
TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK? 
The standard deviation of a portfolio of n hedge funds (or any other asset) is simply 
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where  is the portfolio variance, pσ iσ  is the variance of fund i,  is the weight 
invested in fund i and 
iw
ji ,ρ  is the correlation between funds i and j and n is the total 
number of funds in the portfolio. 
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 Equation (1) can be expanded because when ji = , 1, =jiρ  and  22 iijjii www σσσ =
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In an equally weighted portfolio of n funds with equal weights of 1/n in each asset, then 
, the variance of an equally weighted portfolio becomes 
newp
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As there are n terms in the first summation and n[n-1] in the second summation, if I 
define the mean standard deviation 2σ  and mean covariance 2σρ  as 
 ∑== ni in n1 22 1σσ               (4) 
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equation (3) can be simplified to  
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Equation (6) shows that the expected variance of an equally weighted portfolio of n 
funds can be decomposed into two parts. The first component (represented by the first 
term on the right hand side of equation (6)) can be eliminated by increasing the number 
of funds in the portfolio, this is because as n→∞ then 1/n→0. The second component 
(represented by the second term on the right hand side of equation (6)) cannot be 
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eliminated by increasing the number of funds in the portfolio, because as n→∞ then n-
1/n→1 hence it converges to the product of the average correlation and average 
variance (the average co-variance).  
 
In reality however the population size is never infinity and has some finite value. For 
finite population of N funds then equation (6) becomes 
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and if a portfolio of n funds is randomly selected from the population N then  
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Researchers have generally measured the benefits of diversification by calculating the 
ratio of the variance (or standard deviation) of portfolios of increasingly large values of 
n funds to the base case of n=1. From equation 8, the expected variance of a portfolio 
composed of a single fund is 
 ( ) 22
1 Newp
E σσ =               (9) 
 
Hence if I divide equation (8) by equation (9) I obtain 
 ( )( ) Newpewp nnnEE n ρσσ 1122 1 −+=                       (10) 
 
and equation (10) can be rearranged to give 
 ( )( ) [ ]NNewpewp nEE n ρρσσ −+= 1122 1                       (11) 
 
Three important conclusions can be drawn from equation (11). 
 113
 Firstly, as n→∞ then 1/n→0, thus the variance a portfolio of n funds relative to a 
portfolio of a single fund will tend to Nρ . To put this another way, Nρ  is the relative 
expected variance that cannot be eliminated via naive diversification while [ ]ρ−1  is the 
relative expected variance that can be eliminated completely through naive 
diversification if the population of funds in infinite. 
 
Secondly, the expected proportion of variance reduction is inversely proportional to the 
size of the portfolio n. Even if the population N is infinite, a portfolio of size n=5 will 
eliminate 80% of the diversifiable risk, n=10 will eliminate 90% and n=20 will 
eliminate 95%. In fact the marginal reduction in variance from adding one additional 
fund to a portfolio of n funds can be calculated as   
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]NNNNN nnnn ρρρρρ −+=⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −++−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+ 1111111 2                  (12) 
 
from equation (12) it is clear that as n increases, [ ]nn +2/1 decrease extremely rapidly, 
even in the extreme case of 0=ρ if n=1 the marginal reduction is 50%, for n=5 this 
falls to 3.33% and by the time n=10 it is less than 1%. 
 
Finally for a finite population of N funds, even holding all N funds will result in [ ]ρ−1 /N of the diversifiable risk remaining, thus the maximum amount that can be 
eliminated is ( )[ ]NN /1−  similarly for a portfolio of n funds ( )[ ]nn /1−  is eliminated, 
and hence the proportion of the maximum relative diversifiable risk eliminated with a 
portfolio size n is ( ) ( )[ 1/1 ]−− NnnN . Table 4.1 shows the proportion of maximum 
relative diversifiable risk that is eliminated for selected portfolio sizes (n) from selected 
population sizes (N). 
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Table 4.1 – The Proportion of Diversifiable Risk Eliminated For Selected Portfolio 
and Population Sizes 
 
1000 100% 100%
Population Size
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       100        500  1,000 10,000
5 81% 80% 80% 80%
10 91% 90% 90% 90%
15 94% 94% 93% 93%
20 96% 95% 95% 95%
50 99% 98% 98% 98%
100 100% 99% 99% 99%
500 100% 100% 100%
 
inated for selected portfolio sizes (n) from selected 
rom the above I can reach two major conclusions: 
i)
han 0.25% even if the correlation between the individual funds 
ii)
of 20 funds will eliminate 95% of the total 
diversifiable risk. 
f 10-
0 coincides with the findings of Evans and Archer (1968) for portfolios of stocks. 
s which would rationally explain diversification beyond the 10-20 fund 
ortfolio.  
This table the proportion of maximum relative diversifiable risk that is elim
population sizes (N). 
 
F
 
 The marginal benefit of adding an additional fund to a portfolio of 20 
funds as measured by the ratio of variance to that of a single fund will 
be less t
is zero 
 If the universe of hedge funds is estimated to be approximately 10,000 
then a portfolio 
 
From these two conclusions it is clear why previous researchers have found that 10-20 
funds are enough to form an adequately diversified portfolio of hedge funds and that 
there is little benefit to diversifying further. It is also clear why the magic number o
2
 
However, despite the analysis and conclusions reached above there are two possible 
explanation
p
 
Firstly, equation (11) formalises the relationship between the expected variance of 
portfolio of n funds and a single fund i.e. what will be the average outcome. However 
some portfolios of n funds would have larger variance and others would have smaller 
variance. Since an investor will only have a single portfolio they might choose to 
diversify further in order to be more certain about their level of risk. Secondly, (and 
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similarly) the above analysis is based on the fact that the expected return on an equally 
weighted portfolio of n assets will be identical to the expected return of a single fund, 
once again because there is uncertainty surrounding this expected return and an investor 
will only have a single portfolio they might choose to diversify further in order to be 
more certain about their return. For these two reasons researchers have also examined 
iversification in a terminal wealth framework. 
 MAGIC NUMBER UNDER THE 
LTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK? 
r of promising applications, it can 
ad to the same naïve conclusions illustrated above.  
d
 
4.2.4 WHY IS 10-20 ALWAYS THE
A
 
Authors such as Amo, Harasty and Hillion (2007) have examined how the dispersion of 
terminal wealth varies according to the size of portfolios of randomly selected hedge 
funds, where terminal wealth is defined as the wealth accumulated from an initial 
investment of $1. While this framework has a numbe
le
 
Consider a universe of single hedge funds which produce a mean terminal wealth TWμ  
and have a terminal wealth standard deviation TWσ . If equally weighted portfolios of n 
funds are randomly formed from the universe, then the expected terminal wealth 
tandard deviation of portfolios of size n will simply be the standard error. 
 
s
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n
E TWTWn
σσ =                        (13) 
n of portfoli  of 
creasingly large values of n funds to the base case of n=1, because
 
If (as in the case of Amo et al. (2007)) the benefits of diversification are measured by 
calculating the ratio of the  terminal wealth standard deviatio os( ) TWTWE σσ =1  in
 ( )( ) nEE TWTWn 11 =σσ                       (14) 
 
Since from equation (14) the expected proportion of terminal wealth standard deviation 
reduction is inversely proportional to the square root of the size of the portfolio n, a 
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portfolio of size n=5 will eliminate 55% of the diversifiable risk, n=10 will eliminate 
68% and n=20 will eliminate 78%. Once again marginal reduction in variance from 
adding one additional fund to a portfolio of n funds will fall quite rapidly. In fact by the 
me n=15, the marginal benefit will be less than 1% ( 0082.016/115/1 =−ti ). 
 fact the same 
onclusions could have been reached without resorting to simulations. 
.2.5 ARE 1,000 SIMULATIONS ADEQUATE? 
le estimates of the mean values it might not 
entify the risk of extreme outcomes.  
combinatio
ailability of cheap com
o excuse for not running more simulations. 
.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 twelve years of performance data from January 1995 
rough to December 2006.  
 
From the above analysis it is apparent why Amo et al. (2007) found that “the marginal 
risk reduction is less than 5% from six funds onwards.” And in
c
 
4
 
Previous studies have examined between 500 and 1,000 simulations for each portfolio 
size. While this is adequate for reliab
id
 
For example if there are 1,000 funds in the sample, then there are 491076.4 ×  possible 
ns of 25 funds, hence running 1,000 simulations will only identify 
451010.2 −× % of the population. With the av puter power there is 
n
 
4
 
4.3.1 DATA 
A combination of the TASS live and graveyard databases covering the period from 
January 1994 to December 2006 is used to obtain the data in order to minimise 
survivorship bias. From this combined database I extract monthly net of fee returns and 
strategy details for all hedge funds that are denominated in US Dollars, have assets in 
excess of $10m and report monthly performance. In order to minimise back-fill bias I 
discard the first 12 data points for each fund. This procedure results in a total sample of 
3,493 hedge funds of which 1,485 are from the live database and 2,008 are from the 
graveyard database covering
th
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 Only 27 funds survived the entire period from January 1995 to December 2006 so I use 
a methodology similar to Amin and Kat (2002). For three different inception dates, 
January 1995, January 1999 and January 2003 I start by selecting all of the funds that 
were alive at that point. If a fund stops reporting performance, it is replaced by a fund 
that is randomly selected from the set of eligible funds following the same strategy and 
alive at the time of closure. The above procedure results in three different time series of 
returns covering the twelve year period from January 1995 to December 2006, the eight 
years from January 1999 to December 2006 and four years from January 2003 to 
December 2006. For simplicity I will still refer to the data series obtained from this 
procedure as fund returns.  The size and strategy composition of these samples is shown 
 table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of Hedge Fund Samples 
 
in
Sample Period 
Jan95 - Dec06
Sample Period 
Jan99 - Dec06
Sample Period 
Jan03 - Dec06
Convertible Arbitrage 14 40 96
Dedicated Short Bias 4 13 15
Emerging Markets 40 112 115
Equity Market Neutral 8 43 124
Event Driven 44 124 185
Fixed Income Arbitrage 14 47 77
Global Macro 29 59 62
Long Short Equity 124 344 616
Managed Futures 51 97 106
Multi-Strategy 11 37 86
Total 339 916 1482  
This table presents summary information for the sample of hedge funds collected from the TASS database. Only funds that are 
denominated in US Dollars, report monthly performance and that have assets in excess of $10m are included. If a fund stops 
porting performance, it is replaced by a fund that is randomly selected from the set of eligible funds following the same strategy 
994 to June 2006 as -1.86% per month versus an average hedge 
nd return of 1.01%. 
re
and alive at the time of closure 
 
I am implicitly assuming that in the case of fund closure, investors are able to roll from 
one fund to another at the reported month end NAV and at zero cost. Although it is 
likely that this may understate the true cost of fund closure to the investor, a recent 
paper by Hodder, Jackwerth and Kolokolova (2008) shows that this difference might be 
small. Hodder et al. find that the mean return for funds de-listing from the ALTVEST 
database for January 1
fu
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4.3.2  METHODOLOGY 
th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile in order to quantify the risk around the 
ean value. 
.3.3 TIME SERIES STATISTICS 
 skewness and kurtosis I also calculate 
arious other statistics for each portfolio size. 
 the 5th or 1st percentile 
f the monthly return series for each simulation and basket size. 
 
Using the “fund returns” generated above I create equally weighted portfolios of 
increasing size n (n=1, 2, 3, ... 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, all funds) by randomly 
selecting (without replacement) funds from the data set. For each portfolio, I build a 
time series of returns and use it to generate various statistics which are detailed below, I 
also calculate the terminal wealth achieved from an initial investment of $1 in the 
various portfolios. For each portfolio size, this process is repeated either 2,000 times or 
the maximum number of possible combinations whichever is smaller. I then repeat the 
whole process (including generating the “fund returns” to allow for different random 
replacements) 25 times, thus obtaining either the exhaustive set or 50,000 observations 
of each statistic.  This is necessary not only to estimate the mean behaviour of a 
portfolio of size n, but also to examine the cross sectional variation in the results. For 
each statistic detailed below, I not only calculate the mean value but also the maximum, 
minimum, 10
m
 
4
 
As well as calculating the standard measures of return and risk such as compound 
annual return, time-series standard deviation,
v
 
Value at risk (VAR) measures the potential loss in value of a portfolio over a specific 
period for a specific confidence interval. For each size of portfolio I calculate 1 month 
VAR with 95% and 99% confidence intervals. Rather than relying on assumptions 
about the underlying distribution of returns I empirically measure
o
 
The major limitation of VAR as a risk measure is that it only considers one particular 
point of the return distribution, no information is provided about how large the loss can 
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be when it exceeds the VAR level. Conditional VAR (CVAR) addresses this issue, 
CVAR is defined at the expected loss given the fact that the VAR level has been 
exceeded. Once again I measure this value empirically by calculating the mean values 
elow the 5th or 1st percentile of the monthly return series. 
 portfolio follows an index to which it is 
enchmarked, it is calculated by equation 15 
 
b
 
Tracking Error is a measure of how closely a
b
( )∑= −= nt BenchmarktPortfoliot RRnrorTrackingEr 1 2,,1                    (15) 
where 
ough similar results were obtained using the Credit Suisse 
remont hedge fund index. 
ple of each portfolio of hedge funds with the return on the S&P 500 composite 
dex. 
I can reject the null hypothesis then I am able to conclude that increasing the portfolio 
 
s the number of periods, PortfoliotR ,  is the portfolio return at time t and 
BenchmarktR ,  is the benchmark return at time t. Though this statistic is easily calculated the 
choice of an appropriate benchmark is not so straightforward. As I am assuming that an 
investor is targeting the return of an average fund I use the portfolio of all funds in the 
sample as the benchmark, th
n i
T
 
The statistics above are all designed to help understand the risk profile of a basket of 
hedge funds.  However, investors will also be interested to understand how this basket 
behaves relative to traditional asset classes.  I therefore calculate the correlation over the 
full sam
in
 
Previous authors have often relied upon arbitrary analysis of charts of the standard 
deviation (and other measures) in order to ascertain the point at which the marginal 
impact of increasing portfolio size is no longer significant. Rather than relying upon 
such arbitrary analysis I calculate 95% and 99% confidence intervals for the difference 
in means for portfolio sizes of n and n-1, where the null hypothesis is equal means. Due 
to the non-normality that is inherent in the data I use a bootstrap methodology. I draw 
50,000 observations with replacement for each statistic and portfolio size 1,000 times 
and use the empirical distribution of the resulting sample means to test the hypothesis. If 
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size by one fund has had a statistically significant impact upon the mean of the specific 
test statistic. 
 
4.3.4 TERMINAL WEALTH STATISTICS 
 
In considering the number of mutual funds necessary to reduce risk to its undiversifiable 
minimum, O’Neal (1997) argued that investors should not only consider the time series 
properties of their portfolios (as I do above by calculating these statistics), but also their 
terminal values and more specifically the distribution of that terminal value.   
 
The intuition behind this is as follows.  One could be unfortunate enough to get in to a 
taxi and enjoy a very smooth ride, but ultimately not arrive at one’s chosen destination.  
A traveller may instead be willing to put up with a bumpy cab ride that does get them to 
their chosen destination.  In an investment context then investors should care at least as 
much about the dispersion of their terminal wealth as they do the volatility of that 
wealth over time.  Since long-term investors like pension funds should be focussed on 
the end result, or the value of their “terminal wealth” I follow O’Neal and calculate a set 
of additional statistics to explore the impact of diversification hedge funds on the 
distribution of terminal wealth outcomes. These include: a measure of short fall 
probability; the mean of this shortfall; and also the semi-deviation of portfolio returns.   
 
As described earlier, I calculate the terminal wealth created from an initial investment of 
$1 for each simulation and portfolio size. From this I calculate the mean terminal wealth 
(TWM) as well as the terminal wealth standard deviation (TWSD) and the other higher 
moments such as skewness and kurtosis. 
 
Shortfall probability is calculated by equation (16) 
 
nsObservatioOfNumberTotal
TWMBelownsObseravtioOfNumber
obabilityShortfall =Pr                  (16) 
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A major limitation of the shortfall probability as a measure of risk is that it does not 
account for the magnitude that these returns fall short of the mean (similar to VAR). For 
this reason I also calculate the mean shortfall using equation (17).  
 ( ){ }∑= < −= ni TWMTW iin TWMTWallMeanShortf 1 ,0min                (17) 
 
Where is the terminal wealth for observation i, TWM is the mean terminal wealth 
and is the number of observations where TW <TWM . 
iTW
TWMTWi
n < i
 
An alternative measure of downside risk is the semi-deviation, like the standard 
deviation this will give greater weight to those observations that are farthest from the 
mean, it is calculated from equation (18) 
 ( ){ }[ ]∑= < −= ni TWMTW iin TWMTWtonSemiDeviai 1 2,0min .                   (18) 
 
4.4  RESULTS 
 
4.4.1 TIME-SERIES STATISTICS  
Table 4.3 presents the mean values of all the major time series statistics described above 
for selected portfolio sizes (full results are available on request).  
 
As expected, the mean portfolio return does not vary with portfolio size but only with 
the sample period. Clearly there is uncertainty around this mean value which I will 
investigate further in the terminal wealth framework below. 
 
Risk, as measured by the time series standard deviation of returns, declines rapidly 
initially as the number of funds in the portfolio is increased but the rate of decrease 
levels off quite quickly. These results are exactly as predicted by equations (6) and (11), 
they are presented graphically in figure 4.2 which shows the familiar “L” shape.  
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Table 4.3 – Summary Time Series Statistics 
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Return
Mean 
Standard 
Deviaiton
Reduction
Mean 
Skew
Mean 
Kurtosis
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 99%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 99%
Mean 
Tracking 
Error All 
Funds
Mean 
Correlation 
S&P500
1 11.6% 16.5% 100.0% -0.18 9.06 -6.3% -12.1% -9.9% -17.0% 4.6% 25.8%
2 11.6% 13.3%** 80.6% -0.17 7.52** -5.0%** -9.6%** -7.8%** -13.4%** 3.4%** 32.9%**
3 11.6% 11.9%** 72.3% -0.17 6.88** -4.4%** -8.5%** -6.9%** -12.0%** 2.9%** 37.4%**
4 11.6% 11.1%** 67.6% -0.17 6.43** -4.0%** -7.9%** -6.4%** -11.0%** 2.6%** 40.9%**
5 11.6% 10.6%** 64.5% -0.17 6.21** -3.8%** -7.4%** -6.0%** -10.5%** 2.3%** 43.4%**
6 11.6% 10.2%** 62.0% -0.18 5.96** -3.6%** -7.1%** -5.7%** -10.0%** 2.2%** 45.5%**
7 11.6% 9.9%** 60.3% -0.17 5.84** -3.5%** -6.8%** -5.5%** -9.7%** 2.0%** 47.2%**
8 11.6% 9.7%** 59.0% -0.17 5.72** -3.4%** -6.6%** -5.4%** -9.4%** 1.9%** 48.4%**
9 11.6% 9.5%** 57.8% -0.18 5.62** -3.3%** -6.4%** -5.2%** -9.2%** 1.8%** 49.6%**
10 11.6% 9.4%** 56.8% -0.17 5.51** -3.2%** -6.3%** -5.1%** -9.0%** 1.7%** 50.5%**
11 11.6% 9.2%** 56.0% -0.17 5.45* -3.1%** -6.1%** -5.0%** -8.9%** 1.6%** 51.5%**
12 11.6% 9.1%** 55.4% -0.17 5.38** -3.1%** -6.0%** -4.9%** -8.8%** 1.6%** 52.2%**
13 11.6% 9.0%** 54.8% -0.17 5.31* -3.0%** -5.9%** -4.9%** -8.7%** 1.5%** 52.8%**
14 11.6% 9.0%** 54.3% -0.17 5.25 -3.0%** -5.8%** -4.8%** -8.6%* 1.5%** 53.4%**
15 11.6% 8.9%** 53.9% -0.17 5.20** -3.0%** -5.8%** -4.8%** -8.5%** 1.4%** 53.9%**
20 11.6% 8.6%** 52.3% -0.17 5.00* -2.8%** -5.5%** -4.6%** -8.3%* 1.2%** 55.8%**
30 11.6% 8.3%** 50.4% -0.16 4.70** -2.6%** -5.1%** -4.3%** -8.0% 1.0%** 58.0%**
40 11.6% 8.2% 49.5% -0.15 4.50 -2.5% -4.9% -4.2% -7.8% 0.9%** 59.2%**
50 11.6% 8.1% 49.0% -0.15 4.34 -2.4% -4.7% -4.1% -7.7% 0.8%** 60.0%**
All 11.6% 7.8% 47.1% -0.09 4.30 -1.5% -2.3% -3.8% -7.4% 0.0% 62.7%
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Return
Mean 
Standard 
Deviaiton
Reduction
Mean 
Skew
Mean 
Kurtosis
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 99%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 99%
Mean 
Tracking 
Error All 
Funds
Mean 
Correlation 
S&P500
1 13.7% 15.3% 100.0% 0.30 7.38 -5.8% -10.7% -8.3% -12.2% 4.4% 22.9%
2 13.7% 12.7%** 83.0% 0.30 6.55** -4.7%** -8.5%** -6.6%** -9.6%** 3.4%** 29.3%**
3 13.8% 11.6%** 75.8% 0.32 6.11** -4.2%** -7.5%** -5.8%** -8.4%** 3.0%** 33.5%**
4 13.8% 10.9%** 71.2% 0.33** 5.83** -3.8%** -6.9%** -5.4%** -7.7%** 2.7%** 36.4%**
5 13.8% 10.4%** 68.2% 0.35* 5.65** -3.6%** -6.5%** -5.1%** -7.2%** 2.5%** 38.7%**
6 13.7% 10.1%** 65.8% 0.35 5.45** -3.5%** -6.2%** -4.8%** -6.9%** 2.3%** 40.5%**
7 13.7% 9.9%** 64.4% 0.36 5.40** -3.4%** -5.9%** -4.7%** -6.6%** 2.2%** 42.0%**
8 13.7% 9.6%** 63.0% 0.37** 5.23* -3.3%** -5.7%** -4.5%** -6.4%** 2.1%** 43.1%**
9 13.7% 9.4%** 61.7% 0.36 5.13** -3.2%** -5.6%** -4.4%** -6.2%** 2.0%** 44.2%**
10 13.7% 9.3%** 61.0% 0.38 5.12** -3.2%** -5.4%** -4.3%** -6.0%** 1.9%** 44.9%**
11 13.7% 9.2%** 60.1% 0.38** 5.00 -3.1%** -5.3%** -4.2%** -5.9%** 1.8%** 45.9%**
12 13.7% 9.1%** 59.4% 0.37 4.93** -3.0%** -5.2%** -4.1%** -5.8%** 1.8%** 46.5%**
13 13.7% 9.0%** 59.0% 0.37 4.89** -3.0%** -5.1%** -4.1%** -5.7%** 1.7%** 47.1%**
14 13.7% 8.9%** 58.4% 0.38 4.84 -3.0%** -5.0%** -4.0%** -5.6%** 1.7%** 47.5%**
15 13.8% 8.9%** 58.0% 0.38 4.76* -2.9%** -5.0%** -4.0%** -5.5%** 1.6%** 48.1%**
20 13.7% 8.6%* 56.2% 0.36 4.48* -2.8%* -4.7%* -3.8%** -5.2%* 1.4%** 50.0%**
30 13.7% 8.3% 54.3% 0.34 4.13* -2.7%** -4.4%** -3.6%** -4.9%** 1.2%** 52.0%**
40 13.7% 8.1% 53.1% 0.33** 3.92** -2.6%** -4.2%** -3.4%* -4.6%* 1.1%** 53.3%
50 13.7% 8.0% 52.3% 0.32 3.79 -2.6% -4.1% -3.3% -4.5% 1.0%** 54.2%
All 13.8% 7.8% 49.2% 0.26 3.28 -2.4% -3.2% -3.0% -3.6% 0.0% 58.1%
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Return
Mean 
Standard 
Deviaiton
Reduction
Mean 
Skew
Mean 
Kurtosis
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 99%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 99%
Mean 
Tracking 
Error All 
Funds
Mean 
Correlation 
S&P500
1 13.6% 9.8% 100.0% 0.12 4.54 -3.5% -5.7% -5.0% -5.7% 2.8% 31.3%
2 13.5% 8.3%** 85.6% 0.07** 4.01** -2.9%** -4.7%** -4.1%** -4.7%** 2.2%** 40.4%**
3 13.6% 7.7%** 79.1% 0.05** 3.84** -2.6%** -4.2%** -3.7%** -4.2%** 1.9%** 45.3%**
4 13.5% 7.3%** 74.7% 0.02** 3.72** -2.4%** -3.9%** -3.4%** -3.9%** 1.7%** 48.8%**
5 13.6% 7.0%** 72.0% 0.00** 3.61** -2.3%** -3.7%** -3.2%** -3.7%** 1.6%** 51.2%**
6 13.6% 6.9%** 70.3% -0.03** 3.52** -2.3%** -3.6%** -3.1%** -3.6%** 1.5%** 53.1%**
7 13.6% 6.7%** 68.3% -0.05** 3.44** -2.2%** -3.4%** -3.0%** -3.4%** 1.4%** 54.7%**
8 13.6% 6.6%** 67.2% -0.07** 3.36** -2.2%** -3.4%** -3.0%** -3.4%** 1.3%** 56.0%**
9 13.6% 6.4%** 66.1% -0.08** 3.32** -2.1%** -3.3%** -2.9%** -3.3%** 1.2%** 57.0%**
10 13.6% 6.4%** 65.1% -0.10** 3.26** -2.1%** -3.2%** -2.8%** -3.2%** 1.2%** 57.7%**
11 13.6% 6.3%** 64.4% -0.11** 3.21** -2.1%** -3.2%** -2.8%** -3.2%** 1.1%** 58.6%**
12 13.6% 6.2%** 63.9% -0.12** 3.17** -2.0%** -3.1%** -2.8%** -3.1%** 1.1%** 59.2%**
13 13.6% 6.2%** 63.2% -0.14** 3.13** -2.0%** -3.1%** -2.7%** -3.1%** 1.1%** 59.8%**
14 13.6% 6.1%** 62.7% -0.15** 3.10** -2.0%** -3.0%** -2.7%** -3.0%** 1.0%** 60.4%**
15 13.6% 6.1%** 62.3% -0.16** 3.06** -2.0%** -3.0%** -2.7%** -3.0%** 1.0%** 60.7%**
20 13.6% 5.9%** 60.6% -0.20** 2.95** -1.9%* -2.9%** -2.6%** -2.9%** 0.9%** 62.4%**
30 13.6% 5.7% 58.7% -0.25** 2.83** -1.9% -2.7% -2.4% -2.7% 0.7%** 64.5%**
40 13.6% 5.6% 57.7% -0.29 2.77* -1.9% -2.6% -2.4% -2.6% 0.6%** 65.5%**
50 13.6% 5.6% 57.1% -0.31 2.73** -1.9% -2.6% -2.4% -2.6% 0.6%** 66.3%
All 13.6% 7.8% 54.4% -0.42 2.59 -1.9% -2.3% -2.1% -2.3% 0.0% 69.6%
Panel A: Sample Period January 1995 - December 2006
Panel B: Sample Period January 1999 - December 2006
Panel C: Sample Period January 2003 - December 2006
 
This table presents mean values for various time series statistics for portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds. Panel A presents the results 
for the period January 1995 to December 2006, Panel B presents the results for the period starting in January 1999 and ending in 
December 2006 and Panel C presents the results for the period starting in January 2003 and ending in December 2006. All results 
are calculated from either 50,000 random selections or the exhaustive set of possible combinations using the data set presented in 
table 2. A bootstrap procedure is used to test whether adding 1 additional fund to the portfolio makes a statistically significant 
change in the mean value, those significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
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For the twelve year sample period, holding a portfolio of all 339 funds would have a 
time series standard deviation of 47.1% of the average for the single fund portfolios, a 
reduction of 52.9%. A portfolio of 20 funds would on average provide 47.7% of this 
52.9% reduction, or 90% which is almost exactly what equation (11) would have 
predicted.  
 
Figure 4.2 – Time Series Standard Deviation 
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This figure present graphically the results for the mean standard deviation of portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds for the 3 different 
sample periods using the data from table 4.3. 
 
 
In terms of the statistical significance of the reduction in standard deviation, the results 
vary slightly according to the sample period.  For the twelve year sample period holding 
there is no statistically significant decrease in the standard deviation for increasing 
portfolio sizes above 32 funds, for the eight year sample the cut-off is 24 funds and for 
the four year sample it is 28 funds. 
 
As the sample period shortens (and the number of funds in the sample increases) the 
benefits of diversification appear to decline, implying that the correlation between the 
funds has increased. This is in fact the case, for the twelve year sample of 339 funds the 
average correlation is 15.8% while for the four year sample of 1,482 funds the average 
correlation is 19.6%.  
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All of the above would imply that there is little benefit to holding portfolios of more 
than 20-30 funds which although higher than previous academic estimates does not 
explain why almost a quarter of fund-of-funds hold portfolios of greater than 30 funds. 
However as already mentioned there is significant uncertainty surrounding the mean 
values for each of these statistics. For the twelve year sample period, a 20 fund portfolio 
has a mean time series standard deviation of 8.6% but the 10th percentile value is 10.7%, 
thus a naive investor has a 10% chance of choosing a portfolio of 20 funds that will 
result in a standard deviation of over 2% higher than the mean. In fact to be 90% certain 
of not choosing a portfolio with a standard deviation greater than 8.6% an investor 
would have to hold a portfolio of between 100 and 150 funds. 
  
Figure 4.3 – Skewness 
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This figure present graphically the results for the mean skewness of portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds for the 3 different sample 
periods using the data from table 4. 3. 
 
With regard to the skewness of the resulting portfolios, once again my results appear to 
depend upon the sample period chosen, the results are presented graphically in figure 
4.3. For the twelve year period the average skewness of the individual funds is negative 
and there does not appear to be any statistically significant change as the portfolio size 
increases. For the eight year sample period the average skewness is positive and once 
again there does not appear to be any statistically significant change as the portfolio size 
increases. For the four year sample period the average skewness is positive, but 
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increasing the portfolio size results in increasingly negative skewness with the change 
being statistically significant up to portfolios of over 30 funds. 
 
One of reasons practitioners give for holding larger portfolios is to decrease the risk of 
an extreme loss. One measure of this is kurtosis, a value greater than 3 indicates that the 
tails of the distribution are fatter than the standard normal distribution and hence there is 
a greater probability of extreme outcomes. For all three of my sample periods, 
individual funds on average exhibit excess kurtosis, ranging from a value of 9.06 for the 
twelve year sample to 4.54 for the four year sample. As portfolio size is increased 
kurtosis falls for all three samples though and the rate of this fall is statistically 
significant even for portfolio sizes up to 50 funds in the four year sample period. 
 
Perhaps slightly more intuitive measures of the risk of an extreme loss are VAR and 
CVAR. I report these measures for a monthly horizon at 95% and 99% confidence 
levels and the results for the 99% confidence interval are presented graphically in 
figures 4.4 and 4.5.  
Figure 4.4 – 1 Month Value At Risk 99% Confidence 
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This figure present graphically the results for the mean 1-month Value At Risk at a 99% confidence level for portfolio sizes from 1 
to 50 funds for the 3 different sample periods using the data from table 4.3. 
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Figure 4.5 – 1 Month Conditional Value At Risk 99% Confidence 
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This figure present graphically the results for the mean 1-month Conditional Value At Risk at a 99% confidence level for portfolio 
sizes from 1 to 50 funds for the 3 different sample periods using the data from table 4.3. 
 
Once again, as one would expect, for all three sample periods these measures decrease 
as the portfolio size increases. The point at which the reduction becomes statistically 
insignificant varies according to the sample period, in the case of 99% 1 month VAR 
this occurs at 39 funds, 40 funds and 25 funds for the twelve, eight and four year 
samples respectively. Similar results are obtained for CVAR. These results suggest that 
an investor who is concerned with minimising the risk of an extreme loss would be 
advised to hold a portfolio of at approximately 40 funds which is much larger than the 
size suggested when only considering risk measured in terms of standard deviation.  
 
The tracking error measures how closely a portfolio follows an index to which it is 
benchmarked. If we assume that investors consider the whole population of hedge funds 
as the benchmark and they are attempting to replicate this benchmark by holding a 
smaller portfolio of hedge funds, obviously the larger the portfolio becomes the closer it 
will track the benchmark, but at which point does the improvement in tracking error 
become insignificant? From table 4.3, the improvement in mean tracking error is 
significant at a 99% confidence level in all three sample periods for portfolio sizes up to 
50 funds Figure 4.6 shows my results graphically. 
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Figure 4.6 – Tracking Error  
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This figure present graphically the results for the mean tracking error for portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds for the 3 different 
sample periods using the data from table 4.3. 
 
Thus far all of my results have indicated that there are benefits to holding portfolios of 
hedge funds of sizes much larger than the 10 to 20 suggested in the previous literature. 
In fact my results would indicate that portfolio sizes of between 30 and 40 funds would 
be more appropriate for an investor concerned about either the time series standard 
deviation or the risk of an extreme loss (and even larger portfolios if the investor is 
concerned with tracking a benchmark).  
 
These results are all based on different measures of risk; however it is also important to 
understand how these portfolios might behave relative to an asset class that they may be 
designed to replace or to which they may be combined. For this reason I also calculate 
the average correlation of the portfolios with equities, as proxied by the S&P 500 index. 
The results from table 4.3 (illustrated in figure 4.7) show that as the portfolio size is 
increased so does the correlation with the S&P 500 index and the increase is statistically 
significant up to portfolio sizes of between 39 and 50 funds depending upon the sample 
period.   
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Figure 4.7 – Correlation to the S&P 500 Index  
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This figure present graphically the mean correlation between the hedge fund portfolios and the S&P 500  for portfolio sizes from 1 
to 50 funds for the 3 different sample periods using the data from table 3. 
 
This is clearly a cost of diversification as generally investors will hold hedge funds in 
addition to a traditional portfolio, thus as the correlation rises the diversification benefits 
of hedge funds falls. 
 
4.4.2 TERMINAL WEALTH STATISTICS  
 
All of the terminal wealth statistics outlined in section 4.3 are calculated for the end 
point of 31st December 2006 with the three different start dates of January 1995, 1999 
and 2003. The results for selected portfolio sizes (full results are available on request) 
are presented in table 4.4. Unlike the previously calculated time series statistics, the 
majority of the terminal wealth statistics are point estimates as opposed to means, so it 
is unnecessary to calculate confidence intervals via a bootstrap. 
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Table 4.4 – Summary Terminal Wealth Statistics 
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
(TWM)
Median 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Maximum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Minimum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Terminal Wealth 
Standard Deviation 
(TWSD)
Reduction
Terminal 
Wealth 
Skewness
Terminal 
Wealth 
Kurtosis
Shortfall 
Probability
Mean 
Shortfall
Semi-
Deviation
1 $3.73 $3.16 $46.55 $0.01 $2.80 100.0% 3.20 24.24 63.33% -$1.45 $1.71
2 $3.72 $3.32 $31.27 $0.07 $1.96** 69.9% 2.18 12.90 60.80% -$1.14 $1.35
3 $3.73 $3.41 $21.26 $0.17 $1.62** 57.9% 1.82 9.53 59.76% -$0.98 $1.16
4 $3.73 $3.47 $20.91 $0.71 $1.39** 49.7% 1.56 8.06 58.61% -$0.88 $1.04
5 $3.73 $3.50 $15.52 $0.88 $1.24** 44.4% 1.39 6.97 58.03% -$0.81 $0.95
6 $3.72 $3.53 $15.19 $0.95 $1.13** 40.5% 1.34 6.79 57.89% -$0.75 $0.89
7 $3.73 $3.57 $13.25 $1.26 $1.05** 37.3% 1.17 5.94 56.90% -$0.70 $0.84
8 $3.74 $3.59 $14.06 $1.35 $0.98** 35.1% 1.13 5.88 56.27% -$0.66 $0.79
9 $3.73 $3.60 $10.65 $1.11 $0.93** 33.1% 1.04 5.21 56.00% -$0.63 $0.76
10 $3.73 $3.61 $10.91 $1.55 $0.88** 31.3% 1.04 5.38 56.12% -$0.60 $0.72
11 $3.73 $3.62 $11.00 $1.35 $0.83** 29.8% 1.00 5.25 55.64% -$0.58 $0.69
12 $3.73 $3.62 $9.88 $1.47 $0.80** 28.5% 0.90 4.72 55.41% -$0.56 $0.67
13 $3.72 $3.63 $8.95 $1.65 $0.77** 27.3% 0.87 4.56 55.76% -$0.54 $0.65
14 $3.72 $3.63 $9.12 $1.65 $0.74** 26.4% 0.83 4.54 55.19% -$0.53 $0.63
15 $3.73 $3.65 $9.26 $1.77 $0.71** 25.4% 0.80 4.35 54.82% -$0.50 $0.61
20 $3.73 $3.66 $7.34 $1.75 $0.62** 22.1% 0.70 3.94 54.17% -$0.45 $0.54
30 $3.73 $3.69 $8.08 $2.12 $0.50* 17.8% 0.55 3.76 53.11% -$0.37 $0.45
40 $3.73 $3.70 $6.07 $2.37 $0.42** 15.2% 0.48 3.50 52.64% -$0.32 $0.39
50 $3.73 $3.71 $6.00 $2.36 $0.37** 13.4% 0.41 3.36 52.52% -$0.28 $0.34
All $3.73 $3.73 $3.92 $3.63 $0.07 2.5% 1.20 4.48 53.25% -$0.03 $0.04
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
(TWM)
Median 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Maximum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Minimum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Terminal Wealth 
Standard Deviation 
(TWSD)
Reduction
Terminal 
Wealth 
Skewness
Terminal 
Wealth 
Kurtosis
Shortfall 
Probability
Mean 
Shortfall
Semi-
Deviation
1 $2.80 $2.05 $134.04 $0.00 $4.21 100.0% 9.44 132.11 75.61% -$1.05 $1.21
2 $2.80 $2.14 $74.90 $0.11 $3.08** 73.1% 7.20 80.27 75.27% -$0.90 $1.02
3 $2.82 $2.20 $46.91 $0.46 $2.47** 58.6% 5.19 40.34 74.05% -$0.82 $0.92
4 $2.81 $2.25 $36.36 $0.47 $2.12** 50.3% 4.56 31.89 73.39% -$0.77 $0.86
5 $2.81 $2.28 $35.55 $0.75 $1.90** 45.1% 4.36 31.27 72.33% -$0.73 $0.82
6 $2.79 $2.31 $29.41 $0.77 $1.70** 40.4% 4.01 26.95 72.09% -$0.70 $0.78
7 $2.79 $2.33 $23.87 $0.78 $1.56** 37.0% 3.53 21.06 71.18% -$0.67 $0.75
8 $2.79 $2.35 $27.94 $0.89 $1.48** 35.1% 3.36 19.65 70.80% -$0.65 $0.73
9 $2.79 $2.37 $20.51 $1.07 $1.40** 33.2% 3.22 18.39 69.91% -$0.63 $0.71
10 $2.79 $2.39 $23.09 $0.94 $1.32** 31.4% 2.96 15.65 70.13% -$0.61 $0.69
11 $2.80 $2.41 $15.49 $1.05 $1.27** 30.2% 2.81 13.89 69.52% -$0.60 $0.67
12 $2.80 $2.42 $16.55 $1.03 $1.22** 28.9% 2.69 13.37 68.94% -$0.58 $0.66
13 $2.80 $2.44 $15.54 $1.24 $1.16** 27.6% 2.63 13.09 68.34% -$0.57 $0.64
14 $2.80 $2.45 $13.52 $1.30 $1.12** 26.5% 2.51 11.99 68.34% -$0.56 $0.63
15 $2.80 $2.46 $15.02 $1.23 $1.08** 25.7% 2.39 11.29 67.71% -$0.55 $0.62
20 $2.80 $2.51 $11.63 $1.41 $0.93** 22.1% 2.03 8.73 66.03% -$0.51 $0.57
30 $2.80 $2.57 $9.04 $1.51 $0.76** 18.0% 1.64 6.70 63.13% -$0.45 $0.51
40 $2.80 $2.62 $8.97 $1.56 $0.65** 15.5% 1.43 5.88 60.77% -$0.41 $0.47
50 $2.80 $2.66 $7.01 $1.70 $0.58** 13.8% 1.26 5.14 59.49% -$0.38 $0.44
All $2.80 $2.80 $2.90 $2.74 $0.04 0.9% 0.88 3.37 52.26% -$0.02 $0.03
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
(TWM)
Median 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Maximum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Minimum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Terminal Wealth 
Standard Deviation 
(TWSD)
Reduction
Terminal 
Wealth 
Skewness
Terminal 
Wealth 
Kurtosis
Shortfall 
Probability
Mean 
Shortfall
Semi-
Deviation
1 $1.67 $1.45 $18.47 $0.24 $0.94 100.0% 6.82 83.80 68.18% -$0.36 $0.42
2 $1.66 $1.51 $10.33 $0.36 $0.65** 68.5% 4.61 40.54 66.19% -$0.29 $0.34
3 $1.66 $1.54 $8.04 $0.65 $0.54** 57.5% 3.84 28.16 64.93% -$0.26 $0.30
4 $1.66 $1.55 $7.02 $0.74 $0.46** 49.2% 3.36 22.88 64.23% -$0.24 $0.28
5 $1.66 $1.57 $6.57 $0.89 $0.41** 43.9% 2.99 18.45 63.03% -$0.22 $0.26
6 $1.67 $1.58 $5.45 $0.82 $0.39** 41.0% 2.69 15.31 62.48% -$0.21 $0.24
7 $1.66 $1.58 $6.29 $0.88 $0.36** 37.9% 2.60 14.47 62.33% -$0.19 $0.23
8 $1.67 $1.59 $4.92 $0.97 $0.33** 35.0% 2.39 12.90 61.47% -$0.19 $0.22
9 $1.66 $1.60 $5.30 $1.05 $0.31** 33.0% 2.23 11.62 61.35% -$0.18 $0.21
10 $1.67 $1.60 $4.94 $1.08 $0.30** 31.7% 2.17 11.23 61.09% -$0.17 $0.20
11 $1.67 $1.61 $4.47 $1.07 $0.29** 30.3% 2.09 10.58 60.43% -$0.17 $0.19
12 $1.67 $1.61 $4.06 $1.06 $0.27** 29.0% 1.98 9.63 60.31% -$0.16 $0.19
13 $1.67 $1.61 $4.14 $1.12 $0.26** 27.7% 1.87 9.05 59.97% -$0.16 $0.18
14 $1.67 $1.61 $4.11 $1.14 $0.25** 26.7% 1.83 8.83 59.84% -$0.15 $0.18
15 $1.67 $1.62 $3.91 $1.16 $0.24** 25.9% 1.84 8.86 59.98% -$0.15 $0.17
20 $1.67 $1.62 $3.42 $1.19 $0.21** 22.3% 1.50 6.79 58.98% -$0.13 $0.16
30 $1.66 $1.64 $2.73 $1.26 $0.17** 18.1% 1.21 5.35 57.95% -$0.11 $0.13
40 $1.67 $1.64 $2.72 $1.30 $0.15** 15.6% 1.06 4.86 56.81% -$0.10 $0.12
50 $1.67 $1.65 $2.50 $1.33 $0.13* 13.9% 0.91 4.29 55.82% -$0.09 $0.11
All $1.67 $1.66 $1.68 $1.66 $0.00 0.4% 0.97 3.75 51.82% -$0.00 $0.00
Panel C: Sample Period January 2003 - December 2006
Panel A: Sample Period January 1995 - December 2006
Panel B: Sample Period January 1999 - December 2006
 
This table presents terminal wealth statistics for portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds assuming an initial investment of $1. Panel A 
presents the results for the period January 1995 to December 2006, Panel B presents the results for the period starting in January 
1999 and ending in December 2006 and Panel C presents the results for the period starting in January 2003 and ending in 
December 2006. All results are calculated from either 50,000 random selections or the exhaustive set of possible combinations 
using the data set presented in table 2 
 130
 As one would expect the mean terminal wealth (TWM) is independent of the size of the 
portfolio but does depend upon the sample period. As the average returns were positive 
for all periods, TWM is largest for the twelve year sample and smallest for the four year 
sample period. For portfolios of individual funds, the difference between the maximum 
and minimum terminal wealth values is extremely wide with the minimum being close 
to zero for all three sample periods, this is an indication of how risky simply choosing a 
single fund can be. The risk of extreme outcomes gradually reduces as portfolio size is 
increased but even with a portfolio of 20 funds the minimum terminal wealth is less 
than 50% of the average for the twelve and eight year sample periods. 
 
For all three sample periods the terminal wealth standard deviation (TWSD) declines 
rapidly initially as the number of funds in the portfolio is increased but the rate of 
decrease levels off quite quickly. This is exactly as predicted by equations (13) and (14), 
because the TWSD is simply a function of the square root of the portfolio size. For a 
portfolio size of 20 funds, equation (14) predicts that the TWSD relative to the single 
fund case should be %22201 ≈ , which is the result I find for all three sample 
periods.  
 
An F-test is used to determine the statistical significance of the TWSD reduction as 
portfolio size increases. When comparing two distributions, the ratio of the variances is 
distributed F(d1,d2) where d1 and d2 are the degrees of freedom for the respective 
samples. I am able to reject the null hypothesis of equal variances for all portfolio sizes 
considered; more specifically the TWSD of the larger portfolio is always significantly 
less at the 1% level than the TWSD of the smaller portfolio. This result contrasts with 
the results for the time series standard deviation presented above and implies that there 
are significant benefits to diversifying beyond the 30 fund portfolio level. 
 
For all three sample periods the median terminal wealth is below the mean value which 
indicates that the distribution is positively skewed (as confirmed by the skewness 
measure). This has extremely important implications for the construction of portfolio as 
it indicates that the TWM is influenced by a small number of high performing funds.  
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Figure 4.8 – Probability Density Functions For Selected Portfolio Sizes  
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Sample Period January 1999 - December 2006 
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Sample Period January 2003 - December 2006 
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These figures depict the probability density functions of the terminal wealth achieved from an initial investment of $1 over the three 
sample periods. 
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Figure 4.8 shows the probability density function for the individual funds and selected 
portfolio sizes. The long right hand tails of the three distributions shows the positive 
skewness. 
 
This fact is also illustrated by the shortfall probability. The benchmark I use is the mean 
return all of the funds in the sample, because more of the randomly selected funds have 
a return below the mean than above (as illustrated above) the shortfall probability is 
always greater than 50%. The shortfall probability declines in an almost linear fashion 
as the portfolio size is increase for all three sample periods but does not approach 50% 
until a portfolio of all funds is held. 
 
As previously mentioned, the major shortcoming of the shortfall probability is that it 
does not take account of the magnitude by which returns fall short of the mean, for this 
reason I also calculate the mean shortfall. As with many of the previous risk measures, 
the mean shortfall decreases as the portfolio size is increased and this rate of decrease 
declines fairly rapidly. The mean shortfall is reduced to almost 50% of the single fund 
portfolio level by increasing the portfolio size to between seven and twelve funds 
depending upon the sample period chosen. However these shortfalls are still substantial, 
take for example a portfolio size of 20 funds in the twelve year sample period where the 
mean shortfall is $0.45, this equates to an annual shortfall of 1.19% p.a. Thus a naïve 
investor who formed an equally weighted portfolio of 20 hedge funds has a 53% chance 
of underperforming the mean by an average of 1.19% p.a. 
 
All of the above would imply that there are indeed benefits to holding portfolios of 
hedge funds that are much larger than the ten to fifteen funds that have been previously 
suggested as the optimum size. The main reason for this is that previous studies have 
ignored the uncertainty that exists around the mean return; although the mean return 
remains unchanged as portfolio size is increased the uncertainty around that mean is 
reduced.  If, as in the case of my sample of hedge funds, the distribution of individual 
fund returns is positively skewed then there is a more than 50% probability that a 
portfolio of funds chosen at random will have a return below the mean. 
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To better illustrate this effect I repeat all of the above analysis on a sample of mutual 
fund returns drawn from the Morningstar database. Using the same sample period as 
before (January 1995 to December 2006), I extract all live and dead actively managed 
large cap US mutual funds which results in a sample of 1,934 funds of which 1,407 are 
live and 527 are dead. Summary time series and terminal wealth statistics for selected 
portfolio sizes are presented in table 4.5 which are directly comparable with tables 4.3 
and 4.4. 
 
Table 4.5 – Summary Time Series and Terminal Wealth Statistics 
For Mutual Fund Sample 
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Return
Mean 
Standard 
Deviaiton
Reduction
Mean 
Skew
Mean 
Kurtosis
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 95%
Mean 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
(TWM)
Median 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Terminal 
Wealth 
Standard 
Deviation 
Reduction
Terminal 
Wealth 
Skewness
Terminal 
Wealth 
Kurtosis
Shortfall 
Probability
1 9.9% 15.9% -0.58 4.48 -7.1% $3.10 $3.07 $1.19 0.67 0.26 53.3%
2 9.9% 14.9%** 93.6% -0.60** 4.16** -6.6% $3.10 $3.07 $0.84** 70.6% 0.47 0.33 51.7%
3 9.9% 14.5%** 91.3% -0.63** 4.11** -6.5% $3.10 $3.07 $0.69** 57.7% 0.37 0.37 51.6%
4 9.9% 14.3%** 90.2% -0.65** 4.10** -6.4% $3.10 $3.07 $0.59** 49.6% 0.32 0.41 51.6%
5 9.9% 14.2%** 89.4% -0.67** 4.09* -6.4% $3.10 $3.08 $0.53** 44.6% 0.28 0.43 51.5%
6 9.9% 14.1%** 88.9% -0.69** 4.09 -6.4% $3.10 $3.08 $0.48** 40.6% 0.27 0.46 51.5%
7 9.9% 14.1%** 88.6% -0.70** 4.08 -6.4% $3.10 $3.08 $0.45** 37.4% 0.23 0.47 51.3%
8 9.9% 14.0%** 88.2% -0.70** 4.08 -6.3% $3.10 $3.08 $0.42** 35.1% 0.24 0.48 51.4%
9 9.9% 14.0%** 88.0% -0.71** 4.08 -6.3% $3.10 $3.08 $0.39** 33.1% 0.22 0.50 51.2%
10 9.9% 14.0%** 87.8% -0.71** 4.08* -6.4% $3.10 $3.09 $0.37** 31.2% 0.19 0.51 50.9%
11 9.9% 14.0%* 87.7% -0.72** 4.08 -6.4% $3.10 $3.09 $0.35** 29.7% 0.18 0.52 51.1%
12 9.9% 13.9%* 87.6% -0.72** 4.07 -6.4% $3.10 $3.08 $0.34** 28.5% 0.17 0.52 51.4%
13 9.9% 13.9%* 87.6% -0.73** 4.07 -6.4% $3.10 $3.08 $0.32** 27.2% 0.19 0.53 51.6%
14 9.9% 13.9%** 87.4% -0.73** 4.07 -6.4% $3.10 $3.09 $0.31** 26.4% 0.17 0.53 50.7%
15 9.9% 13.9% 87.4% -0.73** 4.07 -6.4% $3.10 $3.09 $0.30** 25.2% 0.17 0.54 51.4%
20 9.9% 13.8% 87.1% -0.74** 4.07 -6.4% $3.10 $3.09 $0.26** 21.8% 0.15 0.56 51.1%
30 9.9% 13.8% 86.8% -0.75** 4.07 -6.4% $3.10 $3.09 $0.21** 17.5% 0.10 0.58 50.6%
40 9.9% 13.8% 86.7% -0.75 4.06 -6.4% $3.10 $3.09 $0.18** 15.0% 0.10 0.59 50.6%
50 9.9% 13.8% 86.6% -0.76 4.06* -6.5% $3.10 $3.09 $0.16** 13.1% 0.06 0.60 50.6%
All 9.9% 13.7% 86.3% -0.77 4.06 -6.5% $3.10 $3.09 $0.00 0.4% 2.55 0.63 50.4%
Sample Period January 1995 - December 2006
Panel A: Summary Time Series Statistics Panel B: Summary Terminal Wealth Statistics
 
This table presents selected mean values for various time series and terminal wealth statistics for portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds. 
A bootstrap procedure is used to test whether adding 1 additional fund to the portfolio makes a statistically significant change in the 
mean value, those significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. All results are calculated from 
either 50,000 random selections or the exhaustive set of possible combinations. 
 
The time series statistic results in Panel A for mutual funds are strikingly different from 
those previously presented for hedge funds in table 4.3. The mutual funds in the sample 
are much more highly correlated and hence the reduction in time-series standard 
deviation in much less pronounced, in fact there is no statistically significant reduction 
beyond portfolios of 14 funds whereas for hedge funds there was for portfolio sizes up 
to 30 funds. 
 
The terminal wealth statistics presented in panel B are also somewhat different for 
mutual funds compared to hedge funds. Although the distribution of individual fund 
return is still exhibits positive skew and excess kurtosis (skewness = 0.67 and excess 
kurtosis = 0.26) the effect is much smaller than for hedge funds (skewness = 3.2 and 
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excess kurtosis = 25.24). This is reflected in the shortfall probability which is 53.3% for 
portfolios of one fund compared to 63.33% for hedge funds. In fact a portfolio of just 2 
utual funds has a lower shortfall probability than a portfolio of 50 hedge funds. 
al properties of the underlying funds, namely their correlation, skewness 
nd kurtosis. 
.5 EXAMINING THE EFFECT OF REBALANCING 
r lose or make money depending 
n the time series properties of the underlying assets.  
s are 
resented in tables 4.6 and 4.7 which are directly comparable to tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
o under perform (i.e. persistence)  then this will 
clearly not be a profitable strategy. 
m
 
These results clearly demonstrate that a much smaller portfolio of mutual funds 
compared to hedge funds is required to be adequately diversified and that this is driven 
by the statistic
a
 
4
 
Thus far all of my results have been calculated for portfolios that are not rebalanced, 
hence although the portfolio weights are equal at the point at inception they will vary 
significantly over time. As pointed out by Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) rebalancing 
is actually an embedded trading strategy whereby an investor “sells” assets with strong 
prior performance and “buys” assets with poor prior performance. If returns are not 
independent over time, this trading strategy can eithe
o
 
I now repeat the previous analysis with annual rebalancing to equal portfolio weights. 
More frequent rebalancing would be impractical due to the various lock-up and 
redemption restrictions that most hedge funds apply to their investors. The result
p
 
The first and most striking result is that rebalancing does not appear to have been a 
profitable trading strategy in any of the three sample periods considered. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the mean return declines as the portfolio size is increased. The 
reason for this probably lies in the performance persistence of the underlying funds. 
Authors including Agarwal and Naik (2000) and Edwards and Caglayan (2001) have 
found evidence of performance persistence for both winners and losers. Rebalancing the 
portfolios annually means selling part of the best performing funds and buying the worst 
performing funds. If either the best performing funds continue to outperform or the 
worst performing funds continue t
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Ta s 
95 - December 2006
Panel B: Sample Period January 1999 - December 2006
Panel C: Sample Period January 2003 - December 2006
ble 4.6 – Summary Time Series Statistics For Annually Rebalanced Portfolio
od January 19
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Return
Mean 
Standard 
Deviaiton
Reduction
Mean 
Skew
Mean 
Kurtosis
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 99%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 99%
Mean 
Tracking 
Error All 
Funds
Mean 
Correlation 
S&P500
1 11.6% 16.5% 100.0% -0.18 9.08 -6.3% -12.2% -9.9% -17.1% 4.6% 26.0%
2 11.6% 13.1%** 79.3% -0.09** 7.32** -4.9%** -9.3%** -7.6%** -12.9%** 3.4%** 32.2%**
3 11.6% 11.5%** 69.9% -0.06** 6.51** -4.2%** -8.0%** -6.5%** -11.1%** 2.8%** 36.3%**
4 11.6% 10.6%** 64.4% -0.04** 6.05** -3.8%** -7.2%** -5.9%** -10.0%** 2.4%** 39.3%**
5 11.5% 10.0%** 60.8% -0.03 5.73** -3.6%** -6.7%** -5.4%** -9.3%** 2.2%** 41.8%**
6 11.6% 9.6%** 58.1% -0.03 5.52** -3.4%** -6.3%** -5.1%** -8.8%** 2.0%** 43.9%**
7 11.6% 9.2%** 55.9% -0.03 5.34** -3.2%** -6.0%** -4.9%** -8.5%** 1.9%** 45.8%**
8 11.5% 9.0%** 54.5% -0.02 5.22** -3.1%** -5.8%** -4.7%** -8.1%** 1.7%** 47.0%**
9 11.5% 8.8%** 53.2% -0.03 5.09** -3.0%** -5.6%** -4.6%** -7.9%** 1.7%** 48.3%**
10 11.5% 8.6%** 52.3% -0.03 5.01** -2.9%** -5.4%** -4.5%** -7.8%** 1.6%** 49.2%**
11 11.6% 8.5%** 51.3% -0.03 4.95** -2.9%** -5.3%** -4.4%** -7.6%** 1.5%** 50.3%**
12 11.6% 8.4%** 50.6% -0.03 4.86** -2.8%** -5.2%** -4.3%** -7.5%** 1.4%** 51.1%**
13 11.5% 8.3%** 50.0% -0.03 4.81** -2.8%** -5.1%** -4.2%** -7.4%** 1.4%** 51.8%**
14 11.5% 8.2%** 49.4% -0.03 4.76** -2.7%** -5.0%** -4.1%** -7.3%** 1.3%** 52.3%**
15 11.5% 8.1%** 48.9% -0.03* 4.71** -2.7%** -4.9%** -4.1%** -7.2%* 1.3%** 52.9%**
20 11.5% 7.8%** 47.2% -0.04 4.57** -2.5%** -4.6%** -3.9%** -7.0%** 1.1%** 55.1%**
30 11.5% 7.5%** 45.4% -0.04 4.41* -2.4%** -4.3%** -3.6%** -6.7%** 0.9%** 57.5%*
40 11.5% 7.3%** 44.4% -0.03 4.32 -2.3%** -4.1%** -3.5%** -6.6% 0.8%** 59.0%
50 11.5% 7.2% 43.9% -0.04* 4.29* -2.2%** -4.0%** -3.4% -6.6% 0.7%** 59.8%
All 11.5% 6.9% 41.8% -0.03 4.13 -2.1% -3.7% -3.2% -6.5% 0.0% 63.0%
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Return
Mean 
Standard 
Deviaiton
Reduction
Mean 
Skew
Mean 
Kurtosis
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 99%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 99%
Mean 
Tracking 
Error All 
Funds
Mean 
Correlation 
S&P500
1 13.7% 15.3% 100.0% 0.30 7.41 -5.8% -10.7% -8.3% -12.2% 4.3% 22.9%
2 12.5% 12.4%** 80.7% 0.36** 6.69** -4.5%** -8.1%** -6.3%** -9.2%** 3.3%** 28.9%**
3 12.3% 10.9%** 71.5% 0.38** 6.23** -3.9%** -6.9%** -5.4%** -7.9%** 2.7%** 32.9%**
4 12.2% 10.1%** 66.2% 0.42 5.91** -3.5%** -6.2%** -4.9%** -7.0%** 2.4%** 35.8%**
5 12.1% 9.5%** 62.2% 0.43** 5.64** -3.2%** -5.7%** -4.5%** -6.4%** 2.2%** 38.1%**
6 12.2% 9.1%** 59.7% 0.45** 5.44** -3.1%** -5.3%** -4.2%** -5.9%** 2.0%** 40.0%**
7 12.1% 8.8%** 57.5% 0.46** 5.29** -2.9%** -5.0%** -4.0%** -5.6%** 1.9%** 41.6%**
8 12.0% 8.5%** 55.8% 0.47** 5.16** -2.8%** -4.8%** -3.8%** -5.3%** 1.8%** 42.9%**
9 12.0% 8.3%** 54.5% 0.48 5.05** -2.7%** -4.6%** -3.7%** -5.1%** 1.7%** 44.0%**
10 12.0% 8.2%** 53.4% 0.49* 4.96** -2.7%** -4.4%** -3.6%** -4.9%** 1.6%** 45.1%**
11 12.0% 8.0%** 52.4% 0.50** 4.88** -2.6%** -4.3%** -3.5%** -4.8%** 1.5%** 46.1%**
12 12.0% 7.9%** 51.6% 0.50 4.81** -2.5%** -4.2%** -3.4%** -4.6%** 1.5%** 46.9%**
13 12.0% 7.8%** 50.9% 0.50 4.75** -2.5%** -4.1%** -3.3%** -4.5%** 1.4%** 47.7%**
14 12.0% 7.7%** 50.3% 0.51** 4.70 -2.4%** -4.0%** -3.2%** -4.4%** 1.4%** 48.2%**
15 12.0% 7.6%** 49.8% 0.51 4.68** -2.4%** -3.9%** -3.2%** -4.3%** 1.3%** 48.8%**
20 12.0% 7.3%** 47.9% 0.53 4.54 -2.3%** -3.6%** -3.0%** -4.0%** 1.1%** 51.0%**
30 12.0% 7.0%** 45.8% 0.55 4.42 -2.1%** -3.3%** -2.7%** -3.6%** 0.9%** 53.7%**
40 11.9% 6.8%** 44.7% 0.56 4.37 -2.0%** -3.1%** -2.6%** -3.3%** 0.8%** 55.1%*
50 11.9% 6.7% 44.0% 0.57 4.32 -2.0% -3.0%** -2.5%* -3.2%** 0.7%** 55.9%**
All 11.9% 6.3% 41.4% 0.62 4.08 -1.9% -2.3% -2.2% -2.4% 0.0% 59.9%
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Return
Mean 
Standard 
Deviaiton
Reduction
Mean 
Skew
Mean 
Kurtosis
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
VAR 99%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 95%
Mean      
1 Month 
CVAR 99%
Mean 
Tracking 
Error All 
Funds
Mean 
Correlation 
S&P500
1 13.6% 9.7% 100.0% 0.11 4.53 -3.5% -5.7% -5.0% -5.7% 2.7% 31.3%
2 12.9% 8.1%** 82.9% 0.10** 4.04** -2.8%** -4.5%** -3.9%** -4.5%** 2.1%** 40.1%**
3 12.8% 7.3%** 74.6% 0.09** 3.84** -2.4%** -3.9%** -3.4%** -3.9%** 1.8%** 45.4%**
4 12.7% 6.8%** 69.8% 0.06** 3.69** -2.2%** -3.6%** -3.1%** -3.6%** 1.6%** 48.8%**
5 12.7% 6.5%** 66.6% 0.04** 3.58** -2.1%** -3.3%** -2.9%** -3.3%** 1.4%** 51.6%**
6 12.6% 6.2%** 64.0% 0.02** 3.48** -2.0%** -3.1%** -2.8%** -3.1%** 1.3%** 53.8%**
7 12.6% 6.1%** 62.5% 0.00** 3.42** -1.9%** -3.0%** -2.7%** -3.0%** 1.2%** 55.5%**
8 12.6% 5.9%** 60.8% -0.01** 3.33** -1.9%** -2.9%** -2.6%** -2.9%** 1.1%** 56.9%**
9 12.5% 5.8%** 59.5% -0.03** 3.26** -1.8%** -2.8%** -2.5%** -2.8%** 1.1%** 57.9%**
10 12.5% 5.7%** 58.8% -0.05** 3.19** -1.8%** -2.8%** -2.5%** -2.8%** 1.0%** 59.0%**
11 12.6% 5.6%** 57.9% -0.06** 3.15** -1.8%** -2.7%** -2.4%** -2.7%** 1.0%** 60.0%**
12 12.5% 5.6%** 57.2% -0.08** 3.09** -1.8%** -2.7%** -2.4%** -2.7%** 0.9%** 60.8%**
13 12.5% 5.5%** 56.6% -0.09** 3.05** -1.7%** -2.6%** -2.3%** -2.6%** 0.9%** 61.4%**
14 12.5% 5.5%** 56.1% -0.11** 3.01** -1.7%** -2.6%** -2.3%** -2.6%** 0.9%** 62.0%**
15 12.5% 5.4%** 55.5% -0.11** 2.98** -1.7%** -2.5%** -2.3%** -2.5%** 0.8%** 62.5%**
20 12.5% 5.3%** 54.0% -0.16** 2.85** -1.7%** -2.4%** -2.2%** -2.4%** 0.7%** 64.6%**
30 12.4% 5.1%* 52.1% -0.21** 2.74** -1.6% -2.3%** -2.1%* -2.3%* 0.6%** 66.8%**
40 12.4% 5.0% 51.2% -0.24 2.69 -1.6% -2.2%* -2.0%* -2.2%* 0.5%** 68.1%**
50 12.4% 4.9% 50.8% -0.26 2.66 -1.6% -2.1% -2.0% -2.1% 0.5%** 68.8%**
All 12.4% 4.7% 48.5% -0.33 2.57 -1.7% -1.8% -1.7% -1.8% 0.0% 72.1%
Panel A: Sample Peri
 
This table presents mean values for various time series statistics for portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds which are rebala ed nc
annually to equal weights. Panel A presents the results for the period January 1995 to December 2006, Panel B presents the results 
for the period starting in January 1999 and ending in December 2006 and Panel C presents the results for the period starting in 
January 2003 and ending in December 2006. All results are calculated from either 50,000 random selections or the exhaustive set 
of possible combinations using the data set presented in table 4. 2. A bootstrap procedure is used to test whether adding 1 
additional fund to the portfolio makes a statistically significant change in the mean value, those significant at the 5% level are 
denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. 
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Table 4.7 – Summary Terminal Wealth Statistics For Annually Rebalanced 
Weatlh 
Portfolios 
Portfolio 
Mean 
Terminal 
Panel A: Sample Period January 1995 - December 2006
Median 
Terminal 
Maximum 
Terminal 
Minimum 
Terminal 
Terminal Wealth 
Standard Deviation Reduction
Terminal 
Wealth 
Terminal 
Wealth 
Sh
Size
(TWM)
Weatlh Weatlh Weatlh (TWSD) Skewness Kurtosis
ortfall 
Probability
Mean 
Shortfall
Semi-
Deviation
1 $3.73 $3.16 $46.55 $0.01 $2.80 100.0% 3.20 24.24 63.33% -$1.45 $1.71
4 $3.72 $3.50 $18.94 7.95 56.36% -$0.88 $1.05
5 $3.71 $3.53 $17.74 6.74 55.62% -$0.80 $0.96
6 $3.71 $3.56 $13.31 $0.71 $1.12** 39.9% 1.09 5.67 55.25% -$0.74 $0.89
7 $3.72 $3.58 $13.35 $0.88 $1.03** 36.8% 0.99 5.14 54.73% -$0.69 $0.84
8 $3.71 $3.58 $12.01 $1.15 $0.96** 34.2% 0.90 4.85 54.64% -$0.65 $0.79
9 $3.71 $3.60 $10.84 $1.30 $0.91** 32.3% 0.86 4.66 54.07% -$0.62 $0.75
10 $3.71 $3.62 $10.17 $1.19 $0.86** 30.6% 0.78 4.37 53.71% -$0.59 $0.72
11 $3.71 $3.63 $10.64 $1.33 $0.82** 29.4% 0.77 4.36 53.43% -$0.56 $0.68
12 $3.71 $3.63 $10.07 $1.47 $0.78** 28.0% 0.72 4.25 53.36% -$0.54 $0.66
13 $3.71 $3.64 $8.67 $1.50 $0.75** 26.7% 0.67 4.06 52.75% -$0.53 $0.64
14 $3.71 $3.64 $8.70 $1.52 $0.72** 25.8% 0.66 3.93 52.83% -$0.50 $0.61
15 $3.71 $3.64 $8.24 $1.65 $0.70** 24.9% 0.64 3.85 53.22% -$0.49 $0.60
20 $3.71 $3.66 $7.30 $1.72 $0.60** 21.4% 0.54 3.62 52.29% -$0.43 $0.52
30 $3.70 $3.67 $6.39 $2.17 $0.48** 17.1% 0.40 3.31 51.53% -$0.35 $0.43
40 $3.71 $3.68 $6.05 $2.27 $0.41** 14.6% 0.35 3.30 51.37% -$0.30 $0.37
50 $3.70 $3.69 $5.78 $2.54 $0.36** 12.9% 0.33 3.24 51.04% -$0.27 $0.33
All $3.70 $3.70 $3.81 $3.57 $0.06** 2.3% -0.29 2.41 40.00% -$0.06 $0.06
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
2 $3.73 $3.34 $43.93 $0.12 $2.07** 73.8% 3.02 26.15 59.34% -$1.14 $1.35
3 $3.72 $3.44 $39.15 $0.34 $1.63** 58.2% 2.04 16.07 57.40% -$0.98 $1.17
$0.36 $1.39** 49.6% 1.45
$0.74 $1.23** 43.9% 1.26
(TWM)
Median 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Maximum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Minimum 
Terminal 
Weatlh 
Terminal Wealth 
Standard Deviation 
(TWSD)
Reduction
Terminal 
Wealth 
Skewness
Terminal 
Wealth 
Kurtosis
Shortfall 
Probability
Mean 
Shortfall
Semi-
Deviation
1 $2.80 $2.05 $134.04 $0.00 $4.21 100.0% 9.44 132.11 75.61% -$1.05 $1.21
2 $2.57 $2.17 $47.97 $0.16 $1.78** 42.3% 4.66 43.85 74.33% -$0.88 $1.01
3 $2.53 $2.22 $36.07 $0.37 $1.33** 31.5% 3.92 38.90 74.10% -$0.79 $0.90
4 $2.52 $2.26 $14.88 $0.53 $1.06** 25.1% 2.50 13.77 73.90% -$0.74 $0.84
5 $2.49 $2.29 $16.00 $0.68 $0.92** 21.8% 2.46 15.52 74.20% -$0.69 $0.79
6 $2.50 $2.31 $16.57 $0.74 $0.84** 19.8% 2.17 13.04 74.30% -$0.66 $0.76
7 $2.49 $2.33 $12.33 $0.76 $0.75** 17.8% 1.92 10.54 74.99% -$0.64 $0.72
8 $2.48 $2.35 $9.26 $0.79 $0.69** 16.4% 1.74 8.94 75.61% -$0.61 $0.70
9 $2.48 $2.35 $10.74 $0.87 $0.65** 15.5% 1.68 9.23 76.29% -$0.59 $0.67
10 $2.48 $2.37 $11.07 $1.08 $0.61** 14.5% 1.55 8.31 76.44% -$0.58 $0.66
11 $2.48 $2.37 $7.83 $1.14 $0.57** 13.6% 1.37 6.69 77.08% -$0.56 $0.64
12 $2.48 $2.38 $8.13 $1.11 $0.55** 13.1% 1.35 6.78 77.27% -$0.54 $0.62
13 $2.48 $2.38 $7.13 $1.21 $0.53** 12.6% 1.28 6.28 77.75% -$0.53 $0.61
14 $2.47 $2.39 $7.69 $1.25 $0.51** 12.1% 1.29 6.64 78.63% -$0.52 $0.60
.45
50 $2.46 $2.44 $4.12 $1.70 $0.26** 6.1% 0.61 3.76 89.94% -$0.39 $0.43
eatlh 
15 $2.47 $2.39 $7.29 $1.20 $0.49** 11.6% 1.21 6.15 78.98% -$0.52 $0.59
20 $2.47 $2.41 $5.63 $1.30 $0.42** 9.9% 1.00 5.01 81.02% -$0.48 $0.54
30 $2.47 $2.42 $5.30 $1.49 $0.34** 8.1% 0.78 4.19 84.94% -$0.43 $0.49
40 $2.46 $2.43 $4.61 $1.58 $0.29** 6.9% 0.70 4.09 87.74% -$0.40 $0
All $2.46 $2.45 $2.49 $2.41 $0.02** 0.4% -0.28 2.82 100.00% -$0.33 $0.33
Portfolio 
Size
Mean 
Terminal 
W
(TWM)
Median 
Terminal 
Maximum 
Terminal 
Minimum 
Terminal 
Terminal Wealth 
Standard Deviation Reduction
Terminal 
Wealth 
Terminal 
Wealth 
Shortfall Mean Semi-
1 $
Panel C: Sample Period January 2003 - December 2006
Weatlh Weatlh Weatlh (TWSD) Skewness Kurtosis
Probability Shortfall Deviation
1.67 $1.45 $18.47 $0.24 $0.94 100.0% 6.82 83.80 68.18% -$0.36 $0.42
2 $1.63 $1.50 $10.32 $0.57 $0.54** 57.3% 3.26 22.92 66.72% -$0.30 $0.35
3 $1.62 $1.53 $7.15 $0.65 $0.42** 44.1% 2.36 14.04 66.76% -$0.26 $0.31
4 $1.61 $1.54 $5.35 $0.70 $0.35** 37.4% 1.99 10.96 66.12% -$0.24 $0.28
5 $0.31** 33.0% 1.67 8.37 66.81% -$0.22 $0.26
9 $0.28** 29.5% 1.44 6.99 66.90% -$0.21 $0.24
6 $0.26** 27.2% 1.29 6.16 66.89% -$0.20 $0.23
8 $1.61 $1.57 $3.71 $0.97 $0.24** 25.3% 1.26 6.23 67.05% -$0.19 $0.22
9 $1.60 $1.57 $3.23 $0.93 $0.22** 23.6% 1.09 5.24 67.37% -$0.18 $0.21
Panel B: Sample Period January 1999 - December 2006
5 $1.61 $1.55 $4.51 $0.8
6 $1.61 $1.56 $4.26 $0.8
7 $1.61 $1.56 $3.86 $0.9
10 $1.60 $1.57 $3.46 $1.04 $0.21** 22.5% 1.09 5.44 67.50% -$0.17 $0.20
11 $1.60 $1.57 $3.20 $1.04 $0.20** 21.4% 1.03 5.11 68.10% -$0.17 $0.20
12 $1.60 $1.57 $3.02 $1.05 $0.19** 20.2% 0.97 4.87 68.18% -$0.16 $0.19
13 $1.60 $1.58 $2.99 $1.08 $0.18** 19.6% 0.96 4.83 68.82% -$0.16 $0.19
14 $1.60 $1.58 $2.84 $1.08 $0.17** 18.5% 0.83 4.32 68.94% -$0.16 $0.18
15 $1.60 $1.58 $2.89 $1.12 $0.17** 18.0% 0.85 4.46 69.78% -$0.15 $0.18
20 $1.60 $1.58 $2.57 $1.15 $0.15** 15.5% 0.75 4.18 71.05% -$0.14 $0.16
30 $1.60 $1.59 $2.28 $1.22 $0.12** 12.6% 0.59 3.69 73.51% -$0.12 $0.14
40 $1.60 $1.59 $2.17 $1.26 $0.10** 10.9% 0.50 3.52 75.82% -$0.11 $0.13
50 $1.60 $1.59 $2.07 $1.30 $0.09** 9.6% 0.42 3.29 77.72% -$0.10 $0.12
All $1.60 $1.60 $1.60 $1.59 $0.00** 0.3% 0.07 2.25 100.00% -$0.07 $0.07  
This table presents terminal wealth statistics for portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds which are rebalanced annually to equal weights 
assuming an initial investment of $1. Panel A presents the results for the period January 1995 to December 2006, Panel B presents 
the results for the period starting in January 1999 and ending in December 2006 and Panel C presents the results for the period 
starting in Januar
exhaustive set of po
y 2003 and ending in December 2006. All results are calculated from either 50,000 random selections or the 
ssible combinations using the data set presented in table 4.2 
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 Rebalancing does however appear to reduce the volatility of the resulting portfolios. 
Figure 4.9 compares the rebalanced and not rebalanced portfolios. 
 
Figure 4.9 – Time Series Standard Deviation For Annually Rebalanced versus 
Non-Rebalanced Portfolios 
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This figure present graphically the results for the mean standard deviation of portfolio sizes from 1 to 50 funds for both non-
rebalanced and annually rebalanced portfolios for  the 3 different sample periods using the data from tables 3 and 5. 
 
So although there appears to be a cost to this rebalancing strategy in terms of the mean 
onstrated empirically) that approximately 90% of the 
iversifiable time series standard deviation will be removed with a portfolio of 20 
nds. However significant risk still remains in forming portfolios of this size, both in 
rms of the range of uncertainty around this mean value and in a terminal wealth 
amework. 
return there is a corresponding benefit in the reduced standard deviation of the resulting 
portfolio. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that only using time series standard deviation to 
measure the benefits of diversification in portfolios of hedge funds is flawed. I have 
algebraically proven (and dem
d
fu
te
fr
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I have used a bootstrap procedure to demonstrate that there is a statistically significant 
reduction in standard deviation for portfo sizes up to between 24 and 32 funds, 
depending on the sample period chosen. There is also a statistically significant reduction 
in the risk of an extreme loss (as measured by either VAR or CVAR) for portfolio sizes 
up to 40 funds. ds that have 
been suggested tion for the 
observed practi
 
I have shown that in a terminal wealth mework there are benefits to holding 
portfolios of up to 50 funds as measure inal wealth standard 
deviation or the shortfall probability. Fo ll three sample periods examined the 
distribution of individual hedge fund returns is positively skewed i.e. the mean is 
influenc o risks 
not inclu ults for 
ortfolios of m
I have also investigated the effect o balancing of portfolios. Due to the 
 practitioners actually hold 
ortfolios of more than 20 funds. In terms of an optimal number of hedge funds to hold 
ust be careful not to confuse statistical significance with economic 
st that a portfolio of between 40 and 50 funds would 
provide the optimal diversification benefits, however if monitoring costs are high then 
this number might be reduced. 
 
 
 
 
lio 
 Both of these are considerably larger than the 10 to 15 fun
 in previous literature and provide a possible explana
tioner behaviour of holding much larger portfolios.  
 fra
d by either the term
r a
ed by a small number of high performing funds, choosing a small portfoli
ding these funds. I have demonstrated this effect by comparing the res
utual funds to hedge funds. p
 
f regular re
existence of some performance persistence in the underlying funds it would appear that 
for all sample periods examined, annual rebalancing would not have been a profitable 
strategy. However this reduction in mean return is somewhat counterbalanced by a 
reduction in time series standard deviation. 
 
In summary, my work in this chapter shows that there are indeed benefits to holding 
portfolios of hedge funds much larger than the 10-15 that have been suggested in the 
literature and provides an explanation as to why 43% of
p
in a portfolio, one m
significance. My results sugge
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 DO HEDGE FUNDS DELIVER WHEN 
 this chapter I attempt to overcome this 
introducing time variation and non-linearity in two ways, firstly by using an 
symmetric factor model where the factor exposures vary according to the state of 
CHAPTER 5 
 
INVESTORS NEED IT MOST? 
 
 
Abstract 
Factor models that have been widely used for performance attribution and style 
analysis of mutual fund managers have had limited success when applied to hedge 
funds.  This is because hedge funds follow dynamic trading strategies with non-linear 
relationships to the standard asset classes. In
problem by 
a
economy and secondly by applying a two state Markov regime switching regression 
model. Adopting these approaches not only leads to an improvement the fit of the factor 
models, it also allows me to investigate if hedge funds alpha varies over time and to 
ascertain whether they deliver this alpha when investors need it most, namely in times 
of recession when the marginal utility of wealth is higher.   
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Factor models such as that proposed by Sharpe (1990) have been used successfully in 
the traditional asset management world but have had only limited success in explaining 
hedge fund returns. For example, regressing fund returns on an eight factor model Fung 
and Hsieh (1997) found that 47% of mutual funds had r-squared higher than 75% while  
48% of hedge funds had R-squared below 25%. The authors suggest that these low R-
squared are due to hedge funds dynamic trading strategies which result in non-linear 
relationships to the standard asset classes. Some authors (for example Agarwal and Naik 
(2000a)) have considered models that employ factors that themselves have non-linear 
relationships with traditional asset classes such as options, but these approaches have 
een subject to criticism due to the arbitrary nature of their specification. 
time variation and 
on-linearity in different ways. Firstly I use an asymmetric factor model where the 
nomy and secondly I apply a two 
ate Markov switching regression model. Adopting these approaches not only leads to 
 the fit of the factor models, it also allows me to investigate if hedge 
 driven 
y their performance in times of expansion and that in recessions they actually deliver 
most, namely in recessions when the marginal utility of wealth is higher. My results for 
b
 
In this chapter I investigate two alternative approaches that introduce 
n
factor exposures vary according to the state of eco
st
an improvement
funds alpha varies over time and to ascertain whether they deliver this alpha when 
investors need it most, namely in times of recession when the marginal utility of wealth 
is higher.   
 
In the mutual fund literature, many authors such as Wermers (2000) have found that 
funds tend to underperform benchmark models on average. However using a 
conditional performance model Kosowski (2001) finds this underperformance is
b
positive alpha. Though there is a broad literature on the unconditional performance of 
hedge funds including Agarwal and Naik (2000b) and Ibbotson and Chen (2005) who 
find statistically significant positive alpha none of these authors consider conditional 
performance measures. 
 
In this chapter by examining the performance of hedge funds conditional upon the state 
of the economy I attempt to answer whether hedge funds deliver when investors need it 
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the asymmetric factor model where the states are explicitly classified as expansion and 
recession based on the NBER data contrast sharply with the findings of Kosowski 
001). In this case the positive alphas of hedge fund strategies that have been 
 results of the two state Markov switching 
gression model, where the states are determined as those which best fit the data 
identifies one regime with  which coincides with the 
two recessions in my sample period. Thus it would appear that hedge funds might 
deliver when investors need it most. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows, section 2 outlines the data and 
methodology, section 3 presents the results and section 4 concludes.  
 
5.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.2.1 DATA 
For the empirical analysis in this chapter, I use hedge-fund index returns provided by 
Credit Suisse/Tremont for the period from January 1994 to October 2008. The Credit 
Suisse/Tremont indices are asset-weighted indices of funds with a minimum of $10 
million of assets under management, a minimum one-year track record, and current 
audited financial statements. An aggregate index is computed from this universe, as 
well as sub-indexes based on investment style. Indices are computed and rebalanced on 
a monthly frequency and the universe of funds is redefined on a quarterly basis.  
 
The construction methodology means that these indices are free from survivorship bias 
and backfill bias is minimized by excluding the first twelve months of returns. There 
will however be some selection bias as outlined in chapter 1 because of the minimum 
size and age restrictions, though the effect is likely to be small. The performance of 
these indices is reported net of all fees and expenses, however because I do not have 
access to the fee structure of the underlying funds it is not possible to calculate oss 
(2
previously documented in the literature by authors such as Agarwal and Naik (2000b) 
and Ibbotson and Chen (2005) appear to stem from expansion periods when funds have 
statistically significant positive alpha and not recession periods when alpha is not 
statistically different from zero. However, the
re
positive alpha (and low volatility)
gr
returns. As a result of this my results will be subject to the biases outlined in chapter 2, 
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namely that the betas will be understated when the underlying funds are above their 
s outlined in chapters 1 and 2 a large number of factors have been identified as being 
significant drivers of hedge fund returns. In this chapter I use the same 11 candidate 
factors used in chapter 2.  Table 5.1 presents the list of candidate factors to be used in 
e regressions and performance attribution. 
 
turn)
LHTR20Y & 
LHSHORT
al Return MSEMKFL
JPMBXUS
GLOBAL_BONDS MSCI  Wo
DVIX Change In CBOE VIX ex CBOEVIX
high-water mark.  
 
A
th
 
Table 5.1 Explanatory Factors  
Name Description
Datastream 
Mnemonic
MKT Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Composite Total Return WILEQTY
SMB
Dow Jones Wilshire Small Cap Minus Dow Jones 
Wilshire Large Cap (Both Total Return)
WILDJSC & 
WILDJLC
USD Finex-US Dollar Index Return NDXCS00
CMDTY GSCI Commodity Total Return GSCITOT
BOND Lehman US Agggregate Total Return LHAGGBD
CREDIT
Lehman US Credit Intermediate Bond Index Minus 
Lehman Government Intermediate (Both Total 
Return)
LHCRPIN & 
LHGOVIN
SLOPE
Lehman US Treasury: 20+ Year Index Minus
Lehman Short Treasury Index (Both Total Re
EMERGING MSCI Emerging Markets Index Tot
GLOBAL_STOCKS
JP Morgan Global Broad Excluding U.S. Total 
Return
rld Excluding U.S. Total Return MSWFXU
 Ind
 
This table presents the set of candidate factors to be used for the hedge fund performance attribution with their DataStream 
mnemonic 
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5.2.2 LINEAR FACTOR MODEL 
As a first step and for the basis of comparison the non-conditional exposures of the 
hedge fund indices are evaluated by running the following regression 
 
n
FR εβα ++= ∑        tti
i
tit = ,1 ,       (1) 
 including all 11 factors for every strategy, I undertake a procedure 
 identify the significant factors for each strategy individually. This is because of the 
he limitation of this model is that is constrains the relationship between the hedge fund 
ble if the relationship is 
        (2) 
           (3) 
Where  is an indicator variable state variable which takes the value of zero or one 
e t. I define the two states as expansion and 
 
Where tR is the return of the hedge fund index and tiF , are the returns on the candidate 
factors. Rather than
to
heterogeneous nature of hedge fund strategies and the advantage is that it avoids the use 
of superfluous factors in the regressions.  For each hedge fund strategy index I run 
regressions for all possible combinations of one to eleven factors, a total of 211 = 2,048 
regressions, in order to identify the most parsimonious model, which I define as the one 
with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). This set of factors is then used for 
all subsequent analysis. 
 
T
returns and the factor returns to be linear, therefore it is unrelia
non-linear. Authors such as Fung and Hsieh (1997) suggest that the dynamic trading 
strategies employed by hedge funds will result in non-linear relationships between their 
returns and traditional asset classes and hence in the following sections I propose two 
more flexible approaches in order to capture thias non linearity. 
 
5.2.3 ASYMMETRIC FACTOR MODEL 
In order to examine whether hedge fund returns and exposures vary with the business 
cycle I run the following two regressions:  ( ) ttin
i
titt FSR εβα ++= ∑= ,1 ,( ) ( ) ttin
i
ttitt FSSR εβα ++= ∑= ,1 ,
tS
conditional upon the current state at tim
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recession using the business cycle dates taken from the NBER website. Within the 178 
months of my sample period there are two recessions, the first starts in April 2001 and 
lasts until November 2001 (8 months) and the second starts January 2008 and lasts until 
the end of the sample period in October 2008 (10 months). Thus I have 160 months that 
are classified as expansion and 18 months that are classified as recession. 
 
Expression (2) only allows the alpha of the hedge funds to vary conditional upon the 
tate variable St while expression (3) allows both the alpha and the betas or factor 
This approach introduces time variation and non-linearity in the exposures via the factor 
weights being state dep
u
utility of wealth is high. However the approach is open to criticism because of the way 
WITCHING MODEL 
A Markov switching 
mixture of distributions model. In a mixture of distributions model, each time t is 
ich 
llows a first order Markov chain determines which of the 2 (or more) states 
(distributions) we are in at time t. Hence because the current regime st only depends on 
the regime one period ago st-1, the stochastic process can described by the trans
probabilities of moving from one state to another, in a two regime example these are 
defined as 
)
( ) ( )212221
12
12
12|2
1
1|2
ppSSP
p
pSSP
tt
tt
tt
−====
−===
s
exposures to vary. 
 
endent and because these states are defined as recessions and 
expansions, it could identify whether managers add val e when investors’ marginal 
in which the states are imposed which could be seen as arbitrary. In order to overcome 
this I propose a third approach where the states are endogenously determined by the 
model. 
 
5.2.4 MARKOV REGIME S
regime model can be thought of as a special case of the simple 
considered as an independent random draw from two (or more) distributions. However, 
in a Markov switching model, the evolution of an unobserved state variable St wh
fo
ition 
 ( )( ) (=( ) 112|1 1|1 pSSP pSSP tt === ===             (4) 
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Since the pioneering work of Hamilton (1989) who applied Markov switching to U  
GDP, regime switching has been applied to a variety of financial data. Schaller and Van 
S
Norden (1997) considered excess market returns and found robust evidence of 
witching behaviour, Marsh (2000) considered high frequency foreign exchange data, 
and found the data to be w
(2005) successfully modelled periodically collapsing bubbles and Kosowski (2001) 
examined the performan
In this chapter I consider a 2 regime model, where the transition probabilities between 
y the random vector 
s
ell approximated by Markov models, Brooks and Katsaris 
ce of mutual funds conditional upon the business cycle. 
 
regimes are fixed as, these transition probabilities form the transition matrix P. 
⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛= 2212 2111 pp ppP              (5) 
The Markov chain is represented b tξ , whose i-th element equals 
one if St = i and zero otherwise. us, in a two-state Markov chain
However the Markov chain is assumed to be unobservable, thus we can never be sure 
Th  if St = 2. ( )′= 1,0tξ
about the regime at time t, we can only assign probabilities of being in one regime or 
another. The conditional expectation of 1+tξ  given t is denoted by ˆ +ξ  and is 
calculated by multiplying 
tt |1
tξ by P: 
tttt P ||1 ˆˆ ξξ •=+               (6) 
If I assume normality of the errors ti ,ε  for each of the 2 regimes, a vector of the 
onditional densities of the two regimes,  can be calculated from expression (7).   c tη
 
( )( ) ⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎤⎢⎢⎡ ⎫⎩⎨⎧ ′−−−⎤⎡ = − 21
2
1
1 2
)(
exp
2;,,1| σ βαπσθψ xyxsyf ttttt
⎦⎭⎩ 22 22 σπσ⎢⎢
⎢
⎣ ⎬⎫⎨⎧ ′−−−
⎭⎬=⎥⎦⎢⎣ == −
2
2
22
1
1
1 )(
exp
1
1
;,,2| βαθψη xyxsyf tttttt           (7) 
where 
 ( )and ( ),.....21211 ,,........, −−−−− = ttttt xxyyψ212121 ,,,,, σσββααθ P=  denotes the 
information up to time t − 1.  
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Hamilton (1994) illustrates that the optimal inference and forecast for each date t, (
+ ) in the sample can be found by iterating on equations (8) and (9).  
tt|ξˆ  
and  ξˆ  respectivelytt |1
 ( )( )ttt ttttt ηξ ηξξ ⊗⊗= −− 1|' 1|| ˆ1 ˆˆ               (8) 
tttt P ||1 ˆˆ ξξ •=+               (9) 
 indicates the Hadamard product (elementwise multiplication)  
The vector is referred to as the filtered probability and is the best estimate for 
the Markov chain at time t given all information up to time t. The log likelihood for the 
observed data for the value of θ used to perform the iterations can then be calculated 
from equation (10)  
 
                      (10) 
The set of optimal parameters θ can be obtained by maximising the log likelihood 
function under the restriction that probabilities sum to one (P’1 = 1) and standard 
deviations are greater than zero
⊗where 
tt|ξˆ
( )( )∑= − ⊗= Tt tt1 1|' ˆ1log)( ηξθl
( )0>iσ . 
Maximizing this function will give the optimal values for θ and hence the alphas, betas, 
standard deviations and transition probabilities which best describe the underlying 
process. 
 
Once the optimisation is complete, smoothed inferences can be calculated using an 
algorithm developed by Kim (1993). The smoothed probabilities are found by iterating 
on the following equation backwards starting from the last value of TT |ξˆ  
 ( )[ ]{ }ttTtttTt P |1|1'|| ˆˆˆˆ ++ ÷•⊗= ξξξξ           (11) 
where ( )÷  indicates elementwise division  
 
I have written code in MATLAB to estimate the regime switching regression using the 
optimisation toolbox which is available on request 
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 5.3 RESULTS  
 
5.3.1 RETURNS AND STANDARD DEVIATION 
Table 5.2 presents the mean and standard deviation for the hedge fund indices returns 
and the factor returns for the 1994-2008 period as well as sub-periods defined by the 
BER as recessions and expansions. 
0.66% 0.94% -1.76% 4.60% 4.56% 4.34%
Equity Market Neutral 0.75% 0.81% 0.27% 0.84% 0.83% 0.85%
Event Driven 0.82% 0.96% -0.49% 1.74% 1.62% 2.24%
% 1.68% 1.07% 4.02%
5% 3.07% 3.08% 2.86%
All Expansion Recession All Expansion Recession
MKT 0.66% 4.40% 4.01% 6.55%
SMB 0.08% 3.11% 3.14% 2.85%
USD -0.04% -0.12% 0.60% 2.22% 2.12% 2.94%
CMDTY 0.74% 1.13% -2.70% 6.36% 5.76% 9.83%
BOND 0.49% 0.51% 0.24% 1.09% 1.07% 1.23%
CREDIT -0.03% 0.05% -0.75% 0.77% 0.45% 1.91%
SLOPE 0.29% 0.30% 0.17% 2.66% 2.66% 2.75%
EMERGING 0.90% 1.34% -2.95% 6.09% 5.59% 8.70%
GLOBAL  STOCKS 0.45% 0.89% -3.46% 4.68% 4.05% 7.53%
GLOBAL  BONDS 0.51% 0.55% 0.17% 2.30% 2.29% 2.42%
DVIX 0.27% 0.10% 1.81% 4.19% 3.60% 7.66%
Mean Monthly Return Monthly Standard Deviation
N
 
Table 5.2 Hedge Fund and Factor Returns  
Panel A:  Hedge Fund Index Returns
All Expansion Recession All Expansion Recession
Convertible Arbitrage 0.48% 0.70% -1.44% 1.98% 1.36% 4.37%
Dedicated Short Bias
Emerging Markets
Mean Monthly Return Monthly Standard Deviation
0.04% 0.02% 0.23% 4.92% 4.87% 5.47%
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.34% 0.51% -1.14
Global Macro 1.03% 1.14% 0.0
Long Short Equity 0.83% 1.05% -1.15% 2.96% 2.89% 2.97%
Managed Futures 0.62% 0.64% 0.42% 3.45% 3.39% 4.01%
All Hedge Funds 0.76% 0.93% -0.73% 2.28% 2.21% 2.41%
Panel B:  Factor Returns
0.95% -2.00%
0.03% 0.57%
 
This table presents summary statistic for the Credit Suisse Tremont Hedge Fund indices and return factors from January 1994 to  
October 2008. Recession and expansion periods are based on NBER business cycle dates. Panel A presents the mean and standard 
deviation for the hedge fund indices while Panel B presents the mean and standard deviation for the factor returns. 
 
Panel A shows that the mean monthly return for all of the hedge fund strategy indices is
ould appear that for all strategies apart from dedicated short bias the monthly return is 
wer in those months categorised as recession than in those categorised as expansion. 
 
positive for the sample period and consequently so is the index of all funds. However, it 
w
lo
More worryingly is that for five of the strategy indices and for the overall hedge fund 
index the mean return during recessions has actually been negative. A similar pattern is 
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observed in the standard deviation, with eight out of the ten indices exhibiting a higher 
standard deviation in recessions than in expansions. Clearly this is not good news for 
investors because although the historical return has been positive, it implies that 
istorically hedge funds have provided lower returns with higher volatility during 
he procedure outlined in section 5.2.2 was carried out in order to identify the most 
Futures Funds
0006 0.0034* 0.0014
KT -0.9823** 0.3861** 0.1367**
MB -0.4301** 0.1221** 0.0870** 0.3227** 0.1466**
0.0570
62** 0.1590** 0.1470**
LOBAL_BONDS -0.1174* -0.3318* -0.2206* 0.1340* -0.4528** -0.5112** 0.3213**
VIX 0.1014** 0.1196* 0.1098* 0.1196 0.1581** 0.1503** 0.1334**
0.0268 0.0166 0.0326 0.0154
0.2378 0.6849 0.1071 0.5432
h
periods when the marginal utility of wealth is high i.e. hedge funds have not delivered 
when investors have needed it most. 
 
The results for the factor returns presented in Panel B exhibit a similar pattern; eight of 
the eleven factors have lower returns in recessions than in expansions with the 
exceptions being SMB, USD and DVIX. Only the SMB factor has a lower standard 
deviation in recessions than expansions with all ten of the other factors having a higher 
standard deviation.  
 
5.3.2 LINEAR FACTOR MODEL 
T
parsimonious factor model to explain the hedge fund returns and the results are 
presented in table 5.3.  
 
Table 5.3 Static Model  
Convertible 
Arbitrage
Dedicated 
Short Bias
Emerging 
Markets
Equity 
Market 
Neutral
Event 
Driven
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage
Global 
Macro
Long Short 
E
Managed All Hedge 
Alpha 0.0030 0.0092** -0.0009 0.0050** 0.0071** 0.0024** 0.0028 0.
quity
M
S
USD -0.3937** 0.1677** 0.1290** -0.3588* 0.1383* 0.3028**
CMDTY 0.0330* 0.0209** 0.0363** 0.0630* 0.0625** 0.1015** 0.0507**
BOND 0.6834** 0.5300** 0.3934** 0.6963** 1.8839** 0.7990** 0.8276**
CREDIT 1.8729** 1.4249** 0.6732** 1.2819** 0.4105**
SLOPE -0.3480** -0.1560** -0.2166** -0.3055* -0.1979 -0.1746
EMERGING 0.6336** 0.0746**
GLOBAL_STOCKS 0.0433 0.0664** 0.1221** 0.0454* 0.22
G
D
σε 0.0126 0.0263 0.0274 0.0074 0.0108 0.0112
Adjusted R
2
0.5912 0.7146 0.6446 0.2333 0.6115 0.5553
Log Likelihood 529.63 398.29 390.71 624.73 555.73 551.37 395.36 481.22 358.86 495.83  
This table presents the results of the factor selection process outlined in section 5.2.2 using expression (1) and the factor from table 
5.1. In each case the model with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was chosen. The figures in the body of the table are 
the resulting coefficients. Values significant at the 10% level are denoted with * and those significant at 5% by **. 
 
 
The first result of interest in table 5.3 is that the ability of a simple static factor model to 
dequately explain the returns of the Credit Suisse Tremont hedge fund indices varies a
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significantly across the nge from 10.71% for 
managed futures up to 71.46% for dedicated short bias with an r-squared of 54.32% for 
all hedge funds.  
 
The number of relevant factors also varies according to strategy, the most parsimonious 
model for managed futures only contains three factors while for both fixed income 
arbitrage and long short equity an eight factor model is selected. The broad hedge fund 
index that includes all strategies is best described by a model that contains ten of the 
eleven candidate factors. As I found in chapter two, the significant factors are in line 
quities such as long/short equity and dedicated short bias, while fixed income based 
d by NBER business cycle data in order to determine whether 
edge funds deliver alpha in either expansions or recessions. 
 strategies. The adjusted r-squared ra
with what one would expect. Equity based factors such as MKT and 
GLOBAL_STOCKS are identified as significant for those strategies that involve 
e
factors such as BOND, CREDIT and SLOPE are identified as significant for fixed 
income strategies such as convertible arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage. 
 
Alpha is found to be positive and significant for five out of the nine individual strategies 
but not for convertible arbitrage, emerging markets, global macro, long-short equity or 
for the broad hedge fund index of all strategies. This implies that investors could have 
obtained similar returns to the Credit Suisse hedge fund indices by simply holding a 
static combination of the factors identified as significant (which are all investable) and 
consequently hedge funds do not appear to have added much value. 
 
With these results in mind I now turn to the examination of conditional factor models 
with the states determine
h
 
 
5.3.3 ASYMMETRIC FACTOR MODEL 
Using the factors models identified above for each individual hedge fund index I run the 
regression described by expression (2) in order to determine the state dependent alphas, 
the results are presented in table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4 Asymmetric Alpha Model  
Convertible 
Arbitrage
Dedicated 
Short Bias
Emerging 
Markets
Equity 
Market 
Neutral
Event 
Driven
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage
Global 
Macro
Long Short 
Equity
Managed 
Futures
All Hedge 
Funds
Expansion 0.0036* 0.0105** -0.0007 0.0052** 0.0074** 0.0027** 0.0025 0.0014 0.0033 0.0016
Recession -0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0027 0.0036** 0.0050* 0.0000 0.0048 -0.0041 0.0037 -0.0005
-0.9879** 0.3883** 0.1371**
-0.4132** 0.1244** 0.0900** 0.3294** 0.1496**
-0.3625** 0.1685** 0.1291** -0.3595* 0.1332* 0.3015**
0.0315* 0.0201** 0.0354** 0.0641* 0.0592** 0.1018** 0.0498**
0.6863** 0.5266** 0.3866** 0.6981** 1.8989** 0.7701** 0.8327**
1.8117** 1.2750* 0.6508** 1.2479** 0.3821*
-0.3470** -0.1546** -0.2160** -0.3094* -0.1889 -0.1747
0.6309** 0.0750** 0.0574
0.0345 0.0639** 0.1188** 0.0405 0.2315** 0.1445** 0.1425*
-0.1137* -0.3088* -0.2217* 0.1357* -0.4514** -0.5140** 0.3215**
0.0923** 0.1193* 0.1048* 0.1224 0.1528** 0.1500** 0.1298**
0.0126 0.0261 0.0275 0.2319 0.0109 0.0112 0.2338 0.0166 0.0327 0.0154
0.5941 0.7191 0.6427 0.2319 0.6109 0.5549 0.2338 0.6860 0.1020 0.5412
530.77 400.23 390.75 625.09 556.09 551.82 395.42 482.05 358.86 495.97
DVIX
CMDTY
BOND
CREDIT
SLOPE
σε
Adjusted R
2
Log Likelihood
Alpha
EMERGING
GLOBAL_STOCKS
GLOBAL_BONDS
MKT
SMB
USD
 
This table presents the results of the asymmetric alpha model described by expression (2). The two states are defined as expansion 
and recession using the business cycle dates taken from the NBER website. The figures in the body of the table are the resulting 
coefficients. Values significant at the 10% level are denoted with * and those significant at 5% by **. 
 
The improvement of this model over the static model in terms fit, as measured by either 
the adjusted r-squared or the log likelihood, is extremely marginal. However the 
 positive and 
ignificant for five out of the nine individual strategies but not for, emerging markets, 
) in order to determine the state dependent alphas 
nd betas, the results are presented in table 5.5. 
difference between the alphas in the two states of the economy show some interesting, if 
slightly concerning patterns. In the expansion state, alpha is found to be
s
global macro, long-short equity, managed futures or for the broad hedge fund index of 
all strategies. In the recession state, alpha is only found to be positive and significant for 
two out of the nine individual strategies, namely equity market neutral and event driven 
and the alpha for the broad hedge fund index of all strategies is negative though not 
significantly different from zero. This result implies that hedge funds certainly do not 
deliver alpha when investors require it most, namely in recessions when the marginal 
utility of wealth is high. 
 
In this model because the betas are assumed to be constant across the two states of the 
economy any successful market timing of the factors will be reflected in the alpha 
estimates, for this reason I now examine an asymmetric model where both the alpha and 
beta are state dependent. Once again using the same factors as above, I run the 
regression described by expression (3
a
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Table 5.5 Asymmetric Alpha and Beta Model  
Convertible 
Arbitrage
Dedicated 
Short Bias
Emerging 
Markets
Equity 
Market 
Neutral
Event 
Driven
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage
Global 
Macro
Long Short 
Equity
Managed 
Futures
All Hedge 
Funds
Expansion 0.0044** 0.0107** -0.0011 0.0052** 0.0071** 0.0032** 0.0029 0.0012 0.0033 0.0017
Recession -0.0062* -0.0048 -0.0089** 0.0045** 0.0019 -0.0048 -0.0032 -0.0021 0.0008 -0.0024
Expansion -0.9758** 0.4686** 0.1788**
Recession -0.7321** -0.4542** -0.1866**
Expansion -0.4200** 0.1272** 0.0951** 0.3669** 0.1695**
Recession -0.2047 0.1965 0.0417 0.0450 0.0833
Expansion -0.2597 0.2375** 0.1518** -0.0948 0.1327* 0.3435**
Recession 0.3594 0.0199 -0.0787 -0.7964** 0.3321** 0.0659
Expansion 0.0193 0.0134 0.0249** 0.0547 0.0561** 0.1122** 0.0443**
Recession 0.0901* 0.0354** 0.0583 0.1867** 0.0951* 0.170
Expansion 0.5314* 0.5268** 0.3451** 0.4031** 1.7798** 0.6419**
Recession 1.8771** 0.3433 0.2296** 2.1586** 1.6594** 0.6589*
Alpha
SMB
USD
CMDTY
MKT
BOND
5** 0.0900**
0.7164**
0.6506*
Expansion 1.3626** 0.0649 0.9678** 0.9125** 0.4429
Recession 1.4495** 1.3564** 0.8616** 0.5325 0.5465**
0.1497* 0.1139* 0.1537 0.1575** 0.0490 0.1411**
-0.2102** -0.0298 -0.1272 -0.1959** 0.4096** -0.0410
0.0123 0.0251 0.0270 0.0074 0.0105 0.0102 0.0264 0.0150 0.0323 0.0151
14 0.7428 0.1219 0.5638
89 504.17 362.42 506.01
σε
2
CREDIT
Expansion -0.2722** -0.1501** -0.1565** -0.2253 -0.1150 -0.1244
Recession -0.4846** -0.1154** -0.3046 -0.4727** -0.3309** -0.2561**
Expansion 0.6771** 0.0689* 0.0485
Recession 0.2383** 0.1547** 0.1236**
Expansion 0.0526 0.0630** 0.1465** 0.0500* 0.3036** 0.1268** 0.1581*
Recession -0.0394 0.0424* -0.1274 -0.0411 -0.2187* 0.4524** -0.0053
Expansion -0.1301* -0.2475 -0.2632** 0.1916** -0.2080 -0.6236** 0.3222**
Recession -0.2199* 0.8996** 0.1494 0.0955** -1.0660** 0.1324 0.3828**
Expansion 0.0981**
Recession 0.0168
DVIX
SLOPE
EMERGING
GLOBAL_STOCKS
GLOBAL_BONDS
0.6142 0.7396 0.6558 0.2303 0.6327 0.6296 0.26
539.07 409.63 396.72 628.09 563.86 572.52 401.
Adjusted R
Log Likelihood  
e log likelihood over the previous models 
ith r-squared ranging from 12.19% for managed futures up to 73.96% for dedicated 
em
sitive in 
xpansions and negative in recessions though not significantly different from zero in 
documented in the literature stem from expansion periods when funds have statistically 
This table presents the results of the asymmetric alpha and beta model described by expression (3). The two states are defined as 
expansion and recession using the business cycle dates taken from the NBER website. The figures in the body of the table are the 
resulting coefficients. Values significant at the 10% level are denoted with * and those significant at 5% by **. 
 
Introducing asymmetry in both alpha and beta leads to a further improvement of fit, as 
measured by either the adjusted r-squared or th
w
short bias. The difference between the alphas in the two states of the economy becomes 
further polarised, with five out of the nine individual strategies exhibiting positive and 
significant alpha in expansions but only one strategy, equity market neutral exhibiting 
positive and significant alpha in recessions. In fact two of the strategies, convertible 
arbitrage and erging markets actually show negative and significant alpha in the 
recession state. The alpha for the broad hedge fund index of all strategies is po
e
either state. These results appear to confirm what I found above that hedge funds 
certainly do not deliver alpha when investors require it most, namely in recessions when 
the marginal utility of wealth is high. 
 
These results contrast sharply the findings of Kosowski (2001) for mutual funds. In that 
paper the author found that the negative alphas of mutual funds that have been 
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significant negative alpha and not recession periods when alpha is positive. However 
my results imply that the positive alphas of hedge fund strategies that have been 
ocumented in the literature by authors such as Agarwal and Naik (2000b) and Ibbotson 
and Chen (2005) ste tistically significant 
positive alpha and not recession periods when alpha is negative. This in turn implies 
that hedge funds deliver when investors require it least i.e. in expansions when the 
marginal utility of wealth is lower rather than in recessions when it is higher.  
 
Having introduced time variation and non-linearity in the exposures via the factor 
weights being state dependent with those states being defined as either recession or 
expansion, I now examine a two state Markov regime switching model where the states 
are endogenously determined. 
 
5.3.4 MARKOV REGIME SWITCHING MODEL 
Using the factors models identified above for each individual hedge fund index I run the 
MATLAB code described in section 5.2.4 in order to identify a two regime Markov 
regime switching model which best describes the state dependent return generating 
process, the results are presented in table 5.6.  
he Markov regime switching model leads to a better fitting model than the previous 
d
m from expansion periods when funds have sta
 
T
asymmetric models with the log likelihood being higher for all of the individual strategy 
indices and for the broad index of all hedge funds. Two distinct regimes are identified 
for all strategies and in all cases except dedicated short bias the residual variance, as 
measured by εσ , is lower in regime one than in regime two. Regime one is more 
persistent than regime two for all strategies with higher values of P11 than P22.   
 
Seven out of the nine individual strategies exhibit positive and significant alpha in 
regime one (the more persistent, lower volatility regime) but only two strategies, equity 
market neutral and long-short equity exhibit positive and significant alpha in regime 2, 
in fact two of the strategies, dedicated short bias and fixed income arbitrage actually 
show negative and significant alpha in regime 2. Only one strategy, namely equity 
market neutral has positive and significant alpha in both regimes. The alpha for the 
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broad hedge fund index o nt in regime one but not 
significantly different from zero in regime two.  
 
Table 5.6 Markov Regime Switching Model 
f all strategies is positive and significa
Convertible 
Arbitrage
Dedicated 
Short Bias
Emerging 
Markets
Equity 
Market 
Neutral
Event 
Driven
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage
Global 
Macro
Long Short 
Equity
Managed 
Futures
All Hedge 
Funds
Regime 1 0.0086** 0.0148** 0.0034** 0.0041** 0.0078** 0.0062** 0.0038* -0.0011 0.0031 0.0037**
Regime 2 -0.0020 -0.0322** -0.0018 0.0073** -0.0227 -0.0124** 0.0038 0.0121** 0.0002 0.0064
Regime 1 -0.9247** 0.2205** -0.0327
Regime 2 -0.8643** 0.7048** 0.1394
Regime 1 -0.5691** 0.0360 0.0697** 0.1872** 0.0791**
Regime 2 -0.1113 0.1719* -2.0806 0.5516** 0.2039**
Regime 1 -0.1653 -0.1447** 0.0819** -0.0204 0.0824 -0.0881*
Regime 2 0.6825** 0.4024** 3.2719 -0.8565** 0.1392 0.6582**
Regime 1 0.0119 0.0138* 0.0203** 0.0765** 0.0684** 0.1384** 0.0119
Regime 2 0.0592* 0.0136 0.0865** 0.0639 0.0316 0.0785 0.0256
Regime 1 0.4393** 0.2643* 0.3308** 0.2763** 1.5512** 0.9435** 0.1389
Regime 2 0.1915 0.3888 0.1078 1.6389** 1.3546 -0.2923 0.0338
Regime 1 1.0340** -0.7780* 0.7421** 0.5628** 0.6301**
Regime 2 1.8507** 1.5483** 1.5986 0.6642** 2.4221**
Regime 1 -0.2561** -0.1246** -0.1324** -0.4717** -0.2703** -0.0865
Regime 2 -0.0768 -0.0470 -0.3692* 0.1258 0.0545 0.1030
Regime 1 0.3872** 0.0465** 0.0564
Regime 2 0.7788** 1.3991 0.1035
Regime 1 0.0059 0.0250* 0.1085** 0.0308** 0.0407 0.1804** 0.1400**
Regime 2 0.1151 0.0938** -1.6409 0.2465** 0.4506** 0.2175** 0.1863*
Regime 1 -0.0228 -0.1164 0.0499 -0.0723 -0.0525 0.0207 0.8430**
Regime 2 -0.1705 0.8375** -0.4422** 0.3096** -1.2271** -0.9944** -0.3467*
Regime 1 0.0585** -0.0122 0.0741** -0.0015 0.1034** 0.3458** 0.0646*
Regime 2 0.1255* 0.1647* 0.2865** 0.2004* 0.2856** -0.1331 0.1708**
Regime 1 0.0056** 0.0194** 0.0112** 0.0042** 0.0082** 0.0050** 0.0120** 0.0116** 0.0243** 0.0075**
Regime 2 0.0159** 0.0133** 0.0324** 0.0078** 0.0000 0.0084** 0.0332** 0.0127** 0.0288** 0.0156**
P11 0.9288 0.8909 0.9877 0.9505 0.9826 0.9050 1.0000 0.9820 0.8135 0.9797
P22 0.8794 0.3946 0.9872 0.9426 0.3676 0.5663 0.9874 0.9284 0.8142 0.9503
570.92 419.01 444.14 646.00 616.92 628.04 448.31 519.96 367.87 551.77
MKT
Alpha
SMB
USD
CMDTY
BOND
CREDIT
SLOPE
σε
Transititon 
Probabilities
Log Likelihood
EMERGING
GLOBAL_STOCKS
GLOBAL_BONDS
DVIX
 
This table presents the results of the two state Markov regime switching model outlined in section 5.2.4 The two states are 
determined by maximum likelihood using MATLAB. The figures in the body of the table are the resulting coefficients. Values 
significant at the 10% level are denoted with * and those significant at 5% by **. 
 
 
All of the above indicates that hedge fund performance is generally superior in regime 
one i.e. lower volatility and positive alpha and that this regime is more persistent  P11 > 
P22 . However the question remains as to when the individual regimes occur. In the 
Markov regime switching model, because the regimes are endogenously determined by 
the model rather than being arbitrarily imposed (as they were in my previous 
asymmetric models), the transition between the two regimes will most likely occur at 
different times for the different strategies. Using the smoothed probabilities calculated 
from expression (11) I can identify ex-post the probability of being in regime one or two 
at any point in time. These smoothed probabilities are presented graphically in figure 
5.1.  
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Figure 5.1 Smoothed Probabilities 
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These figures depict the smoothed probabilities of being in regime 1 and regime 2 for the multi-factor Markov regime switching 
model of monthly returns of the Credit Suisse Tremont Indices. . NBER recession periods are represented by the shaded areas. 
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 Examining figure 5.1 it is clear that my previous assertion about the possibility of 
edge funds have been in the positive alpha and low volatility regime when the 
 1994 
 October 2008. Firstly by using an asymmetric factor model where the factor 
symmetric factor model where the states are explicitly classified as expansion 
and recession based on the NBER definitio ind that the positive alphas of hedge 
fund strategies that have been previously documented in the literature by authors such 
as Agarwal and Naik (2000b) and Ibbotson and Chen (2005) appear to stem from 
expansion periods when funds have statistically significant positive alpha and not 
cession periods when alpha is not statistically different from zero. The implication of 
is result is that hedge funds do not deliver when investors need it most, namely in 
recessions when the marginal utility of wealth is high. 
 
 
variation in timing of the transition between regimes for the individual strategies was 
correct. Strategies such as convertible arbitrage, dedicated short bias and managed 
futures display frequent changes in regime while other strategies such as emerging 
markets and global macro appear much more stable.  
 
The changes in regime do not appear to coincide with NBER recession periods which 
are represented by the shaded areas. However, the index of all hedge funds has been in 
regime one for both of the recession periods in my sample period. This implies that 
h
marginal utility of wealth is high. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated two alternative approaches that introduce time 
variation and non-linearity to factor models in order to examine the conditional 
performance of Credit Suisse Tremont hedge fund indices for the period January
to
exposures vary according to the state of economy and secondly by applying a two state 
Markov regime switching regression model. My results show that both of these 
approaches lead to models that better fit the returns of the hedge fund indices, as 
measured by the log likelihood, compared to a non-conditional linear factor model. 
 
Using an a
ns, I f
re
th
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 Using a two state Markov switching regression model, where the states are determined 
sitive 
atility. The 
 classification 
o ever for 
the broad index all hedge funds regime one coincides with both of the recession periods 
iver when 
f wealth is high. 
A it must be 
r ed that in the first asymmetric factor model I am imposing two states in what 
nce for 
i y there is 
no theoretical justification as to why hedge fund performance should vary across the 
ines the 
s
d when 
ith positive alpha during the two 
he zero 
a omic or market conditions drive the 
or further 
r
 
 
as those which best fit the data, I identify two distinct regimes. Regime one has po
alpha and lower volatility while regime two has no alpha and higher vol
timing of the transition between regimes does not coincide with the NBER
f recessions and expansions and varies significantly across the strategies, how
in my sample. The implication of this result is that hedge funds do del
investors need it most, namely in recessions when the marginal utility o
 
t first glance these two results might appear to be contradictory, however 
emember
could be considered an arbitrary way. Although it is of economic significa
nvestors to consider the performance conditional upon the state of the econom
two states. In contrast, the two state Markov regime switching model determ
tates by what best fits the data and hence should be considered as more reliable.  
 
Considering the above I can conclude that hedge funds have indeed delivere
investors need it most by being in the regime w
recessions in my sample period. There have however been long periods in t
lpha regime which raises the question what econ
transition between the two regimes? This provides an interesting topic f
esearch.  
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